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I.

The research project: Making Latin American courts’ racial homogeneity visible

1. Introduction and contribution of the project

We live in an increasingly diverse world. At the turn of the 21st century, over 5,000 ethnic groups
made a presence in over 180 independent states.1 Some countries have tried to respond to the challenge of
diverse populations by enacting laws and public policies to accommodate minorities and unprivileged
majorities into political institutions.2 However, socio-political conflict and exclusion continue to be
significant threats to subordinated groups and democracies around the world.3
Like most countries in Latin America, Colombia is a highly diverse country in ethno-racial terms.
According to Daniel Bonilla, by 2006, there were approximately 1 million indigenous persons (who
belonged to 82 different peoples and spoke approximately 64 different languages) and 4.5 million Afrodescendants in the country. Unlike the indigenous peoples, Afro Colombians are—for the most part—
assimilated into the majoritarian culture of the country, with the notorious exceptions of the Palenquero
people of San Basilio, some black communities living on the Pacific basin of the country, and the Raizal
people of the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, who still preserve their cultural
distinctiveness.4
Perhaps one of the most apparent manifestations of Afro-descendants’ exclusion in Latin America
is their limited presence in power positions in different areas, including public posts.5 Afro-descendants are

1

DANIEL BONILLA MALDONADO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN MULTICULTURAL 19 (2006).
MALA HTUN, INCLUSION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICA: GENDER QUOTAS AND ETHNIC
RESERVATIONS 2 (2016). (Noting that, by 2016, approximately 78 countries had created gender or ethnic quotas and
reservations).
3
Donna Lee Van Cott, Building inclusive democracies: Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in Latin America,
12 DEMOCRATIZATION 820–837, 821–822 (2005).
4
BONILLA MALDONADO, supra note 1 at 26–27.
5
LA SITUACIÓN DE LAS PERSONAS AFRODESCENDIENTES EN LAS AMÉRICAS, 90 22–23 (2011),
http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2012/8311.pdf (last visited Sep 23, 2018).
2
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significantly excluded from political positions and high-ranking governmental offices.6 The World Bank
has warned that Afro-descendants absence from most positions of power in the region seems to be related
to the significant obstacles and barriers they face at exercising their human rights.7 As an example, Mala
Htun exposes the magnitude of the problem of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the region's
legislatures by stating:

The degree of Afro descendant underrepresentation is pronounced in Brazil (51 percent of society,
compared to some 20 percent of the lower house of Congress), Colombia (11 percent of society; 5%
of the lower house), and Costa Rica (8 percent of population, no deputy). In Ecuador and Perú, by
contrast, Afrodescendants were close to proportionally represented in 2014, and in Perú all three
Afro descendant legislators were women.”8

The difficulties in attaining proportional representation in public institutions are even more
significant for black women, who face more limited access to public offices than other women and black
men.9 By 2016, black women occupied only 0.03% of parliamentary seats in Latin America; far less than
their percentage in the region’s general population.10
The virtual absence of Afro-descendants in public institutions also means that they are excluded
from the possibility of having their voices heard in the decision-making process on issues of public concern.
In particular, they are excluded from participating as decision-makers in the design, public deliberation,
and implementation of laws, public policies, and other official instruments that could impact their
communities. As Álvaro Bello and Martha Rangel suggest, limited access to political participation and

6

Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel, Equity and exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean: the case of Indigenous
and Afro-descendant peoples, CEPAL REV. 39–53, 47–48 (2002). (noting that one of the most striking illustrations of
the situation of marginalization that Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples face in Latin America is their
extremely-limited political representation and participation).
7
3/27/20 4:41:00 PM
8
HTUN, supra note 2 at 30–31.
9
LA SITUACIÓN DE LAS PERSONAS AFRODESCENDIENTES EN LAS AMÉRICAS, supra note 5 at 25–26.
10
Id. at 26.
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representation also means that Afro-descendants are trapped in a cycle of constant disadvantage, as political
leverage is fundamental for improving a disadvantaged group’s position in society.11
Although there is some data about Afro-descendants' exclusion from public institutions in the
region, we know little about the level of representation of this group on courts. This limited knowledge is
closely related to the lack of sufficient research on the issue of Latin American courts in general and judicial
politics in particular. As Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew Taylor explain, it is only until recently that Latin
American scholars decided to prioritize the study of courts.12 Most political science researchers have
focused their attention on more traditional political institutions, such as legislative bodies and the executive
branch. The existing literature on Latin American courts centers around issues such as the judicial reform
efforts of the 1980s and 1990s, transitional justice mechanisms in the post-authoritarian regimes in the
region, courts’ contributions to social justice, and specific issues related to judicial politics.13
Kapiszewski & Taylor sustain that there are three primary areas of interest for researchers in this
last field: a) The relationship between courts and elected branches of government; b) the impacts that courts
have on public policy processes and outcomes; and c) descriptive and taxonomic analysis of courts and
legal institutions.14 Regarding the study of judges and magistrates in the region, they notice that: “For the
most part, we know little about the backgrounds, ideologies, or preferences of the region’s judges and
justices, and have barely begun to explore the politization of the region’s judiciaries or the implications of
that dynamic for those who populate Latin American courts.”15
In Colombia, the Justice Studies Center of the Americas—CEJA—has pointed out that there is no
systematic information regarding the number of Afro-descendants working for the judiciary, and that it is
expectable that many Colombians would deem the gathering such figures as a potential act of racial

11

Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel, Equity and exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean: the case of Indigenous
and Afro-descendant peoples, CEPAL REV. 39–53 (2002).
12
Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6
PERSPECT. POLIT. 741–767, 741 (2008).
13
Id. at 741–742.
14
Id. at 753.
15
Id. at 754.
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discrimination.16 However, the CEJA has also observed that public officials’ accounts largely converge in
that black Colombians are absent from relevant public positions in the judiciary and other branches of
government.17
Brazil is, perhaps, the main exception to the lack of information regarding the ethno-racial
composition of judicial institutions in Latin America. Anani Dzidzienyo asserts that, by 2003, time at which
Joaquim Barbosa (a black prosecutor and law professor who had been vocal at denouncing racial injustice
in Brazil) was appointed to the Supreme Federal Tribunal of his country, there were only 12 black judges
among the approximately 800 federal judges and six black prosecutors among 600 federal prosecutors in
Brazil.18
Given the lack of primary data in Latin America and other regions of the world, existing literature
on minority representation on judicial bodies has been predominantly focused on the United States of
America and, to a less extent, Europe and Israel.19 This void in the literature is the one that this dissertation
begins to close. By using Colombia as a case study (for reasons that I will detail in section 3 of this chapter),

16

FELIPE GONZÁLEZ MORALES & JORGE CONTESSE SINGH, The Judicial System and Racism Against People of African
Descent: The Cases of Brazil, Colombia, The Dominican Republic and Peru 74 35–36 (2004),
http://biblioteca.cejamericas.org/bitstream/handle/2015/3568/raz-sistema-judicial-racismoing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited Oct 2, 2018).
17
Id. at 35–36. (“On the other side of the system, no record exists of the number of people of African descent working
within the justice administration system. Some observers believe that this is due to the belief that such cataloging
would itself constitute or at least contribute to racial discrimination. It is worth pointing out that during the preparatory
visit for this report, the Colombian Public Defense office, aware of the need to provide such statistical information,
drafted letter to be sent to all judicial, legislative and administrative state agencies requesting information on the
number of Afro-Colombians working in each institution. All those interviewed agreed that there are no black people
in posts of relative importance, either in the justice administration system or within any other state body.")
18
Anani Dzidzienyo, The Changing World of Brazilian Race Relations?, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS:
LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 137–156, 141–142 (Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005).
19
Barbara L. Graham, Toward An Understanding Of Judicial Diversity In American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE LAW
153–181 (2004); Jonathan K. Stubbs, Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race, 26
BERKELEY RAZA LAW J. 92–128 (2016); Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan
and Carter Administration, 71 JUDICATURE 136–142 (1987); Elliot E. Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench:
Gender, Race and Judicial Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 371–388 (1984); Sheldon Goldman, Should There
Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488–494 (1979); Carl Tobias, Diversity and the Federal
Bench, 87 WASH. UNIV. LAW REV. 1197–1212 (2010); Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean
for Justice, 6 MICH J GEND. L 113–152 (1999); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on
State and Federal Appellate Benches, 85 JUDICATURE 84–92 (2001); Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione,
Judicial Diversity On State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL LAW REV. 1203–1251 (2009); Greg Goelzhauser,
Diversifying State Supreme Courts, 45 LAW SOC. REV. 761–781 (2011).
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my dissertation intends to expose the ethno-racial homogeneity of Latin American courts as a problem
affecting Afro-descendants and judicial systems in the region, and to uncover its connection to formal and
informal rules governing the composition and functioning of Latin American courts.
This dissertation is a study of Afro descendant representation on Colombia's courts. Following the
work of Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea, by Afro-descendants, I mean “the descendants of former
African enslaved persons, across generations and processes of mestizaje, and regardless of the level of
individual or collective identity that these populations may have.”20 Similarly, following Hannah Pitkin's
conceptual work, by representation, I mean descriptive representation. From this perspective, “representing
is not acting with authority, or acting before being held to account, or any kind of acting at all. Rather, it
depends on the representative’s characteristics on what he is or is like, of being something rather than doing
something.”21 In this sense, unless otherwise indicated, when I use the word representation, I refer to the
inclusion or physical presence of members of a group within an institution.
The study I offer differs from previous literature in its approach to the problem of minority
underrepresentation in judicial bodies. I analyze this issue based on empirical evidence collected mostly
through the use of qualitative instruments. This analysis diverges from studies that have framed the issue
of minority presence in public institutions purely from a normative perspective, or that have focused on
regions of the Global North.
My particular interest in the courts derives from the fact that, in many Latin American countries,
judicial bodies have proven to be final decision-makers on issues concerning the rights of minorities and
other excluded groups.22 Courts' power to interpret the law with authority engenders a prerogative to
establish the meaning and defining the scopes of rights, including minority rights. Moreover, in modern
democracies, courts may play a role in curbing governmental arbitrariness and might also function as a

20

Oliver Barbary & Fernando Urrea Giraldo, Introducción, in GENTE NEGRA EN COLOMBIA: DINÁMICAS
CALI Y EL PACÍFICO 21–68, 52 (Olivier Barbary & Fernando Urrea Giraldo eds., 2004),
http://www.humanas.unal.edu.co/colantropos/files/3714/8564/0886/Gente_Negra.pdf (last visited Dec 19, 2018).
21
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 61 (1967).
22
Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa, Introduction, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 1–26 (Gretchen Helmke &
Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011).
SOCIOPOLÍTICAS EN
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counterweight to the majority rule in legislative bodies.23 Therefore, adequate functioning of courts is
particularly crucial for minorities, who endure significant restrictions in their possibility to access power in
government or to obtain sufficient assurances in legislative bodies.24
A particular challenge for my research project stems from the taboo around race in Latin America.
In this region, discussions about race discrimination are commonly avoided, and race is not a word usually
heard in casual conversations among people.25 This does not mean that racial discrimination is not present
in Latin American societies. To the contrary, racial discrimination and inequality, as previous studies have
shown, are widespread across Latin America.26 Nevertheless, until recently, official and social accounts of
Latin American societies described them as virtually free of racial discrimination.27 The main reason for
this refusal to acknowledge racial tensions is the myth of mestizaje: The idea that the process of
miscegenation that initiated during the Iberic colonization erased distinctions among European colonizers,
indigenous peoples and Africans brought to the Americas in condition of slavery, leading to the creation of
a mestizo identity that is distinct from—but inclusive of—all previous ethno-racial identities.28 Since many
people believe that the populations of Latin American countries are the result of the mestizaje, some say
that the region cannot have a severe problem of race discrimination as it is impossible to distinguish

23

Charles Geyh, The role of courts in preserving customary independence, in WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS
COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 223–251 (2006), https://eds-a-ebscohostcom.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzMxMDExNF9fQU41?sid=ba3bbb92-f2cd4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=4&format=EB&rid=7 (last visited Mar 10, 2019).
24
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA
(1993),
https://eds-a-ebscohostcom.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzQ4MTg0X19BTg2?sid=ba3bbb92-f2cd4e3f-b475-92daea56b319@sessionmgr4007&vid=8&format=EB&rid=7 (last visited Mar 10, 2020).
25
Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson & Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, Introduction: Racial Nations, in RACE
AND NATION IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA 1–31 (Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, & Karin Alejandra
Rosemblatt eds., 2003).
26
AFRODESCENDIENTES EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE: DEL RECONOCIMIENTO ESTADÍSTICO A LA REALIZACIÓN DE
DERECHOS,
(Jhon
Antón
et
al.
eds.,
2009),
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/7227/1/S0900315_es.pdf (last visited Oct 8, 2018).
27
PETER WADE, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN LATIN AMERICA 179 (second ed. 2010),
http://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=625258 (last visited Jul 16, 2018). (Noting how, for example, until at least
the 1950s, Brazil was internationally seen as a racially harmonious country).
28
Appelbaum, Macpherson, and Rosemblatt, supra note 25.
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segments of the population based on ethno-racial identity.29 The narratives of mestizaje make it extremely
difficult to talk about minority underrepresentation, as this issue tends to go unnoticed or other categories
of analysis, such as class, are used for explaining such phenomena.

2. Specific research objectives

In order to accomplish the primary research goal, the dissertation has three specific objectives:
First, it aims to expose Afro-descendant underrepresentation in Colombia's judicial institutions. Second, it
seeks to identify some of the reasons why Afro-descendants are underrepresented in this country's judicial
power and that facilitate the continuation of racial hierarchies in judicial institutions. Third, it discusses the
foundations of Afro-descendant (and other groups) representation on courts.

3. Selection of the case study

I selected Colombia as a case study for several reasons. First, in this country, the judicial system
has played a significant role in promoting the rights of Afro-descendant communities, by contrast to other
state institutions such as the legislature or the presidency that have had more starring roles in other Latin
American countries.30 Second, Colombia has a significant Afro-descendant population, accounting for
almost 11% of the national population according to the 2005 national census.31 Third, I am a Colombian
national who was raised in Colombia. Given my previous work on issues of race discrimination in this
country, this is a setting in which I had better access to sources and the collection of data was more feasible

29

ELISA LARKIN NASCIMENTO, THE SORCERY OF COLOR: IDENTITY, RACE, AND GENDER IN BRAZIL. (2008),
http://www.myilibrary.com?id=129906 (last visited Dec 6, 2018).
30
CÉSAR A. RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO ET AL., RAZA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN COLOMBIA: INFORME SOBRE
DISCRIMINACIÓN RACIAL Y DERECHOS DE LA POBLACIÓN AFROCOLOMBIANA (1 ed. 2009).
31
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Censo general 2005, DANE: INFORMACIÓN PARA
TODOS (2020), https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-general2005-1 (last visited Mar 16, 2020).
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in comparison to the other countries of the region.32 Fourth, in Colombia, as in most Latin American
countries, the idea of mestizaje coexists with political and legal declarations rooted in modern
multiculturalism.33 The paradoxical relationships between the colorblindness of racial democracy and the
legal protection of different ethnic and racial groups make Colombia a case study that, in many ways, is
archetypical to Latin America, where the discussions on diversity, inclusion, and minority representation
are complex. Fifth, despite their numerous dissimilarities (e.g., the nature of judicial review or the existence
of a specific court or a general court to settle constitutional law disputes),34 many countries in the Latin
American region share with Colombia relevant aspects of their constitutional and judicial system
architecture, such as “a common legal heritage, political culture, civil legal system, and presidential
regime,”35 as well as the existence of the legal action of amparo (in Colombia: acción de tutela) for the
immediate protection of fundamental or constitutional rights.36 Finally, as most countries in the region,
Colombia has a history of discrimination against minorities, primarily indigenous peoples and persons of
African descendant.

4. Study setting and context

As part of the study setting and context I will briefly discuss the history of race relations in Latin
America, providing the background necessary to understand the study design and to evaluate its findings;
succinctly characterize the race stratification and discrimination practices in Latin America; address the
limitations on pre-existing data and the statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants in the region; reference

32

WADE, supra note 27.
TIANNA S. PASCHEL, BECOMING BLACK POLITICAL SUBJECTS: MOVEMENTS AND ETHNO-RACIAL RIGHTS IN
COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL (2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691169385.001.0001 (last visited Dec 3,
2018); TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ, RACIAL SUBORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE,
CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESPONSE (2012).
34
Teresa M. Miguel-Stearns, Judicial Power in Latin America: a Short Survey, 15 LEG. INF. MANAG. 100–107 (2015).
35
Helmke and Rios-Figueroa, supra note 22 at 293.
36
Miguel-Stearns, supra note 34.
33
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the international, constitutional, and legal protections for Afro-descendants in Latin America, with
particular emphasis in Colombia; and refer to the multiplicity of stakeholders in this discussion.

4.1. An introduction to race relations in Latin America, with specific emphasis in
Colombia

In order to grasp modern race relations in Latin America, it is indispensable to go back in history
to explore how the European colonization enterprise shaped the continent and stratified its social systems.
In this section, I briefly reconstruct the main aspects of the history of race relations in Latin America,
making particular references to the situation of Colombia.
According to Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea,37 as in most of Latin America, the presence of
Afro-descendants in Colombia can be traced back to the 16th century, when groups of Africans were brought
to the Americas in the condition of slavery.38 During the colonial period, Afro-descendant's role in the
region was mostly restricted to slavery. Enslaved laborers worked in activities such as mining, farming and
housework.39 Although colonial society was highly stratified based on skin color, since the 17th century,
miscegenation among African, European, and indigenous persons became common.40 The extent of
miscegenation varied depending on the region, as it was less prominent in parts of the Pacific basin and
certain portions of the Caribbean Coast, such as Cartagena.41
Some authors argue that the differences in the magnitude of racial mixing in the Iberic and British
colonies (racial mixing was more common in the Iberic than in the Anglo colonies) could have been the
result of dissimilarities in the colonizers’ settlement patterns.42 The Anglo colonization practices seemed
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to have been family-oriented, as whole households moved from Europe to the British colonies, whereas in
the Iberic colonies, the colonizers where mostly poor European men, who came to the Americas seeking
wealth in extractive economies.43 The disparity in the numbers of white men versus white women in the
Iberic colonies could have encouraged interracial relations between white men and African and indigenous
women, leading to more significant racial mixing than in the North American context.44
Demography, as Robert Cottrol points out, had a decisive role in the fluidity of racial categories
and classifications in Latin America (racial mobility). Less numerous European populations meant that it
was impossible for the Iberic colonies to properly fulfill their role unless persons of indigenous and African
descent were allowed to move upwards in the social pyramid. Such need ultimately enabled some level of
prosperity for significant groups of the new Afro-American populations, especially for those with mixed
racial backgrounds.45
During the colonial period, the Spanish authorities, worried by the extent of miscegenation in their
newly acquired colonies, developed formal racial stratification systems known as "Sistemas de castas"
(caste systems).46 These systems relied on the creation of human taxonomies based on ancestry and the
establishment of a meticulous structure of racial classifications used for purposes such as taxation and the
allocation of social benefits and burdens.47 Edward Telles mentions that it was not uncommon that, given
the extent of miscegenation in the Iberic colonies, the track of ancestry lines was lost over time, in which
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case authorities would assign people their stations in the cast system based on physical appearance, rather
than lineage.48
The caste system provided whiteness a tangible value. White racial purity was relevant for different
purposes, including marriage.49 Advantageous unions often allowed the exchange of whiteness and wealth
in order to secure access to better social or economic positions for the parties.50 Although the use of the
expression casta fell in disuse and was replaced by the term race, the casta laws remained in place at least
until the beginning of the 19th century in some parts of the continent, and would not disappear entirely until
the independency period, time at which most persons were declared free and formally equal before the
law.51
Robert Cottrol asserts the Spanish law of slavery was—perhaps—the one that created the more
comfortable conditions for an enslaved person to receive manumission (i.e., to be freed), as slaves had the
legal right to challenge their owners in court to require the enforcement of freedom agreements.52 Likewise,
Cottrol asserts that “colonial Colombia and Venezuela provided legal protection for manumission and
accepted a large free Afro-American population. It also provided a cultural acceptance of, and legal
protection for, a certain level of racial mobility.”53 Racial mobility manifested in situations such as the
possibility for free people of color to buy patents of whiteness (“cédulas de gracias al sacar”), which
granted them privileges associated with having pure white blood, and in the complex and detailed taxonomy
of racial types present in the Spanish colonies.54 It is also important to remark that all colonial subjects were
not considered the same by colonial authorities. Peter Wade notes that:
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Indigenous people and Africans thus had different locations in the colonial order, both socially and
conceptually. Indigenous people were, officially, to be protected as well as exploited; Africans were
slaves and, although they had rights enshrined in legislation, this was piecemeal and uneven –
although the Spanish did produce a code in 1789 – and the main concern was with control, rather
than protection. This difference continued through the colonial period. Ideally, the Spanish would
have liked to maintain three separate categories: Spanish, indigenous people and Africans; rulers,
tributaries and slaves.55

The categories of “Indio” (Native) and “Negro” (Black) had particular meanings and occupied
different places in Latin American colonies.56 “Indio” was an administrative, fiscal and census category.
It was clearly embedded into the colonial institutions’ affairs.57 The situation of “Negro” was different.
Even though slaves were a clear census category, many black persons were not slaves. Therefore, the
categories of black and slave were not equivalent. Non-slave blacks fell into intermediate administrative
categories.58 In the case of Nueva Granada, the category of “libre” (free) included mestizos, mulattos,
indigenous persons who had abandoned their communal life in the resguardos, and black persons.59 Claudia
Mosquera et al. mention that in the Latin American colonial society, the expression "Libres y de todos los
colores" (free of all colors) is particularly relevant.60 Since the expression “negro” did not have a place in
the colonial racial order in and out of itself, free of all colors denoted a subordinated group that would grow
to occupy a buffer space between the whites, either pure blood Spanish or “criollos” (i.e., Euro descendants
born in the Americas), the tributary Indians, and the enslaved Africans.61
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As Edward Telles mentions, during the colonial period, race discrimination was visible not only in
slavery but also in aspects such as the harassment against free black persons, their law-sanctioned inability
to be elected for the “cabildos,” as well as the persecution they suffered under the Inquisition because of
their religious beliefs and cultural practices.62 Due to this historical legacy of exclusion, significant tensions
between the idea of formal equality and the racial stratification present in the society surrounded the nationbuilding process in Latin America.63
The racial pyramid of Latin American societies that originated in the colonial period would
continue to exist during the independence era and beyond.64 As Mara Loveman explains, in the afterindependence period, the political leaders of the newly emancipated Latin American nations declared their
firm intention to break away from the racial classifications used by colonial rulers and even forbade their
use.65 Nevertheless, at the same time, the new regimes allowed racial classifications to informally and,
sometimes, explicitly continue to influence state affairs.66 In many countries, slavery and the figure of the
tributary Indians continued to be lawful for decades after independence.67 Pro-independence leaders
adopted and updated racial stratification norms that originated in colonial times by associating the idea
citizen to the characteristics of wealthy white men.68 Liberal leaders, such as Simón Bolívar and Domingo
Sarmiento, tended to see non-white and mixed-race populations as obstacles in the consolidation of a stable
and prosperous country and—on occasion—were keen to adopt confrontation politics regarding indigenous
peoples, as they deemed them unfit for civility.69
During the 18th century, the Latin American political leadership faced significant trouble adopting
the liberal idea of citizenship for their post-colonial societies in a context in which colonial subjects were
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still commonly classified according to race and social status.70 Although these classifications were not
particularly rigid, since individuals could climb up in these hierarchies (e.g., by acquiring wealth), some
racial groups were still subjected to specific taxes and other forms of disadvantageous treatment.71 Edward
Telles mentions that even though in some cases national elites sought the support of Afro-descendants and
indigenous peoples to fight for independence —sometimes under the promises of freedom and land rights—
they later declined to grant these patriots access to elevated positions in their armies, which were reserved
for people of the elite.72 Despite this apparent act of ingratitude, the early 19th century independence
movements in the Viceroyalty of New Granada significantly contributed to eroding slavery, as many
enslaved persons joined Simon Bolivar's pro-independence forces, which “led to large-scale
manumissions.”73
In the post-independence period, Colombia and the rest of Latin America abolished slavery.
However, before the definite outlawing of slavery from Colombia and Venezuela, a majority of Afrodescendants was already free since the newly formed republics had initiated legal reforms aimed at
eradicating slavery years ago; for example, by enacting the Freedom of Womb Law in 1821, 30 years before
the abolition of slavery.74
As Claudia Mosquera et al. explain, after the abolition of slavery, formerly enslaved persons were
left to their own means.75 They did not obtain any form of compensation for their work, the damages caused
to them, nor were other measures adopted to help them overcome their precarious socio-economic position
or to address societal discrimination.76 After independence, blacks and other social groups situated at the
bottom of the racial hierarchy continued to be discriminated against based on their culture and phenotype.77
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In this period, race discrimination claims were constantly undermined. Blacks were primarily excluded
from society and mulattoes—despite having some change of social mobility—were mostly excluded from
prominent positions of society.78 Although racial prejudice was blatant in Colombia and Venezuela, these
countries—as it was also the case of Brazil—did not have significant forms of legally sanctioned racial
discrimination.79 This lack of formal segregation was not the case in all of Latin America as, for example,
Panama did have legally-sectioned forms of segregation.80
Since the late 19th century, Latin American national elites embraced scientific racism as a lens to
read their national populations and to justify racially-biased reforms to bring development and progress to
their nations.81 In consequence, as Cottrol points out, during the decades to follow, two ideas would shape
Latin American societies’ race relations:

The first was the Darwinian notion that inferior races would lose in the competition with superior
races and ultimately would die out. The second was that the relative underdevelopment in Latin
America could be attributed to the significant African and Indian elements in the region and the
relatively small European presence.82

Since the predominant idea at that time was that non-white persons could be an obstacle for the
region’s development, political elites decided to whiten their national populations.83 Their intention was to
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erase blackness and indigeneity of their countries.84 Whitening was attempted, in part, through racially
targeted immigration policies that promoted European immigration and restricted the arrival of people from
other parts of the world, such as Africa.85 Despite the national efforts, the ethno-racial composition of Latin
American societies frustrated the success of the eugenics project, as Afro-descendant and indigenous
populations continued to constitute significant portions of the region's national populations.86 This lack of
success was real even in the case of Brazil, which succeeded in attracting a substantial immigration flow
from Europe.87 European immigration was encouraged through the granting of land titles to new settlers,
while at the same denying land rights to the descendants of African enslaved persons over the “Quilombos”
they had occupied for generations.88 Race-based immigration policies in Brazil were more successful at
attracting immigrants than in other parts of the region.89 In Brazil, pro-whitening immigration policies
started as early as the 1850s, had their peak during to government of Getulio Vargas, and continued with
significant force until almost the 1970s.90
In the early 20th century, nationalistic movements arose in different parts of Latin America,
including Mexico and Cuba.91 These movements pressured the elites to expand their national projects to
embrace social groups that had historically been left at the margins of politics. In order to receive social
support, nationalist leaders adopted a unifying discourse that appealed to the idea of racial homogeneity
and national concord to promote alliances that transcended gender, race, and class divisions.92 The idea that
nations could work as “cohesive races” gained strength within Latin American political discourses, as the
region’s intellectuals rejected the scientific racist idea of the inferiority of Latin American peoples.93 In this
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respect, poet José Martí and others called for the formation of social coalitions that included both former
enslaved persons and slave owners, arguing that Cuba was a nation that did not see race and integrated all
Cubans.94
Similar episodes occurred in different countries of the region. Intellectuals such as Gilberto Freyre,
Manuel Gamio, José Vasconcelos, and Uriel García adopted the idea of mestizaje, which highlighted the
positive consequences of the mixing of races.95 Hence, the mestizo was anointed as the racial model of
national identity, displacing the white-defined liberal citizenship model that had been central during the
independence period. Nationalist thinkers managed to re-frame Afro-descendant and indigenous
populations' legacy within Latin American nations.96 In their discourse, these groups were no longer to be
seen as a sign of backwardness, but as a particular trait of Latin American identities, whose contributions
could be celebrated as an essential part of the national history: The history of the mestizo nations.97 In the
case of Brazil, mestizaje had a particular variance which would come to be known as racial democracy.98
In practice, however, the mestizaje narratives were more a doctrine about the origin and character
of Latin American national identities than a framework for the actual transformation of the state to attain
substantive equality for all. Nancy Appelbaum et al. explain that, even though during the late 19th and early
20th centuries the use of national identities as a form of racial identity (e.g., the Chilean race) was common,
there were variances in how these "national races" interacted with racially subordinated groups that lived
within their national borders.99 Specific populations, such as the indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants,
were commonly placed “outside of the nation” in the mestizaje narratives and continued to face significant
exclusion.100 Ultimately, the nation was still defined in opposition to these others: The indigenous peoples,
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the immigrants, the poor.101 Moreover, the narratives of mestizaje did not eradicate racial subordination nor
translated into an improvement in the living conditions of racially ostracized groups, who continued to be
defined by exclusion and exoticization.102 Even though the discourses of mestizaje was not benign to all
racial groups,103 some authors argue that the construct of Latin American nations as racially homogenous
was not something that was not defended only by the elites. Instead, they argue that it was appropriated by
disadvantaged social groups in order to advance their political agendas.104
Whitening and mestizaje narratives supplemented one another. Tanya Hernandez explains that
different countries responded differently to the influence of eugenics, depending on their capacity to attract
European immigrants and the size of their non-white groups. While some countries focused almost
exclusively on whitening their national populations (e.g., Chile, Argentina, and Urugüay), others invested
significant effort in promoting the discourse of mestizaje.105
Moreover, Shane Greene, following the ideas of Gordon (1998), explains that the predominant
narratives on mestizaje in Latin America begin with the mixture of white men and indigenous women as
their starting point, positioning the indigenous component as an essential piece of the nation’s fabric.106
These same accounts tend to erase blackness from national memories, discarding its participation in the
construction of the nation and rendering this part of the population invisible.107 As Edward Telles and
Tianna Paschel explain, blackness was a vital part of the construction of the Brazilian racial democracy,
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but was almost wholly excluded from the construction of mestizaje narratives in the Dominican Republic,
and was reduced to its most minimalistic expression in the case of Colombia and other countries.108
Despite the long history of slavery and racial stratification in Latin America, the ideological power
of mestizaje was such that it managed to project a virtually-free-of-discrimination image of the region to
the world. During a good part of the 20th century, Latin American countries were internationally perceived
as places characterized by racial harmony, especially when compared to the United States of America and
South Africa.109 This supposed absence of racial conflict was reinforced by governmental discourses across
the region that sustained that the extensive miscegenation practices and the well-established color-blind
legalist tradition had eradicated racial animosity in the region.110 In the specific case of Colombia, Edward
Telles mentions that during the second part of the 1900s, issues of race were typically understood as being
subsumed in aspects of class inequality.111 During this period, the idea of ethno-racial minorities was not
salient in the national imaginary, except perhaps for indigenous peoples, who were portrayed as savages.112
In those times, Afro-descendants continued to be politically and legally invisible, except for being included
in an extended idea of mestizaje.113
However, Latin America’s perceived racial harmony would start to crumble. After World War II,
the impulse of the global decolonization trends and the surge of new social movements in the U.S. gave
birth to social movements in the region that began to question the mestizaje narratives.114 Revisionist
scholars played a significant role in this process, as they evidenced racial discrimination practices in places
such as Brazil and Cuba. While referring to Nicaragua, Jeffrey Gould used the expression “the myth of
mestizaje” to contest the accounts denying the racial tensions that had been preached throughout this
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country.115 In his view, the idea of mestizaje was commonly used to conceal the deep patterns of race
discrimination, exclusion, and violence present in Latin American societies, being in this sense nothing
more than an allegory.116 Likewise, as Deborah Yashar asserts, the increasing relevance and visibility of
ethnic movements in the 20th century challenged the 19th-century idea of homogenous societies as the base
of state-building processes.117 Several Latin American thinkers opposed disputing the idea of a racially
harmonious region on the grounds that it would legitimize the concept of race, which they deemed U.S.centric and unfit for Latin America.118
Starting in the mid-1980s, most Latin American countries adopted new constitutions. Rodrigo
Uprimny comments that these new political documents introduced significant changes to favor minorities
and to embrace multiculturalism and diversity.119 Furthermore, Tianna Paschel clarifies that these
constitutional reform processes left aside the rhetoric of mestizaje and—instead—granted new rights to
indigenous peoples and, in some cases, Afro-descendants.120 Paschel explicates that these new changes
were more radical for Afro-descendants than for indigenous peoples, as this was the first time Afrodescendants would engage with the state as a group entitled to collective rights.121
According to Paschel, these new forms of ethno-racial policies are not the result of a single multicultural turn, but instead ensued from two distinct phenomena: The first is the “multicultural alignment,”
which opened the door to collective ethnic rights (e.g., territorial rights, political autonomy, rights to use
traditional languages) in some countries. The second is the “racial equality alignment,” which led to the
creation of affirmative action policies (e.g., equal opportunity laws and quotas in education) in some parts
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of the region.122 The multicultural alignment, which was the dominant discourse in countries such as
Colombia, had its roots in the adoption of ILO Convention 169 and was cemented on the principle of
cultural difference. For this reason, it mainly targeted indigenous communities and some rural Afrodescendant communities.123 In contrast, the racial equality alignment was based on the equality principle.
This alignment was tailored to reach general black populations, had particular influence in Brazil, and was
anchored in the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the
Durban Conference.124 César Rodríguez and Carlos Baquero recognize that these legal changes advanced
the protection of diversity in Latin American societies.125 Although, they also assert that the region's states
have only been open to the idea of protecting indigenous and Afro-descendants when their claims do not
entail economic redistribution policies, being in this sense a form of "neoliberal multiculturalism.”126
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—ECLAC—has reported that, by
the end of 2017, at least 14 countries in the Latin American region had some type of racial equality or Afro
descendant rights policy, and that additional public programs against racism and race discrimination were
expected in the coming years.127 Many Latin American countries have established specialized
governmental agencies and institutions to handle cases of race discrimination.128 In the case of Bolivia, for
example, the national government has a plan for the eradication of race discrimination and ethnic and
cultural exclusion, which includes a diagnostic of the scope of the problem, a map of key actors to address
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violations, a strategic plan with general and specific objectives to accomplish the plan’s goals, and a system
of oversight and evaluation.129
In Colombia, many institutions are in charge of promoting the rights of Afro-descendant
populations, including the Direction for Black, Afro Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero Communities of
the Ministry of Interior; the Direction of Populations of the Ministry of Culture; and the Vice-Ministry for
Participation and Equality of Rights.130 Additionally, Afro-descendants also find participation in other
institutional arrangements, including the National Planning Council, the High-Level Advisory Commission
for Black, Afro Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero Communities; the Pedagogic Commission of Black
Communities; the National Culture Council, among others.131

4.2. Characterizing the Latin American racial order

In Latin America, racial hierarchies can be described using a pyramidal shape, in which whiteness
is located at the top and blackness and indigenousness at the bottom.132 Yesilernis Peña et al. conducted a
study in which they compared levels of racial prejudice in three countries in Latin America (Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico) and the United States.133 They were looking to see whether they
could find empirical evidence to support the Iberian exceptionalism (racial democracy) thesis, which denies
the existence of significant levels of racial prejudice and discrimination in Latin America, or at least similar
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levels of prejudice than in the U.S.134 The results revealed that racial prejudice could be found in all Latin
American countries. The authors concluded that:

Not only were both explicit and implicit prejudice in the Caribbean higher than in the United States,
but it is also noteworthy that the levels of both forms of racial prejudice in socialist (ostensibly
classless) Cuba appeared no less severe than that found in either the Dominican Republic or the
American-controlled island of Puerto Rico.135

In addition to being widespread, racism and racial discrimination seem to manifest in particular
ways in this region. Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea differentiate between direct and indirect
discrimination in their characterization of racism in Latin America.136 The authors mention that forms of
indirect discrimination are, since the abolition of slavery, the most prevalent manifestation of racism in this
region.137 Despite the number of laws and public policies aimed at protecting Afro-descendant populations,
situations of disparate negative impact on ethno-racial minorities continue to be frequent in the region.138
According to a World Bank report, this is due, at least in part, to the fact that discrimination is rooted in
informal forms of expression and practices–often considered benign—that have naturalized racism, making
it almost invisible.139 In this respect, Rita Segato asserts that, unlike in the U.S., where racism tends to be
made visible in the relationship of subordination between different racial groups, in Latin America, racism
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is constructed in the interactions among individuals, being in that sense an inter-personal rather than an
inter-group relationship.140
A particular characteristic of Latin America’s racial order is that phenotype, and particularly skin
color, plays a determinant role in the processes of racialization. Anani Dzidzienyo writes that race relations
in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, have been characterized by two parallel situations.141 The first is
that phenotype and physical appearance have significant relevance in defining racial privilege and
subordination, with whiteness being praised and blackness decried. The second is that these assessments of
racial value coexist with narratives of formal racial equality, which in theory secured an equal opportunity
for everyone to participate of racial mixing, but contributed in practice to the exclusion of non-white persons
(indigenous and black) from power positions in the social, economic and cultural spheres.142
Regarding the role of skin color in race discrimination, Eunice Aparecida de Jesus has written about
how, in Brazil, racial prejudice hits harder individuals who have more prominent black features.143 She
warns that the more visible these black features are in a person, the greater are the difficulties that they face
in their lives.144 Along the same vein, Hebe Clementi describes Latin America as a pigmentocracy, in which
the color of the skin is particularly important hierarchy marker.145 Edward Telles uses this same term in the
description of the results of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)–an empirical
study based primarily on topics of race, ethnicity, and color. PERLA concluded that, in Latin America, skin
color closely correlates to social stratification.146 At describing some of the findings of PERLA, Telles
mentions that, in Colombia, skin color correlates with aspects such as educational attainment, parents' level
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of education, type of employment, monthly income, and discrimination experiences. In all of these areas,
lighter-skinned individuals fair better than darker-skinned persons.147 Telles also documented other patters
of color-based residential segregation in Brazil.148
From a similar perspective, Tanya Hernandez stresses that phenotype is at the core of racial
identities in Latin America. She indicates that “for instance, before a racial designation of Black is deemed
appropriate, custom dictates an informal visual assessment of an individual’s hair texture, nose width,
thickness of lips, and degree of dark pigmentation for consistency with what is stereotypically viewed as a
Black person.”149 In this sense—Hernandez notes—racial classifications can be described as a “prejudice
of mark,” as two people with similar ancestries but different phenotypes can be classified differently based
on their physical traits.150 In contrast, Elisa Larkin Nascimento sustains that there is little difference
between the prejudice of mark (color) and the prejudice of origin (ancestry), as color is nothing more than
the sign of origin, which is the ultimate factor leading to rejection and discrimination.151
Despite the evidence suggesting that color constitutes the basis of the racial stratification system in
Latin America, some believe that color differences—and the privileges or burdens that are attached to
them—are not explicitly connected to race discrimination.152 While discussing the case of Brazil, Elisa
Larkin Nascimento sustains that even though racial classifications are enforced based on skin color and
physical traits (rather than blood or ancestry), the idea that preferences are based solely on appearance,
potentially shields them from being decried as racist.153 This denial of the correspondence between color
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and race-based stratification is designated by this author as the “sorcery of color,” as it is continuously used
as a screen for hiding color-based hierarchies that shape white supremacy.154
The law has played a central part in the construction of racial stratification in Latin America.
Following the work of Costa, who identified four types of regimes affecting Afro-descendant populations
in the region, Manuel Góngora-Mera characterizes four different articulations between racial hierarchies
and the law in this region since colonial times.155 these are:

1) a widespread practice of noncompliance with protective provisions while formally honoring strict
adherence to the letter of the law, hiding the real situation of ethno-racial groups under the
appearance of legal protection; 2) the consequent tradition of unequal application of law according
to the addressees of the norms, with strong correlation to racial hierarchies; 3) the legal
normalization of transregional and domestic race-based inequalities; and 4) the legal
inclusion/exclusion of ethno-racial groups, in line with the political interests of the elites.156

Góngora-Mera points out that these articulations have allowed the persistence of ethno-racial
exclusion in Latin America, as they have prompted the preservation of white supremacy and reinforced
racial hierarchies.157 In this respect, he asserts that, until recently, Latin American societies denied the
existence of racial discrimination in the region, hiding behind "a legal veil of formal equality.”158 Since
most countries in the region had granted citizenship to non-whites at least since the time of the independence
and, with few exceptions, there were no systems of formal segregation in the post-independence period,
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some use this “formal equality argument” to deny the existence of a significant problem of race
discrimination in the region.159
However, the use of the formal equality argument seems to disregard that subordinated ethno-racial
groups were primarily excluded and ignored during vast periods of the region's history, and also that in
certain parts of Latin America there were, in fact, systems of formal and informal segregation. Elisa Larkin
Nascimento remembers that, in parts of Brazil, racial segregation was possible thanks to the support of
public authorities.160 Tanya Hernandez argues that the role of the law in the creation of whitening
immigration policies. Hernandez also mentions that many unwritten norms (consuetudinary laws), which
were enforced by public authorities, were used as an instrument for racial exclusion against different
populations.161 In the particular case of Colombia, Daniel Bonilla argues that the state has used the legal
system to try to eradicate or assimilate ethnic groups into the majoritarian culture.162

4.2.1.

The nuances of racial fluidity in Latin America: Racial classifications,
racial identities, and ways of naming race

A particular aspect of Latin America’s racial order is that ethno-racial identities in this region are,
in general, more fluid than in other countries such as South Africa and the United States.163 By fluidity, I
mean that in Latin America, ethno-racial identities may change or be contingent upon circumstances such
as geographic location, class status, self-identification, sharing of a non-majoritarian culture, among others.
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In contrast to the hypo-descent rules governing race relations in the United States, the small white
population in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador and the national aspiration of whiteness
seemed to have promoted the use of distinctions between black and mix-race individuals. This situation
facilitated the development of a system of racial classification that allowed people with traceable white
ancestry and an advantageous social position to be considered white despite having some African ancestry,
too.164 In this respect, Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel argue that, in Latin America, racial classifications
tend to be more fluid than in the United States. In this region racial classifications are based mostly on
phenotype, include a significant number of intermediate categories, and they describe a spectrum of
colors.165
Peter Wade mentions that there is significantly more ambiguity in the use of racial categories in
Latin America than in other regional contexts, as the boundaries of who falls within the category of black
or indigenous are far from being clear or self-evident.166 Since in Latin America the boundaries of racial
classifications have not always been stable, the definition of who is white and who is not has varied
throughout the years.167 The traits commonly associated with whiteness also vary from country to country,
and different factors influence how ethno-racial classifications are defined and applied to people.168 In a
study conducted by Edward Telles and René Flores, the authors mention: “This study has shown that
identifying as white, although constrained by skin color, is also shaped by age, education, and national
context, as well as by the color of those one is interacting with.”169 Due to similar situations, the World
Bank has stated that it is necessary to study the situation of Afro-descendants from a variety of angles and
to use different ways of measuring Afro-descendants.170
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Different racial groups have distinct forms of fluidity or mobility in the Latin American racial
stratification scale.171 In this sense, citing Peter Wade's work on the position of both indigenous and Afrodescendants, Edward Telles refers to the differences in racial mobility of indigenous and Afro-descendant
persons:

Mobility out of the indigenous category is often achieved through demographic, cultural, or status
change as indigenous is often understood on the basis of community, language, and low
socioeconomic status (Patrinos and Psachoroupoulos 1994; Friedlander 1975; Sieder 2002). One
can become a mestizo by moving to an urban area, speaking Spanish, or moving out of poverty.
Blacks and mulattos can sometimes move out of these categories through changes in status, as in
the popular phrase ‘money whitens’ (Schwartzman 2007), though such mobility has probably been
overstated and may even be reversed (Mareletto 2012; Telles and Paschel forthcoming). Thus, social
mobility seems less likely to change the racial status of individual Afro descendants compared to
that of indigenous people.172

Also, regarding the influence of class status on racial identities and classifications in Latin America,
Tanya Hernandez asserts that:

In Latin American settings, social status informs formal racial classification, as illustrated by the
common belief that persons of prominence should not be ‘insulted’ by referencing their visible
African ancestry. Additionally, it is generally presumed that because no person of prominence could
be Black, these persons should be designated distinctly.173

171

TELLES, supra note 42.
Id. at 32.
173
Hernández, supra note 149 at 1105–1106.
172

35

This specific relation between high-class status and racial mobility has historical antecedents since,
as I mentioned before, during colonial times, wealthy individuals could purchase "cédulas de gracias al
sacar,” which allowed them to have access to some of the privileges that the caste system granted to
whites.174
In this region, there is a robust lexicon of terms used to describe people's racial features, whose
fluidity is at odds with the race-based hierarchical structure of Latin American societies.175 Henry Gates
asserts that answering the question of who is black in Latin America is a complex task since there are many
ways in which Afro-descendants refer to their ethno-racial identity (e.g., using words as preto, negro,
mulato, pardo, moreno).176 Moreover, people with similar phenotypes can be described using different
racial classifications, depending on a broad range of situations, such as the intended politeness of the
interaction or the level of intimacy among the parties involved.177 Livio Sansone explains that color
terminology can be particularly subjective, as it varies depending on the person doing the assessment, the
purpose of such assessment, and the context in which it is done.178 Sansone mentions that "a son can be
preto to his mother and moreno to his father, or, as proven by my questionnaire, a family can be called
escuro by their neighbors to the left and mista by their neighbors to the right."179
However, color terminology could be less related to racial classifications than one might imagine.
Robin Sheriff, in her ethnological study of a community in Rio de Janeiro, affirms that the participants in
her study used this variety of color terminology not to classify each other in racial terms, but rather to
describe themselves and others based on physical appearance, as they continued to have a clear white-black
division of the racial world.180 Thus, she suggests that anthropologists could have misinterpreted the
multiplicity of color-based terms as forms of racial categories, while they are simply adjectives to describe
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physical characteristics.181 In contrast, Mara Loveman sustains that, although people in Latin America are
attentive to racial differences, they are not familiar with the use of racial classifications, and most would
generally describe to their race by stating their nationality.182
Due to the fluidity of ethno-racial categories, determining who is Afro-descendant is not easy in
Latin America. According to the World Bank, the term Afro-descendant was first used by civil society
organizations in the region in the early 2000s to describe a population that shared a particular common
ancestry (usually linked to being the descendants of African enslaved persons that were brought to the
Americas during the European colonization period) but that have significant dissimilarities among them.183
This umbrella term includes Afro-indigenous communities, such as the Garifuna people, and also large
portions of Latin American non-ethnic groups, such as the pardos in Brazil.184
The particularities of racial classifications, terminology, and identities in Latin America,
undoubtedly, affect my research agenda, as they add a level of complexity to my inquiry.

5. Limitations on pre-existing data and statistical invisibility

An additional aspect to consider is the limited pre-existing information related to race
discrimination in Latin America, especially in the context of the justice system. This lack of substantial
previous data is a direct consequence of the myth of mestizaje: As racial discrimination in the region was
believed to be inexistent, there was no apparent reason to collect data on race.185 International organizations
have already diagnosed the problem of the limited or total absence of data on race discrimination issues and
the situation of minority populations in Latin America. They have warned about its negative consequences
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to guarantee the rights of Afro descendant populations in the region.186 The ECLAC has mentioned that
although Afro-descendants account for a significant share of the Latin American population, they have
traditionally made invisible in the general population, and their contributions to the region's development
had not been sufficiently acknowledged.187 I will refer more extensively to the issue of statistical invisibility
of the Afro descendant population when I discuss the potential factors influencing Afro descendant
representation.

6. Institutional precariousness of Latin American judiciaries

In addition to the limited available information on issues of race, many Latin American countries
also struggle with an acute institutional weakness in their judicial sectors. By institutional weakness, I refer
to the severe limitations of the judicial institutions and procedures to effectively deliver justice and to
efficiently process the load of cases before them with transparency. Gretchen Helmke and Julio RiosFigueroa comment that, despite their prominent role in the political landscape of individual countries, Latin
American courts face significant dangers and constrains in the work they do.188 As an example, the authors
reference that, between 1985 and 2008, high courts in the region encountered numerous situations that put
their survival at risk.189 Additionally, courts seem to have a reputation problem and they do not enjoy the
confidence of the people. Their levels of trust among the population were crumbling by the early 2010s.190
However, authors such as Jorge Esquirol have warned that neoliberal institutions might be
overstating the perceived institutional weakness of Latin American judicial systems when compared to
those in the U.S.191 In Esquirol’s view, this generalized perception of Latin American “failed law” have led
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to continuous and unsuccessful reform efforts which have had different objectives over time. Nevertheless,
he argues that none of these reform efforts will be able to solve this perceived breakdown in judicial
institutions as “the failure they purport to redress is actually a combination of features endogenous to all
systems of law, problems projected on the region as a whole, and assessments contingent on political and
organizational preferences.”192

7. International, constitutional and legal protections for Afro-descendants in Latin
America

The international law protections established for Afro-descendants have been well-received in
Latin America.193 By the end of 2017, the subscription of instruments to combat racial discrimination was
standard among Latin American states. All countries in the region had ratified the Convention 111 of the
International Labor Organization on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Most countries had also ratified
either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the remain countries had adhered to these covenants.194 A similar situation
takes place with the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
and the Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the International Labor Organization. Both
instruments had have been ratified or adhered to by most countries in the region.195 Besides, the 2001
Durban Conference (as well as the Durban Declaration and Action Plan), which called for state action to
guarantee Afro descendant's rights and combat racial discrimination, has had a prominent role in promoting
the rights of Afro-descendant populations in the region.196
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Within the Inter-American system, in 2005, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—
IACHR—established the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-descendants and Against Racial
Discrimination.197 In 2013 the Organization of American States—OAS—adopted the Inter-American
Convention Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Related Forms of Intolerance, and the InterAmerican Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.
At a national level, attention should be paid to constitutional and legal instruments as well. During
the past 30 years, countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Venezuela, Argentina, Paragüay, and
Urugüay enacted new constitutional texts that introduced significant changes to the structure of these states,
including their judicial systems.198 This neo-constitutionalist trend has also led to what some refer to as the
Latin American multicultural turn, consisting of the constitutional and legal acknowledgment that different
cultures are coexisting at the interior of many Latin American countries.199 In practice, this
acknowledgment translated into the adoption of legal instruments aimed at securing, with different degrees
depending on the country, the rights of ethno-racial groups in the region.200

7.1. The multicultural turn in Colombia

In Colombia, the neo-constitutional and multicultural trends materialized in the enactment of a new
Constitution in 1991.201 This political document was crafted by a National Constitutional Assembly, which
included the participation of many different social and political groups.202 The Assembly was formed after
a significant number of voters supported the decision to enact a new Constitution in a special election.203
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Donna Van Cott argues this constitutional process was an institutional response to a political crisis in terms
of representation, participation, and legitimacy of the Colombian state.204 The process leading to the
adoption of the new Constitution occurred amid an unstable political and social period, as the violence
resulting from the confrontation between the leftist guerrilla groups, the drug cartels, and the Colombian
state was raging through the country.205 The constitutional change that arose from this crisis marked a break
with the liberal constitutional tradition that had dominated the political landscape since the time of
independence, as this constitutional text relinquished the idea of the mestizo nation and recognized
multiculturalism and ethnic diversity in the country.206
This constitutional process opened the door for different excluded groups to seek the recognition
of past injustices and the granting of new fundamental rights, including indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants, who, until that moment, lacked significant legal protection for their lands.207 The National
Constitutional Assembly included the participation of three indigenous delegates, which used their
positions to advance ethnic rights in the country and to achieve the recognition of cultural autonomy of
their peoples.208 These delegates argued against the disadvantageous treatment that cultural minorities had
historically faced in Colombia and in favor of acknowledging the Colombian nation’s diversity.209
According to Daniel Bonilla, the Constitution included three specific types of rights for ethnic
communities: Those that secure the self-government for minority groups; those that promote the political
participation of ethnic groups; and those that protect the expression and reproduction of the cultural heritage
of these groups.210 Although, these newly adopted rights have created tension between the principles of
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cultural unity and cultural diversity incorporated in the Constitutional text, as well as between the principle
of minorities' self-determination and the centralized political and juridical character of the Colombian
state.211 The new Constitution granted some ethnic groups, and particularly indigenous peoples, the rights
to reserved seats in Congress, the explicit recognition of the multicultural character of the nation, the legal
protection of indigenous territories, political autonomy for such territories, the legal establishment of the
Special Indigenous Jurisdiction, and right to be consulted regarding resource-extraction projects in their
territories.212 Another relevant aspect of the 1991 Constitution is that its equality provision (article 13) does
not only contemplate a right to formal equality before the law but also establishes that the state must
promote conditions of substantive equality. This provision also orders the state to adopt special measures
to favor discriminated groups.213
Nevertheless, Afro-descendants were not so well-positioned as indigenous peoples to benefit from
the changes introduced by the new Constitution, and there was little support for this group’s inclusion in
the constitutional drafting process.214 Donna Van Cott explains that, unlike indigenous peoples, Afrodescendants did not attain any seats at the Assembly elections and lack direct representation in this body.215
This absence of representation seems to have been the consequence of several factors, including: The “lack
of financing, weak politization of blackness in general, lack of support from other sectors, and
fragmentation among the Pacific Coast black communities.”216
Since Afro-descendants did not have direct representatives at the Constitutional Assembly, they
lobbied delegates and formed alliances with indigenous peoples’ representatives to promote their interests
in the Assembly.217 As a result of this mobilization strategy, the Assembly adopted at the last minute,
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transitory article 55,218 which constitutionally recognized certain land rights for Afro-descendants, by
allowing them to claim collective ownership over the territories that some black communities had inhabited
for decades in the Pacific basin of the country.219 It is crucial to notice that the term "black communities,”
coined in the Constitutional text, originally referred exclusively to the black communities of the Pacific
coast, which were believed to be the descendants of cimarrones.220 However, the use of this term has
expanded to cover other black populations in urban and rural areas of Colombia that claim a type of
ancestral ethnic identity.221
As a direct consequence of the constitutional process, the Colombian Congress enacted Law 70 of
1993, which operationalized transitory article 55 of the Constitution by defining the process thorough which
black communities of the Pacific coast could obtain legal recognition of their communal property rights.222
In correspondence with the ethnic paradigm of multicultural rights, this law conceptually framed Afro
Colombians as ethnic groups, portraying them as rural communities that were mostly located along the
Pacific Coast of the country.223 Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea comment that the description of black
communities as an ethnic group (which partially resembled the legal status of indigenous peoples) also had
the intention of leaving behind the use of the concept of race and its perceived biological nature.224
Parallelly to the passing of Law 70, Congress enacted Law 47 of 1993, which established a special
statute for the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and recognized ethnic rights for
the Raizal people.225 According to Daniel Bonilla, both Law 70 and Law 47 of 1993 were, at the time, the
most recent pieces of legislation enacted to benefit Afro-descendants in Colombia since the law that freed
enslaved persons in 1851.226 More recently, the Colombian Congress has enacted new laws to protect Afro-
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descendants from discrimination, including a statute that criminalizes discrimination based on race and
other factors, and a law that creates special seats in congress for black communities’ representatives.227
The Latin American neo-constitutional trend and its multicultural turn are essential factors to keep
in mind while studying the ethno-racial composition of the region's judiciaries. Not only due to the changes
that these reforms introduced in the architecture of Latin American states but also because of the different
protections that minority groups conquered. Such protections constitute transcendental changes in the
position of these groups within the state.

8. The multiplicity of stakeholders

An additional aspect that is determinant to understand the study setting and context of this research
is the different types of stakeholders present in the debate about the ethno-racial composition of the
judiciary. Different groups may have different readings of the level Afro-descendant representation in the
judicial systems and its consequences. It would be important to take into consideration the perspectives of
a variety of actors. Analyzing minority representation on courts certainly is a task that usually centers
around judges, but that may not be restricted to them. Judicial employees play a significant role in everyday
court work. Depending on the institution, judicial employees may perform tasks such as reviewing and
assessing the content of case dockets and even drafting court decisions. Thus, to study minority inclusion
in the court system should also take into consideration the role and perspectives of the employees who assist
judges in their duties.
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9. Positionality and social position

According to Ravitch, positionality and social position are essential elements of the researcher's
identity,228 which is, in turn, a central piece in the research design.229 In other words, the results of the
inquiry will be, in the end, the results of research processes and data collection methods vis-à-vis the
researcher’s positionality and social position.230 As the principal researcher in this project, I am “the
primary instrument of the research."231 In consequence, it is essential to situate my inquiry within my own
personal and professional background.
I identify as a gay, Afro-Colombian man. I have middle to dark skin and curly hair. I grew up in a
lower-class neighborhood of Medellín, a predominantly white-mestizo city in the Northwest part of
Colombia. In my hometown, people would commonly describe me as Moreno—a word used to "politely"
describe a male of black features who is not in the darker side of the skin color spectrum. Although I grew
up in a context in which racially charged comments and attitudes are familiar, I did not identify as black
until my late 20s. Before then, I did not have a clear consciousness about my racial identity, and I would
have probably identified as mestizo if I had been asked. I initially started to self-identify as black after being
confronted about my racial identity at the NGO I was working at as an intern. I am the only self-identified
black person in my family. Despite having dark skin, my parents do not identify as black or Afrodescendant, which they understand to be an identity reserved for people with darker skin tones and probably
from the coastal regions of Colombia. Additionally, I was raised in the majoritarian culture of Colombia,
which is markedly catholic, heteronormative, uneven in terms of class, and with the idea of mestizaje as a
central component of national identity.

228

SHARON M. RAVITCH & NICOLE MITTENFELNER CARL, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH BRIDGING THE CONCEPTUAL,
THEORETICAL, AND METHODOLOGICAL 11 (2016). (Noting that "positionality […] is the researcher´s role and identity
as the intersect and are in relationship to the context and setting of the research […] To fully understand researcher
positionality researcher must consider social location (identity markers of researchers…")
229
Id. at 10–11.
230
Id. at 40.
231
Id. at 40.

45

In terms of class, I was brought up in the context of urban poverty. My parents were low-income
workers. I attended public schools and attended a private college in my hometown thanks to scholarships.
Later on, and also funded by different scholarships and fellowships, I completed a master's degree in the
U.S., which I specialized in critical race studies and law and sexuality. Currently, I am in the final stages
of my doctoral dissertation. Due to my education, I believe that I am a person who, even though it is read
as black and has specific lower-class identifiers, can often blend into spaces of privilege to some extent and
who can navigate institutionalized settings with ease.
I have dedicated my career to work on human rights issues, especially in the field of race and sexual
orientation discrimination. I have done so by litigating discrimination and human rights cases before
Colombian courts, and by working directly with black and LGBT persons and organizations in Colombia.
At an ideological level, I believe that in most western societies, and especially in the context of Latin
America, there is a problem of pervasive and widespread racial discrimination, which is rooted in situations
such as the enslavement of Africans and the conquest of native peoples by European nations. Both in the
case of Latin America and the United States of America, I believe that this situation of discrimination has
structural dimensions. Racism has been and continues to be used as a condition that justifies the unequal
allocations of privileges, burdens, benefits, and responsibilities based on factors such as phenotype,
ancestry, cultural background, national and regional origin.
Regarding my sexual orientation, I am openly gay to my family and friends. I believe that I have
certain mannerisms that depending on the context, may indicate a non-heterosexual sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, I conform to most traditional gender norms associated with masculinity in the context of
Latin America.
I have work experience within the judicial system and also litigating human rights cases before the
courts in Colombia. For about two years, I worked as a judicial clerk for one of the magistrates of the
Constitutional Court of Colombia, one of the high courts in the country. During my time working for the
court, I was surprised by the fact that this court, which has one of the best records in the region on protecting
the rights of these communities, was also space where Afro-descendants and other minorities were virtually
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absent. Not only there has never been any black or indigenous tenured magistrate on this bench, but the
staff of the court was almost entirely white and mestizo. Hence, my particular interest in studying the
problem of black representation in spaces of power, and particularly in the judiciary, came not only due to
my general interest in issues of race discrimination but also to my particular experiences as a judicial
employee. I consider that my personal experiences regarding discrimination, as well as the situations I
referred to during my practice as a lawyer in Colombia, shaped my view regarding the problem of minority
underrepresentation on Colombia's judicial system.
A final aspect that I deem relevant to mention is that, due to the nature of my inquiry, I will try to
exalt black voices, their narratives, and perspectives about the object of this inquiry. This aspect of the
research design relates to my experiences working as an advocate and a researcher. During my career, I
have been in many scenarios in which situations affecting the lives, well-being, and rights of Afrodescendants are often discussed, written about, and decided upon without considering the viewpoints of
black persons. More usually than not, Afro-descendants are absent from decision-making processes
involving them and their future. In this particular research endeavor, I try to counter this impulse by
privileging black voices and by trying to elevate them to a place where they can be elements that allow for
the transformation of their reality. This research is also the production of a counternarrative, as it tries to
put Afro-descendant’s perspectives at the center of the debate.

10. Theoretical framework and bodies of literature influencing the research

The core of the theoretical framework for this study is the works of critical race scholars. Critical
race studies can be understood as a “movement of left scholars, most of them scholars of color, situated in
law schools, whose work challenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and
represented in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society as a whole.”232 Critical
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race theorists have inquired about the role of the law and the legal system in the preservation of white
supremacy in the U.S. They have exposed the contradictions between racial inequality in the law and in
society and the equality principle that is supposed to guide the functioning of the legal system.233
I opted for using critical race theory as the central pillar of this project's theoretical framework due
to the centrality that this movement gives to the questions about race and the relationship between racial
subordination, the legal system, and judicial institutions.234 Although critical race theory was born as a
movement primarily interested in the particularities of race in the U.S., I consider that many of its postulates
can be useful to understand the Latin American context. The former is due to the shared place that race
inequality has in the histories, processes of nation-building, and the development of social relationships in
both the United States and Latin America.235 I am, by no means, implying that Latin America and the
United States of America share the same history regarding racial oppression. I am also not asserting that
racial discrimination against minority groups has played out similarly in both regional contexts. Neither I
am sustaining that the critical race theory's conceptual constructs can be applied to Latin America without
dealing with the particularities of racial and political dynamics in this other regional context. What I want
to express is that critical race theory provides a refined conceptual framework to explore how the legal
system is intimately related to racial inequality. This aspect, which is common to the contexts of the United
States and Latin America, provides significant justification to use this conceptual framework to study the
problem of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in Latin American judiciaries. This use of the framework
is especially warranted given the still nascent state of the debates on race and the law in the Latin American
academic context. Therefore, it is necessary to explore different conceptualizations that may be useful to
understand the region's reality.
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The second pillar of my theoretical framework comes from the works of legal realists and critical
legal theorists, especially in their vision about the role of judges for the creation of law and the decision of
cases.236 The debate about judicial impartiality and the role of judges in the process of case decision is one
of the most traditional jurisprudential debates.237 It is possible to identify at least two main competing
perspectives in this debate. First, there are formalist currents of thinking, which give impulse to the idea of
judicial obedience to the will of the legislator as a precondition for a correctly working legal system. As
Montesquieu would express regarding the separation of powers: Judges should be “no more than the mouth
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or
rigor.”238 Second, there are realism perspectives, which dismiss the idea of judicial neutrality, instead of
stressing the political role of the judicial function. Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the most widely known
realists, wrote about what constitutes the law, as the object of study of the legal discipline, that "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."239
Depending on the line of thinking, Afro descendant representation on courts seems to have different
connotations. From a formalist perspective, the judge needs to be impartial, and the nature of its task makes
its identity to have less importance for the decision of cases. From a neo-realist perspective, judges are
political players. Given that a democratic government's basis is a fair representation, the identity of judges,
their experiences, and interests are significantly more relevant.240 I believe, following the work of realists,
that judges play an essential role in the process of knowing what the content of the law is. Judges are
political actors that have the power to use the law as a way to protect their interests. I understand that such
power of judges is not unrestricted, but I still believe that judges possess significant discretion in deciding
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cases.241 Therefore, studying who judges are, their backgrounds, and the experiences informing their work
is inquiring for nothing different than what the law is and how it is applied to specific cases and individuals.
Consequently, to ask about judges is nothing different than to ask about the law itself.
The third pillar for my inquiry is the previous work that lawyers and social scientists have done
about the issue of minority and women's representation on U.S. courts. Recent discussions on group
representation in U.S. public institutions have focused on the idea of diversity. This conceptual framework
gained strength following Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,242
in which the United States Supreme Court found the need for classroom diversity to fall within the category
of a compelling governmental interest. Since then, diversity has become a common point of tension in
debates on affirmative action in higher education and the composition of governmental institutions.243
Political scientists have studied minority representation on courts in the United States since the
1970s.244 There have been four main points of debate around this issue, which I will debate in more detail
through the text: How the process of diversification of the U.S. judiciaries has taken place? What are the
rationales to justify the need for judicial diversity? Do different judicial selection mechanisms lead to
different judicial diversity outcomes? And what are the effects of diversity in judicial decision-making?
One of the most common concerns regarding the discussion of judicial diversity is its tension with
the principle of judicial impartiality, which is a constitutional guarantee in most western democracies.245 If
judges are to be impartial, some question whether minority judges should be barred from knowingly
considering minority points of view when they engage in legal reasoning.246 Some also question whether
minority judges, due to constraints present in judicial activities, are in a position to represent minority
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communities’ points of view. In other words, whether the expectations on minority judges to incorporate
in their decision-making minority points of view may be the result of mere identity essentialism.247
Nevertheless, there have been significant non-essentialist efforts to argue for minority representation in
courts.248
Some authors have argued that, despite being an important goal, judicial diversity should not lead
to an endorsement of just any person of color nominated to a judicial station.249 Instead, they emphasize
the idea that nominees should have representativeness.250 In this respect, Graham subscribes to Hannah
Pitkin’s conceptual framework that differentiates between descriptive and substantive representation.251
The first refers to the actual composition of institutions and the way they resemble the composition of the
population they represent. The second focuses on the decisions governmental officials make concerning the
interests of represented groups. How descriptive and substantive representation interrelate has been the
subject of extensive debate. Some authors stress the importance of substantive representation, while others
emphasize descriptive representation as a condition that increases the positive results of substantive
representation. Nevertheless, debates on both aspects of representation are usually held simultaneously due
to the multiple connections between them.252
Part of the literature has problematized the discrete role that race and gender have played in the
judicial selection process at a federal level in the United States.253 Nevertheless, for many years now, there
has been an academic and public policy debate on which methods of filling court vacancies best ensure
judicial diversity.254 Through the years, some studies suggested that appointive systems are more efficient
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at increasing minority presence in the judiciary; others indicated that elective systems give women and
minorities a higher chance of being selected. Others argued that merit-based systems are best-suited for the
selection of minority and women judges.255 Finally, some propose that judicial selection procedures no
longer have an impact on judicial diversity.256 Additionally, there are additional factors that determine
minority representation in the judiciary.257 Studies on diversity in United States state courts have concluded
that governors of different political parties have different inclinations when nominating judges, with
Democratic governors appointing more women and minorities than those appointed by Republicans.258
Feminist legal theory has energized the debate on judicial diversity, contributing studies on
women’s presence in the judiciary.259 As the underrepresentation of women on judicial bodies continues to
be a problem in many parts of the world, different conceptual approaches have been used to understand this
issue. These frameworks include equal opportunity, representativeness, and diversity.260 Nevertheless,
some have questioned the efficacy of such rationales to “address the symbolic exclusion of women from
traditional notions of judging and judicial authority.”261
In addition to the U.S., other countries have implemented a wide range of strategies to combat the
lack of minority and women presence on courts. A segment of the literature indicates that current legal rules
imposing restrictions on affirmative action may the most substantial barriers for achieving diversity in the
judiciary: "paradoxically, the legal framework constructed to promote equality now stands in the way of
the realization of it."262
Minority representation on courts also appears to be a point of controversy outside of the U.S.
Concerning France, where the collection on population's racial and ethnic data faces legal restrictions, there
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have been efforts to identify how minorities and other marginalized groups are represented in the
judiciary.263 Mathilde Cohen used qualitative data to assess how discourses by judges, prosecutors, and
other types of actors involved in the judicial system undermine the perceived importance of race and sexual
orientation on courts.264 According to the author, legal professionals use different mechanisms to avoid
acknowledging the importance of race and sexuality in judicial bodies, while at the same time recognizing
the importance of other characteristics–such as gender and socio-economic status–for the judiciary. The
result of the deployment of such strategies is often a general denial of the importance of sexual orientation
and racial identities in the judicial context.265
The final pillar of my theoretical framework, refers to the previous work that scholars have done
on the issue of race relations in Latin America. In this respect, I reviewed the literature on aspects such as
the role of the law in maintaining racial subordination,266 Latin America’s colonial history, the relationship
between race and the nation-building processes,267 the impact of blanqueamiento and mestizaje narratives
on race-relations, the racial identity formation,268 the issue of Afro-descendant statistical invisibility,269 the
concepts of race and ethnicity,270 previous studies on race discrimination,271 and scholarly texts on the legal
instruments for protecting ethno-racial groups in the region, among other topics.272 Instead of explaining
each point of tension in this literature, I will use it to analyze the research project and its findings.
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11. Research design

My research process had three stages: 1) Literature review; 2) data collection through the use of
information requests; 3) data collection through interviews and site visits.

11.1. Literature review

At the first stage of the project, I conducted a literature review of the leading academic sources
related to the two critical aspects of my inquiry: the key theoretical debates on minority representation on
judicial institutions and the relationship between race and the law in Latin America. I used Zotero to collect,
process, and organize the information I gathered in this process. With this information, I wrote two separate
documents describing the findings this part of my research produced, which were later used to write the
dissertation. I did not conduct specific searches for the critical race theory and the legal realism sources
because I was already acquainted with these bodies of literature, which facilitated their use in this research
endeavor.

11.2. Data collection through the use of information requests

In Colombia, as it is the case in most Latin American countries except Brazil, I could not find
previous data on the ethno-racial composition of the region’s judiciaries. Hence, it was necessary to collect
primary data. I considered different alternatives to gather that data, such as conducting an on-line survey to
judicial servants or even to contact judiciary administrators to explore the possibilities of conducting a
judicial census (as the one judicial authorities conducted in Brazil).273 However, due to time and financial
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resources, I decided that the most feasible alternative to collect the information was to ask a sample group
of courts to report about their gender and ethno-racial composition.

11.2.1. Information requests concerning the composition of high and
intermediate courts

I decided to send information requests to request data on the ethno-racial composition of the court
system in Colombia. I submitted requests to a group of courts asking them to self-report on the composition
of the institution in terms of gender and race/ethnicity, as well as informing whether there were affirmative
action policies in place for these groups. Since I had certain doubts about whether the courts would reply
to my information requests, given the national reticence to discuss the racial exclusivity of its elite spheres,
I submitted the information requests under the form of an administrative mechanism known as “derecho
de petición” (right of petition). The right of petition is an administrative mechanism and constitutional right
incorporated in article 23 of the Colombian Constitution, which reads: “Every individual has the right to
present respectful petitions to the authorities on account of general or private interest and to secure prompt
resolution of same.”274 According to the Statutory Law 1755 of 2015, which operationalizes the right of
petition, any citizen may use this instrument to request information and copies of documents to public
authorities.275 In the case of rights of petition that request information, public authorities have ten days to
deliver a response to the petition.276 Given the constitutional right status of the right of petition, public
authorities were, at least formally, required to provide a timely response to the requests, even if they did
not deliver the demanded information.
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Before I explain the sampling used for the information requests component of my research, I should
briefly introduce the structure of the Colombian judicial system and its parallels and or distinctions from
other judicial systems in the region.

11.2.2. Structure of the Colombian judicial system

Special Jurisdiction for
Peace

Colombian Judiciary

Ordinary Jurisdiction

Supreme Court of
Justice

Superior Tribunals of
Judicial District

Contentiousadministrative
jurisdiction

State Council

Constitutional
jurisdiction

Superior Council of the
Judicature

Constitutional Court

Office of the Attorney
General

Attorney General

Deputy prosecutors
and other public
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Administrative courts

Special jurisdictions

Peace Tribunal

Special Indigenous
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Special Unit for
Investigation and
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Military criminal
justice (Law 940 of
2005(.

Executive Secretariat

Courts for civil, labor,
criminal, adolescent,
family, sentence
execution, andsmall
conflict affairs (lower
courts with circuit and
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In contrast to the US system, where there are a federal judicial system and several state judicial
systems, in Colombia there is a unitary judicial system. This system includes the ordinary, contentiousadministrative, and constitutional jurisdictions, each with a high court of closure, the Office of the Attorney
General of the Nation, and other special jurisdictions.277
The Supreme Court of Justice is the court of closure of the ordinary jurisdiction. This jurisdiction
also includes 33 superior tribunals of judicial district (intermediate courts), and several courts for civil,
labor, criminal, adolescent, family, penalty execution, and small conflicts affairs (lower courts with circuit
and municipal jurisdiction). The contentious-administrative jurisdiction has the Council of State as its
highest Court and also includes 26 administrative tribunals (intermediate courts), as well as administrative
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courts (lower courts). The constitutional jurisdiction's central institution is the Constitutional Court.278 The
Superior Council of the Judicature is in charge of the administration, management, and control of the
judiciary, and it is divided into two panels, one for the decision of disciplinary cases against judges and
attorneys (jurisdictional-disciplinary panel) and one for the administration of the judiciary (administrative
panel).279 The Office of the Attorney General has as its primary function to investigate and prosecute crimes
before the court system, and it includes the Attorney General (Fiscal General de la Nación), a number of
the deputy prosecutors, and other public servants.280 The special jurisdictions include the justice systems
of the indigenous communities, which are in charge of applying the traditional law of these communities,
and the peace judges, for the resolution of individual and commentary conflicts, among others.281
Following the peace accords between the government of Colombia and the FARC, a Constitutional
reform created the Special Jurisdiction for Peace—SJP. The SJP is the foremost institution crafted for
achieving transitional justice in Colombia. Although the SJP was conceived as an autonomous organism
and has a different legal regime than the rest of the judiciary, it transitionally administers justice.282 The
SJP is composed of a Peace Tribunal, which is its closure body, and three panels: The Panel for the
Acknowledgement of the Truth, Responsibility, and the Establishment of Facts and Conducts; the Panel for
the Definition of Legal Situations; and the panel for Amnesty and Indult. Besides, it has a Special Unit for
Investigation and Prosecution and an Executive Secretariat.283
Despite their similarities, Latin American judicial systems have essential differences in terms of
judicial authority (judicial review, certoriati, the value of precedent, among others),284 as well as in other
aspects of judicial institutions. In this respect, Julio Ríos-Figuero and Andrea Pozas Loyo affirm that:
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For instance, Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador have all created judicial councils, but only Peru has
also created a constitutional tribunal, while both Mexico and El Salvador have transformed the
Supreme Court and a chamber of it, respectively, into constitutional adjudication organs. At the
same time, El Salvador allows all citizens to file suits before the constitutional organ, while Mexico
and Peru provide access only to public authorities, such as a fraction of legislators or political parties.
|| Similar interesting differences exist in virtually every other judicial institution, from the
prosecutorial organ to the appointment and tenure of supreme, lower, administrative, and
constitutional judges.285

Furthermore, as Oswald Lara Borges and et at. describe, the region’s countries have adopted
different models to aspects such as judicial review, determining the size and composition of the high courts,
duration of judges’ mandate, judicial selection and appointment mechanisms over time.286 Nevertheless,
many Latin American countries still have significant similarities in respect to their hierarchical nature of
the judicial system, their civil law traditions, and similar challenges in terms of transparency, effectiveness,
overload, among others.287

11.2.3. Purposeful sampling

The first major decision that arose regarding the submission of the information requests was the
recipients’ selection. According to the statistics of the Superior Council of the Judicature, by October 10,
2018, 5,354 judges were serving in courts and tribunals across Colombia. Additionally, there were 32,298
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judicial employees (judicial workers that are not judges nor prosecutors) working for the judiciary. Given
the significant number of courts in the judicial system, I decided to concentrate my efforts in the high and
intermediate levels of the ordinary and contentious-administrative jurisdictions, as well as in the
constitutional jurisdiction, the Superior Council of the Judicature. Likewise, I also decided to include the
SJP in my study.
I excluded the Office of the Attorney General because of the prosecutorial nature of its functions,
which in general differ from the role of neutrally deciding cases associated with the courts. Additionally,
the size complexity and autonomous nature of the Office of the Attorney General would require a specific
inquiry for its study. Likewise, I excluded the special jurisdictions due to the specific type of cases they
may decide as well as the restrictive range of their jurisdictional functions. In the particular case of the
Special Indigenous Jurisdiction, since only indigenous peoples administer this type of justice, there was an
additional reason for its exclusion from its study: It would have been redundant to inquire about the ethnoracial composition of indigenous jurisdictions unless one were to distinguish among the different peoples
and their particular use of their jurisdictions, which exceeds the objectives of this particular research. In
contrast, despite the specific mandate of the SJP, I decided to include it this research because it was the
most recently created judicial institution in Colombia. Besides, the peace accords that gave birth to the SJP
included specific provisions regarding its ethnic and gender composition, which created specific incentives
to study minority representation in it.288
I concentrated my study in the high and intermediate levels of the ordinary and contentiousadministrative jurisdiction because the number of high courts, superior, and administrative tribunals (61 in
total) was manageable for this type of inquiry. Another important reason for including intermediate
tribunals in the sample is that, as Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew Taylor point out, there is a need to expand
judicial research in Latin America beyond the high courts of the region, to also focus on lower courts and
other judicial bodies. In this respect, the authors remark that: "While the interventions of high courts are
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doubtless important, the fact that they often transfix us can lead to insufficient attention to the 'everyday' or
'routine' justice carried out by lower courts, which can be more socially relevant and certainly influence
judicial politics.”289
Despite my eagerness to study lower courts as well, I decided to abstain from including them in
this part of the process. If I had decided to extend this exercise to the circuit, municipal and administrative
courts, I would have ended with a sample pool of approximately 5,000 courthouses, which was extremely
difficult to manage, given the limited financial and time resources for this research. An additional advantage
of concentrating in high and intermediate courts is that they have a broader geographic jurisdiction than
lower courts. Similarly, this selection followed the rationale that it is likely that at these top layers of the
judicial system, judges will have more impact on the creation of legal norms.290
In addition to the courts, I also decided to request information to the National Registry of Attorneys,
an office ascribed to the Superior Council of the Judicature, which is in charge of issuing professional
licenses for attorneys. I decided to send an information request to the registry to try to establish how many
lawyers there were in Colombia and to see if there was information regarding their gender or ethno-racial
background. As being a lawyer is a precondition to becoming a judge, it is crucial to know how many black
lawyers there are.
In the end, I sent a total of 65 information requests to:
-The four highest courts in the judicial system: The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of
Justice, the State Council, and the Superior Council of the Judicature.
-The SJP.
-The National Registry of Attorneys.
-The total number (33) of superior tribunals of judicial district.
-The total number (26) of administrative tribunals.
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11.2.4. Content of the information requests

The information requests were, in the case of the courts, addressed to the president of each court.
In the case of the National Registry of Attorneys, they were sent to the responsible head of the office. The
reason for directing the letters to the courts' presidents is that, as a general rule, the president of each court
has the power to represent the whole institution and is the authority that could have access to the data that
I required.291
The information requests were designed as follows: There was an introductory part stating that the
right of petition had the purpose of obtaining information about the gender and ethno-racial composition of
the particular court. This section also explained that this was part of my doctoral research on the issue of
minority underrepresentation in judicial institutions. It mentioned that we already knew that there was
minority underrepresentation in the courts of the region and that we were trying to assess the extent of the
presence of women and ethno-racial minorities on Colombian courts to find alternatives to overcome this
situation. This section also stated that the information request did not intend to establish the individual
ethno-racial or gender identity of any particular individual, as I was just asking for anonymous statistical
data.
Clarifying that I was not trying to collect data on the racial identity of any specific individual was
paramount. The habeas data law in Colombia (a type of privacy of information law) says that data on any
particular person's ethnic or racial origin is considered sensitive. Thus, it cannot be collected unless certain
exceptions.292 Fortunately, one of these exceptions is when the data about the racial origin is collected with
scientific and statistical purposes, in which case it is necessary to share the data guaranteeing the anonymity
of the individuals.293
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Following this section, I asked the recipient to inform on the total number of judicial posts there
were at the court. I also requested them to specify how many of these positions were occupied by women,
indigenous persons, afro-descendant persons, indigenous women and afro descendent women.294 I asked
them to inform on the total number of judicial employee posts in the court and asked them how many of
the employees that occupy such positions fell in the same gender and ethno-racial categories stated above.
In the case of the high courts and the SJP, I formulated two separate questions regarding judicial employees:
I inquired about the number and gender and ethno-racial breakdown of auxiliary magistrates and asked the
same information about all other judicial employees. Third, I requested that in the case they did not provide
the data about the gender or ethno-racial composition of the court, they explained why they could not do it.
Fourth, I asked about the existence of programs intended to facilitate the hiring, permanence, or conditions
of employment for women in the different positions at the court (affirmative action policies). In case such
policies existed at the court, I asked them to explain their scope. Finally, I repeated the previous question
about affirmative action policies for Afro-descendants and indigenous persons.
In the case of the Superior Council of the Judicature, in addition to the questions about the
composition of that particular institution, I also requested information concerning the number, gender and
ethno-racial breakdown of judges serving at Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court, the State
Council, the SJP, all superior tribunals of judicial district, all administrative tribunals, all sectional councils
of the judicature, and all circuit and municipal courts of the ordinary jurisdiction, as well as all
administrative courts of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
The information request for the National Registry of Attorneys asked them to provide information
regarding the total number of attorneys with valid licenses in the country. Likewise, I required them to
identify how many of them were women, indigenous persons, Afro-descendant persons, indigenous women,
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and Afro-descendant women. I also asked them to indicate before which sectional council of the judicature
they completed their registration.
The final section of the right of petition included contact information via e-mail, a physical address
in case they decided to send a response in hard copy, and my signature. In addition to the petition, I
submitted a presentation letter that confirmed my status as a doctoral student signed by my academic
advisor.

11.2.5. The rationale for the content the information requests

I used the verb "to inform" to ask about the composition of the courts because I wanted to let
respondents decide how to assess its gender and ethno-racial composition. It is possible to think of many
different methodologies and criteria to establish the gender and ethno-racial composition of a group or to
determine the ethno-racial and gender identity of a person. It was possible to ask the person to self-identify
in gender or ethno-racial terms, to ask another individual to hetero-identify them based on pre-established
criteria, or to use standardized mechanisms as a way to identify a person (e.g., color palette).
How defines ethno-racial identities in Latin America (e.g., whether based on phenotype, ancestry,
DNA, geographical location, cultural background, discrimination experiences, or something else)
influences the assessment of the ethno-racial composition of a group. The same can be said about
establishing gender identities. Due to the complex debates about ethno-racial and gender identities and the
impossibility to control the gender and ethno-racial composition assessment, I decided to leave the method
for assessing ethno-racial identity open for courts to decide about it. A potential critique of the data
collection process is that the lack of a unified methodology to collect the ethno-racial data represents a
significant problem that poses questions on the reliability of the data. However, the purpose of the rights of
petition was simply to attain a general view on the courts' perspectives on minority representation within
them. The idea was to use the information as a proxy for the level of Afro-descendant representation inside
judicial institutions. The responses of the information requests, instead of corresponding to the number of
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Afro-descendants or indigenous persons working on Colombian courts, should be understood as reports
that describe the perceptions that judicial institutions have concerning the presence of minority groups in
their interior. Also, I should mention that the interviews and site-visit components of the empirical work I
conducted pursue the attainment of supplementary information, context, and substantive meaning to some
of these perceptions.
I also consider that, despite the nuances of ethno-racial identities and classifications in Latin
America, Afro-descendants are a visible minority, as people belonging to this group can be, generally
speaking, classified as belonging to his group based on their physical appearance. 295 I also believe that the
diversity within the black identity and the complexities of racial classifications in Colombia have been used
as an excuse to undermine the politicization of race in this country. A condition that discourages the
acknowledgment of racial discrimination by way of defending the idea that racial differences in this context
are too subtle to be recognized.296 My data collection process tries to refrain from the impulse to avoid
asking about racial identification in Latin America due to its complexities in the region. In this respect,
Mata Htun has argued that one of the main difficulties for the creation of affirmative action programs is the
trouble of defining who is black. Likewise, as one of her interviewees pointed out, people in Brazil
strategically use the intricacies of racial identification in the region to deny the possibility of compensatory
measures for past discrimination.297
An additional reason for not pre-establishing a particular methodology for courts to assess their
gender and ethno-racial composition is that, depending on the nature of the complexity of the task, this
could have discouraged courts to provide information about the perceived number of women and minorities
working for the judiciary. For example, requesting the courts to ask each judge or judicial employee to self-
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identify their gender and ethno-racial identity could be read as a petition to conduct a quasi-census. Courts
could have easily refused to such possibility, given their limitations in terms of time, legal responsibilities,
and access to resources.
I decided to ask about the number of judge and employee posts because I wanted to limit the
influence that the potential unfilled vacancies at the court might have in the results. Inquiring about the
number of posts allowed me to compare the perceived levels of women and minority representation to the
number of available posts instead of comparing them to the number of judges or employees working for
each court at any particular time. I decided to inquire about the gender breakdown for three reasons: The
first is that from the literature about women representation on the United States' judiciary, I anticipated that
women would be underrepresented on the bench in Colombia, as women continue to face discrimination
on many aspects of public life, including employment.298 Given the still limited research on this issue in
Colombia, it was essential to render this situation visible. Second, to ask about the gender composition, and
especially to ask about it before asking about ethno-racial composition, was an incentive for courts to
respond the questions about indigenous and Afro-descendant presence in the judiciary. I suspected that even
though in Latin America is difficult to talk about gender issues publicly, it is even more challenging to talk
about racial issues. If this were true, to ask about gender composition first presented an invitation to talk
about ethno-racial composition without having to face address exclusively the racial component. Also, if
the courts could provide data on their gender composition but not about their ethno-racial composition,
there would be an immediate question about the asymmetrical treatment about gender and race. Third, to
ask about gender composition also allowed me to ask about intersectionality vis-à-vis the presence of Afrodescendant and indigenous women on courts.
A final aspect of the gender composition questions that I should discuss is the implicit binary
assumption underlying this part of the information requests. I decided to ask about women representation,
assuming that men and women are the only gender identities present at these courts. Thus, by assessing the
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number of women at the court, I could also determine the number of men at the court. This assumption is
problematic since it could be possible that at least some of the judges have gender identities that scape the
gender binary. There is no public information about openly trans, gender fluid, or non-binary judges in
Colombia. Nevertheless, I assumed that gender non-binary individuals constitute a small fraction of the
Colombian judiciary and that the gender binary presumption can be used for this analysis, despite the
general undesirability of this logic for social studies.
Regarding the questions about indigenous persons, I decided to ask about their representation in
the judiciary because indigenous peoples are the second-largest ethnic minority in Colombia, and they have
been the central group for multiculturalist state policies in Latin America.299 Indigenous peoples in
Colombia have faced significant levels of discrimination exclusion from public spheres.300 I anticipated
that they would be significantly underrepresented in the judiciary. Hence, I considered necessary to render
this situation visible.
In the case of Afro-descendants, I decided to use such a term because, as I explained before, is the
most accepted to refer to black persons in Latin America. Afro-descendant is used to include both racial
and ethnic identities and does not have a negative connotation, unlike the word "black" has in specific
contexts. In a footnote in the information request, I asked the respondents to include within this category to
all black, mulatto, Afro Colombian, Raizal of the Archipelago of San Andres, Providencia, and Santa
Catalina, and Palenquero of San Basilio persons. These additional categories represent groups within the
universe of Afro-descendants. Some, such as black or mulatto, tend to emphasize the racial dimension of
Afro-descendant identities. In contrast, Raizal and Palenquero refer to specific ethnic groups that have a
distinctive culture and are located in particular parts of the country. The questions about ethno-racial
representation are based on the assumption that only Afro-descendant, indigenous, and white-mestizo
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ethno-racial identities are present in the Colombian judiciary. Thus, it is possible to know the perceptions
of the number of white-mestizo persons in the courts by subtracting the number of Afro descendant and
indigenous persons from the total number of judges or judicial employees. This assumption is problematic
because there might be other ethno-racial identities in the judiciary. Nevertheless, I believe that departing
from this type of ethno-racial trinary logic can be pragmatic in this context, given our general knowledge
on the ethno-racial composition of the country.
I also decided to ask specific questions concerning the presence of indigenous and Afro-descendant
women in the courts. I suspected that, as in the U.S. context, minority women could face different obstacles
to access positions in the judiciary when compared both to minority and non-minority men, as well as nonminority women.301
Regarding the questions about judicial employees, it is essential to clarify that, under Colombian
law, any judicial servant who is not a judge or a prosecutor is considered a judicial employee.302 In general
terms, judicial employees do not have the power to conduct judicial functions. A problem with the category
of judicial employees is that it encompasses a vast number of jobs that vary significantly in terms of
prestige, salary, responsibilities, and hierarchy. For example, both judicial clerks and I.T. staff may be
considered judicial employees, despite their job profiles being significantly different.
I decided not to ask specifically about the gender and ethno-racial of each type of judicial employee
position because of the difficulties to access the job descriptions. Likewise, such breakdown could have
made it more difficult for courts to respond to my questions, as they would have needed to differentiate
among the different types of judicial employees in their responses. This request could have ultimately
discouraged courts to provide the required information. The only exception that I made about the nondistinction among judicial employees was the specific questions that I asked about the jobs of auxiliary
justices in the high courts that I sent information requests to. I specifically asked about the gender and
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ethno-racial composition of auxiliary justices because they occupy posts that are particularly wellpositioned within the judicial system's structure. They enjoy particular high prestige and significant income
advantages when compared to other judicial employees.303
The request of explaining why they could not provide the data on gender or ethno-racial
composition had two purposes: To provide incentives for the courts to provide the information; and to
understand the reasons for the negative answer.
The questions about affirmative action policies were designed to see if the courts had implemented
any measures on their own to promote women and minority representation. I was aware that there were not
centralized affirmative action policies for the judiciary. However, it was still possible that particular courts
had developed their own policies to promote the presence of persons belonging to certain groups in their
staff. I decided to separate the gender-based from race-based affirmative action policies as special measures
might be in place for women but not for indigenous or Afro-descendant persons, or vice versa, since that is
the case in other public sectors.
Last, in the case of the information request sent to the National Registry of Attorneys, I decided to
ask about the sectional councils of the judicature before which the registered attorneys applied for the
license. I considered that this could provide secondary data about the ethno-racial composition of the legal
profession in case there was not centralized data about the ethno-racial breakdown of lawyers in Colombia.

11.2.6. Vetting

After working on an initial draft of the information requests, I undertook a vetting process of the
instrument. Two Colombian colleagues, who had conducted significant research and advocacy on issues of
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racial discrimination in Colombia, and my academic advisor participated of the vetting process. I
incorporated their comments into the information request template.

11.2.7. Information requests’ sending

The first group of information requests was sent out on October 24th, 2019. It included the rights of
petition addressed to the four high courts, the SJP, the National Registry of Attorneys, and 11 superior
tribunals of judicial district. On November 1st, I sent the second group of information requests addressed to
the remaining superior tribunals of judicial district. Finally, on November 19, I sent all the remaining
information requests addressed to the administrative tribunals. There were some information requests that
were sent out on different dates that the ones formerly mentioned because their addresses were not available
on those dates. The reason why the sending process was done progressively instead of in a single moment
was that I wanted to make sure that people were receiving the information and that no significant
adjustments were needed to the requests so that the courts could appropriately process them. As I will
explain later, this precaution turned out to be vital, given the problems with courts' public contact
information.
All information requests were sent from my university e-mail address since my geographic location
at the time was New York City. I sent the messages to the e-mail addresses of the presidents of each court.
In the case of the four high courts, I called the general secretary of each of them and asked the e-mail
addresses directly. In the case of the SJP, I send the e-mail through the Concerns, Petitions, Complaints,
and Grievances' format as well as the information e-mail address that I found on their webpage. In the case
of the National Registry of Attorneys, I sent the message to the registry's e-mail found in the Colombian
judiciary's webpage. Finally, in the case of the superior tribunals, I used the directory of the presidencies of
the superior tribunals made available to the public in the Colombian judiciary's webpage. This directory
included information regarding most superior tribunals, but not all of them. In the case of the missing email addresses, I had to search online until I found the necessary information or even call the tribunals
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directly to ask for their contact information. The process of calling to ask for the e-mail addresses was
complicated in some cases. For example, a superior tribunal of the Caribbean region required me to send
them my national identification number before providing me the e-mail address.
Immediately after I sent the first group of e-mails, many of those addressed to superior tribunals
bounced. Many of the e-mail addresses listed as contact information for the presidencies of the superior
tribunals were incorrect. Likewise, in some cases, the e-mail addresses listed for a particular tribunal
corresponded to those of another tribunal. Given this situation, I had to go on-line and try to find alternative
e-mail addresses for sending the information requests. I also used the general courthouse directory included
in the judiciary's webpage. In many cases, I had to re-send the e-mail several times until it did not bounce.
In some instances, the name listed in the directory did not correspond to the president of the tribunal. For
this reason, when days later I submitted the rights of petition addressed to the administrative tribunals, I
decided not to include the name of the tribunal's president, but simply direct the document to the president
of the tribunal. In the case of administrative tribunals, I sent the initial e-mail directed to each tribunal to,
at least, two e-mail addresses, to minimize the risk of the e-mail bouncing. I used the e-mail addresses listed
in the administrative tribunals' presidencies directory, in the general courthouse directory, and others I
found online.
After the information requests were sent out, I started receiving responses from the courts. In some
cases, I had to send several e-mails reminding courts to respond, noticing that the legal deadline to reply
had already expired. Moreover, some courts made singular requests as a precondition for responding. A
tribunal that asked me to send them a scanned version of the right of petition with my original signature, as
they alleged they could not process the request with my electronic signature alone. Some courts even argued
that they were not legally authorized to respond to that kind of request, and therefore did not provide
information or decided to forward the request to a different authority—usually to the executive director of
judicial administration. Additionally, some courts would not deliver all the information required. Some, for
example, gave me data about the gender composition of the court but not about its ethno-racial composition.
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Hence, in order to obtain full responses, I had to engage in e-mail exchanges with the courts and perform
constant oversight and follow up on the response progress.
In the end, of the total of 65 information requests I submitted, 55 of them received some type of
response, representing a response rate of 84,62%. The average number of calendar days that took courts to
respond was 28 days. The superior tribunals had a response rate of 87,88%, whereas the administrative
tribunals had a response rate of 76,92%. All the high courts, the SJP, and the National Registry of Attorneys
responded to the information requests. This is different from the number of courts that provided complete
information, as some courts only provided a formal response. The last response I received from an
institution was on February 25th, 2019, which means that the information was collected in about four
months.

11.3. Information requests concerning group representation in legal education

As I will explain in more detail later, access to good quality legal education rapidly became one
topic that always arose during my research process, which increased the need to gather data about Afrodescendants’ access to law schools. Since there was a virtual absence of data concerning the gender and
ethno-racial composition of the legal profession, I decided to submit information requests to a group of law
schools to inquire about the levels of Afro-descendant, indigenous, and women's presence in legal
education. According to the data provided by Colombia's National Information System of Higher
Education, by 2018, there were approximately 228 active undergraduate law programs with a qualified
registry in the law related areas of knowledge core.304 However, some institutions appeared several times
in the same registry, which means that the number of programs it was likely much lower. The proliferation
of law programs in Colombia is extensive. I decided to send information requests only to a sample of them.
The universities selected for this data collection exercise were those that had graduated Magistrates of the
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Constitutional Court of Colombia. Since the Constitutional Court is the most prominent in the country, it
was likely that they had graduated from law schools that provide high-quality education. Although this was
not necessarily the case, the sample had the mere intention of providing a view of the level of presence of
ethno-racial minorities in this area. In addition to these institutions, I also submitted an information request
directly to the Minister of Education, which asked about this same topic.
The information requests addressed to the Ministry of Education and the universities explained the
purposes of my search and required them to inform on the number of undergraduate programs in law that
had Ministerial approval. They were also asked to inform on the number of students matriculated and the
number of graduates from such programs in the past five years, indicating how many of them are women,
Afro-descendants, indigenous persons, Afro-descendant women, and indigenous women. I also asked them
to explain why they could not provide such data in case they did not deliver it. Likewise, I inquired about
affirmative action policies for the same population groups in these law schools.
I submitted 13 rights of petition in total, some of which were sent by e-mail and some in hard copy.
The first right of petition was sent on March 3rd, 2019. A total of 9 institutions (69.2%) offered some type
of response to the information requests—this is lower than the number that provided the needed data. The
last response was received on June 4th, 2019, which means that the data was collected in approximately
three months. 58 was the average number of calendar days that took an institution to reply.

11.4. Data collection through interviews and site visits

In addition to the information requests, I also decided to conduct semi-structured interviews to
gather additional data, and to identify about potential reasons for the marginal level of Afro-descendant
representation on Colombia's courts.
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11.4.1. Interview process

I requested IRB approval to conduct approximately 60 interviews with four types of relevant actors
in the context of Afro-descendant representation in courts. Fordham University's IRB approved my
application on February 25th, 2019.

11.4.2. Purposeful sampling

The interviews were held with:
-Judges, the majority of whom were Afro-descendants.
-Afro-descendant judicial employees, the majority of whom were Afro-descendant.
-Afro-descendant attorneys.

In the case of judges and judicial employees, I was particularly interested in interviewing those
who were Afro-descendants because I believe they are the ones who could better identify the different
obstacles that they have faced at entering the court system. However, the perspectives of non-Afro
descendant judges and judicial employees also proved to be essential for the study, mainly because of the
anticipated dearth of Afro-descendants working in certain courts. In the case of Afro-descendant lawyers,
the rationale behind interviewing them is that they could be potential applicants to become judges or judicial
employees in the future, and could provide additional perspectives to understand the obstacles to become
part of the court system. Attorneys could also provide insights about whether the minimal number of Afrodescendants serving in the court system impacts their work or the rights of the members of this group when
they come before the tribunals. Due to the need to inquire about the relevance of certain aspects of the
participant's identity, I used self-identification as a way to ascertain the ethno-racial identity in this
component of my research. Asking about the experience of being an Afro-Colombian working for the courts

73

was only suitable for participants who self-identity with such a group. If participants did not identify with
this group, the questions' pertinence would have been undermined.
Since I could not find pre-existing data to help me locate Afro-descendant judges or judicial
employees, I used snowballing sampling as the methodology to identify potential interviewees. I also
utilized my professional network to locate some interviewees, which in turn provided me with the contact
information to reach additional participants. In the case of the attorneys, I also used a directory provided by
the Racial Discrimination Watch (Observatorio de Discriinación Racial), a human rights consortium.305
This database had the contact information of approximately 40 Afro-Colombian lawyers. I had worked with
this organization in the past. I received e-mail authorization from the coordinator of the Racial
Discrimination Watch to use the database to contact potential interviewees on January 29, 2019. I also tried
to balance the regional composition of the sample by conducting a limited number of interviews in every
city.
Initially, the study design contemplated two additional types of participants: Social leaders and
representatives of Afro-descendant civil society organizations and judicial and public servants with a role
in the judge and judicial employee selection process. These interviews were discarded after further
consideration. In the case of civil society organizations, the changing nature of the civic leaders' obligations
made it difficult to schedule appointments successfully. Many appointments were canceled immediately
before, and, in the one case, an interview took place, but the responses of the interviewee made visible that
the organization did not have a formed perspective on this particular issue. In the case of judicial servants
involved in the judicial selection process, I tried to schedule an appointment with a representative of the
Judicial Council of the Judicature. However, the interviewee failed to confirm the appointment or return
my messages.
I interview a total of 45 participants in 8 cities of the Andean, Pacific, Caribbean, and Insular
regions of Colombia, in a period between March 4th and May 15th, 2019. 35.6% of the interviewees were
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attorneys, a similar percentage were judges, and 28.9% were judicial employees. 13.3% of the interviews
were conducted in Medellín, and a similar percentage in San Andrés, 35.6% in Bogotá, 8.9% in Cartagena,
6.7% in Quibdó, 15.6% in Cali, 2.2% in Buenaventura, and a similar percentage in Tumaco. 2.2% were
also completed online. The mean duration of the interviews was 46 minutes, with the shortest interview
lasting 16 minutes and the most extended 102.
Of the 45 participants, 62% identified as men and 38% as women. 88.9% of the interviewees selfidentified as Afro-descendant,306 6.7% as Indigenous, and 4.4% as White/Mestizo. The average age of the
respondents who provided information about their age was 40.2 years.307 44.4% of participants reported
being single, 33.3% married, 17.8% in a marital union and 4.4% did not provide information about their
marital status. Regarding their place of origin, 6.7% reported being from Antioquia and a similar percentage
from Bogotá. 13.3% from Bolívar, 4.4% from Cauca, 2.2% from Cesar, and a similar percentage from
Putumayo. 20% from Chocó, 6.7% from Nariño, 8.9% from the Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia,
and Santa Catalina. 13.3% from Valle del Cauca, and 17.8% did not provide information about their place
of origin. Regarding the rural-urban divide, 77.8% of respondents reported that they grew up in urban areas,
17.8% in rural areas, and 4.4% did not provide information in this regard. In terms of the highest degree of
education attained, 15.5% of the sample held a bachelor's degree and the same percentage a post-graduate
diploma (specialization),308 62.2% a master’s degree, and 6.7% a doctorate. Regarding the type of
institution where they completed their secondary education, 24.4% of respondents declared that they
completed high school education in a private institution, 73.3% in a public institution, and 2.2% did not
answer this question. The mean year of graduation of those who provided information about the year they
received their bachelor’s degree was 2001.309 60% of interviewees graduated from a private college and
40% from a public college.
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11.4.3. Interview’s content

The interview protocol for judges and judicial employees included four types of questions: About
the experience of becoming judges or judicial employees; about the interaction of the interviewee's identity
and the work they do; about their perceptions on Afro-descendant representation on the courts; about
situations of discrimination. In the case of the attorneys, sections 1) and 2) were replaced by general
questions about their professional experience and their perceptions of the justice system. The exact
questions in the protocol can be found in the annexes.

11.4.4. The rationale for interview questions

I decided to use the first group of questions as a way to identify, based on their experiences, barriers,
obstacles, or situations that shaped the interviewees' access to the courts and the legal profession. The
second group of questions intended to capture the participants' perspectives on whether (and if so, how)
judges' identities influence judicial activity. The third group of questions had the intention of gathering
additional data on the ethno-racial composition of Latin American courts, and to supplement, provide
context and meaning to the data collected through the information request component of the research.
Lastly, the final group of questions had the intention of inquiring about experiences of discrimination in the
context of the judicial system in order to identify potential prejudice-related factors affecting Afrodescendant access to judicial institutions.

11.4.5. Vetting

Before being submitted to the IRB approval process, my academic advisor, and a colleague who
has significant experience working on Afro-descendant issues in Colombia vetted the interview protocol.
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11.4.6. Conducting the interviews

In order to conduct the interviews, I asked permission to collect data directly to the judges, judicial
employees, and attorneys. They could decide whether or not they desired to participate. In order to conduct
the interviews, I visited the cities of Medellín, Bogotá, San Andrés, Cartagena, Quibdó, Cali, Buenaventura,
and Tumaco. These sites were selected based on the findings acquired during stage two of the research
process, their significant levels of Afro-descendant population, and their role in the public and economic
life of the nation.
The interviews took place in courthouses, public offices, attorney's offices, restaurants, and other
spaces at the convenience of the interviewees. In general, the interview process took place as follows: After
I made initial contact with the potential interviewee, I explained the purposes of my study, its objectives,
and the types of questions they would be asked if they agreed to participate. I stressed the fact that they
were completely free to decline my proposition, and that no unwanted repercussions would occur to them
if they chose to decline. Before I started to formulate questions, I would answer to any concerns the
participants would have and provided them the informed consent forms (in Spanish), so they could sign
them if they agreed to participate in the research project. Immediately after, I proceeded to conduct the
interview, which was audio-recorded in two separate devices. Once the interview concluded, I would ask
participants to fill out the socio-demographic questionnaire, which I used to compile certain biographic
information about the interviewees. Finally, I would ask participants if they could identify other persons
that fall within the selection criteria that might be interested in participating in the study. Whenever possible,
the first contact and subsequent interviews with participants were conducted in person. In certain occasions,
I contacted participants beforehand by phone, text messages, e-mail, or social media.
The interviews’ audios were transcribed into text in the Spanish language. I used Atlas.ti, a
qualitative data analysis software to code, organize and analyze the information collected through the
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interview process and the notes stemming from the direct observation exercises, which I will reference in
the following section.

11.4.7. Site Visits

In addition to the interviews, I completed a group of site visits to some courts in the cities of
Medellín, Cartagena, San Andrés, Tumaco, and Buenaventura. These visits had the purpose of partially
observing the composition of the judiciary in these cities and to witness some judicial proceedings taking
place at the moment of my visit. During these visits, I took notes that were analyzed with the same software
I used to code the data produced by the interviews. The primary purpose of these visits was to supplement
the information I obtained through the interview concerning the ethno-racial composition of the judicial
institutions in several cities. Notably, site visits allowed me to appreciate the level of presence or absence
of Afro-descendants in the courts in locations where finding interviewees was difficult. Unlike in the
interview process, in the site visits, the ethno-racial composition of the courts was assessed through heteroidentification.
In the following chapter, I will refer to the research findings.
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II.

“In Colombia we are all mestizos”: Afro-descendant representation on Colombian courts

In this chapter, I will refer to several aspects concerning the composition of Colombian courts,
including the judicial activity and the institutional problems that affect the judicial system in Colombia; the
selection mechanisms for magistrates, judges, and judicial employees; the competing narratives on race
present at the courts, which became visible during the data collection process;310 the gender and ethnoracial composition of the legal profession and judicial institutions in Colombia; and the specific impact that
geographical location has on the ethno-racial composition of judicial institutions in the country.

1. The judicial activity and institutional problems affecting the judicial system in Colombia

During a normal day at the courthouses, judicial servers (judges and judicial employees) spend
most of their time reading case-dockets, attending hearings, engaging in legal research, drafting opinions,
and issuing rulings.311 Judges and magistrates dedicate a significant part of their time to coordinate,
supervise, and review the work of their chamber’s judicial employees. They also debate cases with other
judges (in situations of collegiate courts) and perform specific administrative duties.312 Some of the study
participants commented that, in most cases, courts operate as islands, separated from one another. A court
rarely knows about the work of another court. This isolation is particularly true in the case of judges who
do not serve in panels.313
The respondents agreed on the idea that a person must have substantive experience and outstanding
academic credentials to become a judge. These qualifications facilitate the access to the bench, at least in
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the cases of career positions. Working at a judicial institution has impacts on judicial servers, both inside
and outside the courthouses. In the case of inter-personal interactions inside the courts, most participants
describe their professional relations with colleagues as good.314 Concerning the impact that the judicial
activity has on their personal lives, some judges asserted that they need to maintain a low profile and
sufficient distance from attorneys who litigate in their jurisdictions since they need to preserve the
perception of impartiality.315 Despite the general indications of positive work environments, interviewees
affirmed that formalism and hierarchy characterize the judicial activity in Colombia.316 A participant who
has several years of experience working at the high court level mentioned that, in this layer of the judiciary,
auxiliary magistrates are:

a precious asset because of how the law is spoken and told in these spaces, which is different from
the everyday life of regular judges. It is a superior view, a different view; the rigor that the appeal
techniques demand—and that it is not easy [to learn]—leads, one way or the other, to grant
preference to those who have mastered that form of expressing the law.317

An interviewee discussed how this hierarchy could also be felt in the subtleness of language. The
participant stated that is not uncommon to hear judges calling “my employees” to the judicial personnel
working at their chambers despite their actual employer being the judicial branch—in many cases, judges
do not have the power to remove judicial employees from their stations directly.318 Hierarchy is also visible
in the architecture of judicial institutions. During my site visit to Medellín's main judicial complex, I noticed
that there were three separate entrances for accessing the judicial building. One was reserved for judicial
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servers, another for attorneys, and the last one for the general public. This arrangement seems to convey a
clear stratification of the different types of participants in the judicial ecosystem.319
Hierarchy is also present in the salary differences of judicial servers. According to data made
available by a Colombian NGO, in early 2018, the monthly salaries for judicial functionaries (judges and
magistrates) were approximately: 32,500,000 COP (11,000 USD) for high court magistrates; 25,100,000
COP (8,655 USD) for intermediate tribunal magistrates; 10,600,000 COP (3,655 USD) for specialized
judges; 9,500,000 COP (3,275 USD) for circuit judges; and 8,100,000 COP (2,793 USD) for municipal
judges.320 A high court magistrate makes roughly four times as much as a municipal judge.321 Similar wage
differences are present in the case of judicial employees: Auxiliary magistrates and specialized
professionals 33, which are the first and second highest-earning judicial employee positions, made
25,100,000 COP (8,655 USD) and 8,700,000 (3,000 USD), respectively.322 The first position pays almost
three times as much as the second one per month.
Hierarchization becomes notorious in the role that higher-ranking judges have in the evaluation of
lower judges’ performance.323 Judges and judicial employees’ evaluation process considers four factors:
quality, efficiency, organization, and publications.324 Magistrates of high courts and intermediate tribunals
are subjected to this assessment process every two years, whereas regular judges and judicial employees
are evaluated annually.325 Functional superiors appraise the “quality” of the judges and judicial employees’
work. The high courts’ magistrates assess the quality of the intermediate tribunals’ judges in their respective
jurisdiction. These magistrates, in turn, value the work of circuit court judges.326
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Another topic that came up several times during the interviews was the judicial overload and the
limited resources of the judicial system. According to the data provided by the Superior Council of the
Judicature, by November 6, 2018, there were 32,298 judicial servants in Colombia, of which 5,354 were
judges, and 26,944 were judicial employees. Nevertheless, the justice system is overstretched due to the
high number of cases pending resolution. The number of judges and judicial employees insufficient for
meeting the justice demand.327 An interviewee claimed that in the city of Tumaco, for example, there is
only one specialized criminal judge in charge of deciding approximately 800 pending cases.328
Overburden translates into significant delays in the processing of cases. Delays can last for several
years, even for conflicts that lack significant complexity, and be more significant at the top of the judicial
system.329 An interviewee mentioned that while she was working for a high court in the year 2009, the
court was issuing rulings in cases that had initiated in the year 2001.330 Participants consistently identified
judicial congestion as a factor that contributed to the denial of access to justice and legal remedies in many
cases.331 In addition to this circumstance, the Superior Council of the Judicature’ case-processing goals can
be exceedingly ambitious. A participant, who serves as an intermediate tribunal magistrate, mentioned that
for the 2019-2021 period, the Council had established a benchmark of roughly 750 decisions per year for
these tribunals. For the interviewee, this goal appeared impossible to reach.332
Lack of sufficient resources, insufficient institutional capacity, and inadequate infrastructure are
significant problems for judicial institutions in Colombia. Courts lack adequate infrastructure and office
space. I could see directly that several courthouses had cracks in their ceilings and trash accumulating in
the hallways—side by side with case dockets that could not be fitted into the regular storage facilities.333
This situation was visible even in the responses that the courts gave to my information requests concerning
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the composition of judicial institutions. The lack of a centralized database with the résumes of all judicial
servants, and the absence of an updated and publicly available directory of courthouses are examples of this
institutional precariousness.334
These findings seem to fall in line with previous literature on Latin American judiciaries’
institutional precariousness.335 Nevertheless, as Jorge Esquirol notes, it is important not to overstate the
challenges that such limitations pose on the rule of law in Latin America, especially in comparison to other
regions of the world.336 Esquirol argues that the generalized perception of failure can be harmful for Latin
American societies, as this image undermines the legitimacy of state institutions, discards pre-reform
options present in the existing Latin American law, and weakens the position of the region’s countries in
the hemispheric legal relations.337

2. Selection mechanisms for magistrates, judges and judicial employees

It is crucial to differentiate among three types of judicial positions in order to explicate the different
mechanisms used for judicial server selection. These are high court magistrates; career magistrates, judges,
and judicial employees' positions; provisional and temporary magistrate, judges, and judicial employees'
positions; and free appointment and removal judicial employees' positions.
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2.1. High court magistrates

Each of Colombia’s high courts has a different magistrate selection procedure. The requirements
to become a Magistrate of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council are
established in article 232 of the Constitution.338 In the case of the Constitutional Court, the Senate (the
upper house of the Colombian Congress) has the power to appoint the magistrates. They select magistrates
out of three-name lists of candidates. The President, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the State Council
may propose three lists each.339 The Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council’s magistrates are
appointed by the existing members of this court, out of a list of candidates submitted by the Administrative
Chamber of the Superior Council of the Judicature.340 The term for these positions is eight years.
Magistrates cannot be reappointed.341 It is not necessary to have been engaged in a judicial career to occupy
one of these judicial positions.342
In the case of the Superior Council of the Judicature—Administrative Chamber, the State Council
selects three of the magistrates, the Supreme Court of Justice selects two, and the Constitutional Court
selects one. Congress appoints the magistrates of the Superior Council of the Judicature—Disciplinary
Chamber from three-name lists that the National Government submits.343 All Magistrates of the Superior
Council of the Judicature are elected for non-renewable 8-year terms.344
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In the case of the SJP, the magistrates of the Peace Tribunal need to fulfill the same requirements
established for the magistrates of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the State Council.345 In
the case of the magistrates of the SJP’s chambers, they need to comply with the same requirements of the
magistrates of the superior tribunals of judicial district.346 The magistrates of the SJP, whose term will last
for the lifetime of the jurisdiction, were appointed by a selection committee.347 This committee was
composed of delegates of the Supreme Court of Justice—Penal Chamber, the United Nations General
Secretary, the Permanent Commission of the State University System, the President of the European Court
of Human Rights, and the International Center for Transitional Justice’s mission to Colombia.348
The judicial selection mechanisms for the high courts are political. Putting aside the basic
requirements for the positions (which many candidates can potentially meet), the institutions who nominate
or elect the magistrates have broad discretion to select the persons who will be appointed. Hence, the
process is not necessarily centered around the idea of "finding the best candidate." There is no obligation
for the selecting institution to pick the most qualified applicant since there is a lack of specific parameters
to determine who the most competent contestant might be.

2.2. Career magistrates, judges, and judicial employees

According to article 125 of the Colombian Constitution, as a general rule, posts at the state’s organs
and institutions are career positions. Access to them needs to follow the parameters established in the law
to determine the merit and virtues of potential candidates.349 In the specific case of the judiciary, article
156 of Law 270 of 1996 mentions that:
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The judicial career is based in the professional character of functionaries and employees, in the
efficacy of their work, in the guarantee of equality of possibilities in the access to career to all
citizens that are apt for it, and in the consideration of merit as the fundamental principle for the
access, remaining, and promotion in service.350

In consequence, as a general rule, access to judicial positions should take place through meritselection, which shall seek to retain talent, improve judicial servers’ skills, and secure an adequate provision
of justice services to all citizens.351 All intermediate tribunals’ magistrates, judges, and judicial employees
positions that the law does not explicitly name as being of free appointment and removal are career
positions. Merit selection is expected to determine access to these posts.352 The Superior Council of the
Judicature is the institution in charge of managing the judicial career.353
In the case of judges and magistrates, the selection process to access career positions are expected
to be recurrent, open and public. The process consists of has five steps: The merit contest; the composition
of a national eligibles' registry; the creation of a candidates’ lists; the appointment; and the confirmation.354
In the case of judicial employees, step two is followed directly by the conveyance of the eligibles' list and
the appointment.355
The merit contest evaluates the applicants’ knowledge, capabilities, experience, and personal
conditions. The contest has two parts: The selection, which includes an assortment of the applicants to
become part of the eligibles’ registry—usually done through a group of tests and exams; and the
classification, which involves the creation of an applicants' ranking based on merit.356 The Superior Council
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of the Judicature undertakes the creation of the national eligibles' registry for the magistrates, judges, and
judicial employees’ vacancies, in which it includes the candidates who approved the previous stage of the
process. In the registry, candidates are ranked based on merit. This registry expires after four years of being
created.357 The following step (list of candidates) is the provision of positions to be covered with the lists
of names. The list shall include at least five candidates.358 After this stage, every time there is a vacancy in
a court, the nominating institution needs to notify the judicial administrators, which, in turn, will appoint
the person selected to fill out the vacancy.359
In the case of judges and magistrates, applicants who will occupy these positions for the first time
ought to pass a judicial training course.360 This course has the purpose of training candidates to fulfill their
obligations as judges. The course can be a step in the selection process, in which case it is known as “cursoconcurso” (course-contest). The course-contest has an eliminatory function. If candidates do not approve
a stage of the contest, they are removed from the selection process.361
Concerning the security of their positions, judges who attained their seats through merit-selection
have tenure over their stations.362 They can stay on their seats until they decide to resign, receive a pension,
reach the age of mandatory retirement (70 years of age), or are removed from their positions. Removal can
only occur due to negative performance in their work, because of a disciplinary or criminal process, or
because of other narrowly defined circumstances.363 These rules give a certain sense of employment
stability to career judges.364
A significant difference between the selection process for high court magistrates and career
magistrates, judges, and judicial employees is that in the case of the latter, the selection process seeks to
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recruit the most qualified applicants. In contrast, in the case of high court magistrates, the selection is mainly
political. However, according to some participants, the merit-selection process is flawed and can lead to
disparate impacts on individual applicants. I will discuss these aspects in the next chapter.

2.3. Provisional and temporary magistrates, judges and judicial employees

As I previously explained, according to the law, judicial positions are expected to be occupied by
persons who have undergone a merit-selection process. However, under certain circumstances, these
positions can be left vacant, either definitively or temporarily. Vacancies open the door for the appointment
of provisional or temporary judicial servers.
Provisional judicial servers (either magistrates, judges, or judicial employees) are appointed in
situations in which there is a definitive vacancy (e.g., resignation). Provisionality can also happen when
there is a short-term vacancy that is not filled out by a temporary commission (encargo), or that will last
more than six months.365 A commission takes place when there is a need to appoint a judicial servant to
temporarily cover another position. This commission should last for a maximum of two months, after which
there must to be a new appointment (either provisional or through merit selection).366 The law establishes
that provisional judicial servants should not remain in those positions for longer than six months in cases
of definitive vacancies since, by that time, a merit-based appointment should take place.367 Although, as I
will explain in more detail in another section of the manuscript, provisional appointments are, in reality,
not only widespread in the judiciary but can also last for years.
There are no clear rules to appoint provisional judicial servants, which allows for the nominating
institution’s discretion to play a significant role in the provisional appointment of magistrates, judges, and
judicial employees. The Constitutional Court has stated in several decisions that, following the principle of
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merit, "… judicial functionaries shall be elected from a list or registry created through a public merit contest,
regardless of the position being only temporal."368 In theory, provisional judges should be selected from
the pool of candidates included in the eligibles' list instead of being dependent upon the nominating
institution's discretion. Nevertheless, the selection of provisional judicial servants continue to be
discretional in many cases.

2.4. Free appointment and removal judicial employees

The free appointment and removal judicial employees are positions in which the judicial employee
can be hired and dismissed at the discretion of the nominating authority. Free appointment and removal
positions are relatively exceptional in the judicial branch, and they need to be established by law.369 Some
examples of these positions are the auxiliary magistrates and other judicial employee positions in the high
courts, assistant lawyer positions, positions that are dependent upon the office of the presidency of the high
courts or the office of intermediate tribunals’ magistrates.370 Several judicial employee positions of the SJP
are also of free appointment and removal.371

3. The competing narratives on race present at the courts

During the data collection process, courts seemed to convey competing narratives about race and
race relations in Colombia. There was a marked difference between the narratives on race articulated in the
answers to the rights of petition and those that judicial servers communicated during the interviews. In their
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answers to the information requests, courts tended not to recognize the relevance of race in the composition
of judicial institutions. In contrast, judges and judicial employees seemed to acknowledge the relevance of
race and even offered accounts concerning situations of race discrimination during the interview processes.
I will refer to the two narratives about race that were evident during the data collection process: The refusal
to acknowledge race and the use of the mestizaje narratives visible in the responses to the rights of the
petition and the acknowledgment of racial tensions during the interview process.

3.1. The refusal to acknowledge race and the use of the mestizaje narratives present
in the responses to the rights of petition

Judicial institutions avoided discussing race in several forms in their responses to the rights of
petition. This denial of race can is visible, for example, in that certain courts declined to provide information
about their ethno-racial composition. The State Council refused to provide information concerning the
ethno-racial composition of the institution, arguing that the racial or ethnic origin was sensible data
protected by the right to habeas data (a type of data protection/privacy right). This answer is troubling. My
information requested complied with Colombia's data protection law, which allows data-collection on race
and ethnicity if the data is anonymized and used for scientific or academic purposes.372 Also, most courts
in the country, including the Constitutional Court, provided the requested data, which is additional evidence
that the information could be handed out without any legal infringement.
The State Council was not the only court that declined to answer my request. Courts used different
resources for not providing the requested information. The Supreme Court of Justice enunciated that such
institution "is governed by principles of merit and equality," without providing any further explanation of
its refusal to address the petition's queries. I believe that the use of the idea of merit in this context is
strategic since it allows courts to avoid discussing issues of race in their composition. This use of the idea
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of merit as a means to not acknowledging race was also present in the courts' responses to the questions
concerning affirmative action policies. Courts seemed to agree that, since the principle of merit governs the
judicial career in Colombia, the law does not allow for any form of affirmative action programs in the
judiciary.
A third example worth mentioning concerning how courts and judicial servants attempt to avoid
discussing race is the response that the Superior Tribunal of Santa Marta gave to the right of petition. Instead
of informing the ethno-racial composition of the court, the Tribunal sent me a link to the court’s webpage,
in which there were bios and pictures of the judicial servers—apparently suggesting that I should be the
one making the assessment. After I iterated my request, the tribunal simply stated that the institution did
not have among its duties the administrative affairs I was inquiring about and did not provide any further
comment on the matter.
I consider that these situations convey aversion to acknowledge the relevance of race inside judicial
institutions, which seems to be an example of how courts may also consider race as a taboo. I also think
that these findings resemble those found by Mathilde Cohen when discussing judicial diversity in
“colorblind” France, as she also reported different ways in which French judges would use different
mechanisms to avoid discussing race in the context of the judiciary.373
Another type of response seemed to downplay the role of race by using mestizaje accounts to excuse
the low levels of Afro-descendant representation on Colombian judicial institutions. For example, the
answer provided by the Superior Tribunal of Armenia mentioned that, even though no Afro-descendants or
indigenous persons were working at that court, "A majority of persons in Latin America descend from the
indigenous peoples.” Regarding how the data was collected, the Superior Tribunal of Pamplona stated:
“Being Colombia a mestizo society, the ethno-racial aspects you asked about are answered exclusively in
relation to the more general traits of them and in response to the way the servers self-refence themselves.”
Finally, the Superior Tribunal of Cali affirmed that, although none of the magistrates of that court self-
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identified as Afro-descendant or indigenous: "Nevertheless, in reality, in Colombia we are all mestizos
because Spain colonized us."
These responses seem to minimize the relevance of race in the context of the judiciary. Likewise,
they reflect how mestizaje narratives have impacted the discussion of race relations in Latin America, as
documented in previous literature.374 The myth of mestizaje dictates that miscegenation among European
colonizers, indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans has erased the distinctions among such groups over
time. This doctrine states that miscegenation led to the creation of a mestizo identity that is distinct from,
but inclusive of all, the previous ethno-racial identities.
Mestizaje has historically been used as a rationale for not recognizing racial tensions in Latin
America. Tanya Hernandez explains that the cultural model of mestizaje has permitted states to defend the
idea that, in the region, racial classifications are difficult to use,375 and has encouraged people not to classify
themselves on racial terms, as racial classifications are deemed divisive and unwarranted.376 Likewise,
Tianna Paschel explicates that the mestizaje narratives were a tool used to deny the existence of racial
discrimination and inequality in this region.377
Some argue that the mestizaje discourses provided an egalitarian façade for racial domination and
that they allowed Latin American national elites to create a system of racial inequality that would last longer
than those of South Africa and the United States.378 As an example, in the context of Brazil, despite the
clear racial stratification of society, the lack of a state definition of race prevented for a long time Afrodescendants from developing a group consciousness with the potential to move onto collective action.379
Similar situations have taken place in other Latin American countries, too. In Ecuador, discussions about
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racial and ethnic discrimination have turned into a controversial issue, as the idea that everybody is mestizo
has precluded a substantive debate around this topic.380 Thus, it is not atypical that certain courts had used
mestizaje narratives to minimize the relevance of the low level of Afro-descendant representation in
Colombia's judicial institution.
A Tianna Paschel explains, in Colombia, the idea of mestizaje has been more welcoming to the
indigenous heritage than to its African component.381 This condition has contributed to the erasing of Afrodescendants from country's history, their invisibilization in the national memory, and their geographic
confinement.382 Because of this, it is not strange that, at evoking mestizaje narratives in their answers,
certain courts emphasized the indigenous component in the Colombian racial mix, disregarding the Afrodescendant legacy.

3.2. The broad acknowledgment of race during the interview process

A different type of judicial discourse about race offered by the courts is the one that recognizes it
as a condition that shapes social relations. This type of narrative appeared to be more prevalent in the
interview process. On several occasions, the participants referred to different instances at which race
seemed to shape social relations. A judge in a city of the Andean region of Colombia mentioned that many
of the cases before her court that involved Afro Colombian persons related to aspects such as the protection
of the constitutional rights of forcibly displaced persons and the recognition of social security benefits and
labor rights for construction workers. The judge mentioned that “behind great civil constructions there is a
vast Afro population, because […] the men are dedicated in a very protagonist way to activities that only

380

Scott H. Beck, Kenneth J. Mijeski & Meagan M. Stark, ¿Qué Es Racismo?: Awareness of Racism and
Discrimination in Ecuador, 46 LAT. AM. RES. REV. 102–125, 102–103 (2011).
381
PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 41. (Noting that: “mestizo Colombia largely excluded blacks from the national discourse.
Rather, the mixture of European and Indian blood came to signify what it was to be Colombian”).
382
Id. at 41–42.

93

they [Afro-descendant men] do.”383 Another judge mentioned that labor law litigation concerning domestic
workers' rights tended to include Afro-descendant women because "as a general rule, you see many Afrodescendant domestic workers.”384 A third one enumerated several industries in which Afro-descendants
were commonly engaged in, such as restaurants, construction, postal services, security, and other manuallabor jobs.385 Similarly, another judge described that it was noticeable to him that Afro-descendants tended
to be a large number of those processed by the criminal justice system in the Caribbean coast region.386
Some judicial employees also emphasized that Afro-descendants comprise a significant portion of the
victims of the internal armed conflict and those appearing before transitional justice mechanisms.387
I believe that these comments reflect that judicial servers are aware of how Colombian society is
stratified based on race. They can see that certain types of social issues affect Afro-descendant communities
more strongly than others or even provide accounts of the racialization of certain occupations. These
accounts seem to convey awareness about the relevance of race and the existence of racial inequality in
society, by contrast to the apparent race-less narratives that the courts tended to provide in the responses to
the rights of petition. Moreover, as I will explain in the following chapters, interviewees were also aware
of the lack of diversity in judicial institutions in Colombia, and even discussed racial tensions present inside
the judicial system and in the interactions that take place inside of courtrooms.
I think that there are several reasons for why race was discussed differently in the responses of the
rights of petition and the interview processes. In the responses to the rights of petition, the courts were
providing written responses to a citizen's inquiry. During the interview process, the participants were
providing individual—confidential—responses to a researcher’s questionnaire. Furthermore, given the
composition of the high courts and intermediate tribunals, it is likely that the responses to the rights of
petition were prepared by white-mestizo judicial servers who could have more hegemonic views on race
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relations. In contrast, Afro Colombian judges, judicial employees, and attorneys, composed most of the
study's sample. Interviewees might have experiential knowledge about racial inequalities. Despite the lack
of a definitive explanation for these differences, it was apparent that there were critical contrasts in how
race was treated at different moments of the research process.
In the following pages, I will discuss the existing data on the composition of the legal profession
and judicial institutions in Colombia.

4. Data on the composition of the legal profession

According to the National Registry of Attorneys, by November 22nd, 2018, in Colombia, there were
approximately 304,705 attorneys with valid licenses and 13,340 without valid licenses registered before the
Superior Council of the Judicature. If we consider that, according to the National Administrative
Department for Statistics’ preliminary data on the 2018 census, Colombia’s population is estimated to be
approximately 45,500,000 individuals, Colombia has approximately 445 validly licensed attorneys per
every 100.000 persons.388

4.1. Gender distribution

Of the total number of attorneys with valid licenses, approximately 149,449 were women, which
means that women account for approximately 49.047% of the total number of attorneys with valid licenses.
If we consider that women are approximately 51.4% of the country’s population, then it is possible to assert
that women appear to be only slightly underrepresented in the pool of licensed attorneys.389
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Percentage of licensed attorneys by gender [2018]
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

4.2. Ethno-racial distribution

The National Registry of Attorneys does not collect data on ethno-racial identity. The registry did
not provide further explanation regarding why the database could account for the gender breakdown but
not for the ethno-racial breakdown. It only mentioned that the requested information is not included in the
format (template) for the inscription before the registry.

4.3. Regional distribution

I also requested data regarding the number of licenses issued before every sectional council of the
judicature. Since these institutions are located in different parts of the national territory, the data about the
application request is relevant since it may suggest regional variances regarding where in the country
attorneys are applying for their licenses.
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Percentage of attorney licenses by sectional council of the judicature
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The National Registry of Attorneys' data indicates that central regions of the country, such as
Cundinamarca, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca, tend to account for higher percentages of attorney licenses
issuance than other regions. This distribution could indicate that these regions might also have high
percentages of legal professionals.
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5. Data on the composition Colombian judicial institutions

5.1. The composition of the high courts

There are four high courts in the Colombian judiciary: The Constitutional Court, the State Council,
the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Superior Council of the Judicature. In addition to these judicial bodies,
my analysis also includes the SJP. In order to explain these results with more clarity, I separately refer to
the data on magistrates (high court judges), auxiliary magistrates, and judicial employees.

5.1.1.

High court magistrates

Number of high court and SJP magistrates [2018]
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

According to the answers that the courts provided, 134 magistrates serve in the four high courts
and the SJP. I noted that the courts’ report on the number of magistrate seats and the number of those that
women occupy contradicted the number of magistrate seats that the Superior Council of the Judicature
reported. As an example, in the case of the State Council, that court reported that there was a total number
of 27 magistrate seats, 6 of which were occupied by women. In contrast, the Superior Council of the
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Judicature reported for that court a total number of 30 magistrate seats, 9 of which were occupied by women.
Since these reports do not seem to match (possibly due to seat vacancies or communication issues), I
decided to use, whenever possible, the numbers that the courts reported about their composition. I assume
that the information that the courts reported about themselves is likely to be more accurate, given the
proximity between the institution providing the information and the object that information refers to.

5.1.1.1. Gender composition

Percentage of women magistrates in the high courts
and the SJP [2018]
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

According to the answers that the courts provided, women occupy 47 out of the 134 Magistrate
seats in the high courts and the SJP. They account for 35% of the total of magistrates. Although generally
underrepresented among the high courts, women magistrate' numbers are better (and reach parity level
when compare to the total number of judges) in the SJP (19 out of 38), than in the Superior Council of the
Judicature (5 out of 13), the Constitutional Court (3 of 9), the Supreme Court of Justice (14 out of 47) and
the State Council (6 out of 27).
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5.1.1.2. Ethno-racial composition

Only the Constitutional Court and the SJP provided data about their ethno-racial composition.
These two courts seem to represent two opposite realities about Afro-descendants and indigenous persons’
representation in judicial institutions. Of the 38 magistrates in the SJP, 4 are indigenous persons, and 4 are
Afro-descendants. Each group accounts for approximately 10.53% of the magistrate seats on this court.
Furthermore, there are three Afro-descendant women and two indigenous women serving on this court,
which means that 7.89% of the court’s magistrates are Afro-descendant women, and 5.26% are indigenous
women. In contrast, in the Constitutional Court, there is not a single judge who is indigenous or Afrodescendant.
Since Afro-descendants and indigenous persons compose approximately 10.62% and 3.43% of
Colombia’s National Population,390 Afro-descendants Magistrates in the SJP appear to have achieved parity
representation levels between these two metrics. Indigenous magistrates have tripled their level of
representation when compared to their share of the national population.

Ethno-racial composition of the Constitutional Court
and the SJP in numbers [2018]
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Percentage of Afro-descendant and indigenous
magistrates in the SJP [2018] compared to their share
of Colombia's national population [2005]
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5.1.2.

High court auxiliary magistrates

I obtained data regarding the number of auxiliary magistrates in the SJP and all the high courts,
except the Supreme Court of Justice. In these institutions, there is a total of 295 auxiliary magistrates, with
the State Council having the highest number of them, and the Constitutional Court having the lowest.

Number of high court and the SJP auxiliary magistrates
[2018]
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5.1.2.1. Gender composition

Out of the 295 auxiliary justices whose gender was informed, 133 were women, accounting for
45.08% of the total number. Although women are underrepresented when compared to their share of the
national population, they are more numerous in the State Council (60 out of 125), than in the Constitutional
Court (13 out of 28), the Superior Council of the Judicature (36 out of 83) and the SJP (24 out of 59).

Percentage of high court and the SJP women auxiliary
magistrates [2018]
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5.1.2.2. Ethno-racial composition

The high courts and the SJP did not provide information regarding the ethno-racial composition of
their auxiliary magistrates, except in the case of the Constitutional Court, where there is not a single Afrodescendant or indigenous auxiliary magistrate.
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5.1.3.

Other judicial employees

In the case of judicial employees that are not auxiliary magistrates, the high courts and the SJP
reported a total of 1,832 employee positions unevenly distributed among the different courts. The Supreme
Court of Justice did not inform data regarding judicial employees.

Number of judicial employee positions in the high
courts and the SJP [2018]
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[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

5.1.3.1. Gender composition

Women occupy 1,010 of the 1,832 employee positions reported for the high courts and the SJP.
They comprise 55.13% of the employees working for these courts. In consequence, women are not
underrepresented when compared to their share of the national population at this level of the judiciary. They
surpass the level of representation that men have. Women’s numbers are particularly high in the case of the
Constitutional Court (143 out of 227), followed by the State Council (384 out of 674), the Superior Council
of the Judicature (122 out of 228), and, finally, the SJP (361 out of 703).
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Percentage of high courts and the SJP women judicial
employees [2018]
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5.1.3.2. Ethno-racial composition

In the case of judicial employees, only the Constitutional Court provided the requested information.
Indigenous persons and Afro-descendants do not occupy a single one the 227 employee positions reported.

5.1.4.

Participants’

perceptions

of

Afro-descendant

and

indigenous

representation on the high courts

During the interview process, participants agreed that, leaving aside the SJP, Afro-descendants are
virtually absent from the high courts.391 One of the interviewees, an Afro-descendant woman who works
as a judicial employee in a city of the Andean region, described the situation as follows:
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If one goes to the other high courts, the situation is not like that [comparing it to the SJP]. They are
white people, they are men, and men from Bogotá and that attended the best universities in
Colombia. Then, I would say that, in general terms, excluding the SJP from the scene, to access a
good position in a high court, one must have specific credentials apart from being a good lawyer, as
coming from privileged contexts392

Some participants highlighted the low level of Afro-descendant representation on the
Constitutional Court (which has a reputation of being politically progressive in the country), with one of
them stating that no black person had ever been appointed as a tenured magistrate to that court.393 However,
another participant questioned this perceived absence of Afro-descendants at this court. He posed doubts
about the information provided by the court in this regard and asserted that if one used phenotype to assess
representation, one would find at least some Afro-descendants working at this institution.394
In different interviews, participants named particular Afro-descendant persons that worked or used
to work for this court as evidence of at least a certain level of Afro-descendant presence. However, the
names that participants referred to tended to be the same.395 From my perspective, the fact that a singular
black person (or few black people) were always mentioned when discussing Afro-descendant presence at
this space, instead of being proof of inclusion or diversity, seems to evidence tokenism, or the fact that the
number of persons of this ethno-racial group is so low that people can typically refer to "the one" or “the
few” black persons at the institution.
In the case of the other high courts, the situations seem to be similar. An interviewee (who had
previous experience working at the high courts) estimated that out of 150 judicial employees working at
one of the Supreme Court of Justice's chambers only two were Afro-descendants. He also mentioned that
he could not remember seeing more than three Afro-descendants among the entire court's staff, which the
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interviewee estimated in between 500 and 600 judicial employees.396 Likewise, others mentioned that the
lack of Afro-descendants might be affecting the institutions’ interns as well, with one interviewee
mentioning that very few of the high courts’ interns are black,397 and another one, who worked as an intern
for one of the high courts, mentioned that during the time she spent there, she was one of only two black
interns working for that court.398

5.1.5.

The particularities of the SJP

As some of the interviewees pointed out, the SJP is an exception to the trends in the composition
of the high courts in Colombia.399 Women occupy half of the tenured magistrate positions and Afrodescendants and indigenous persons have a level of representation that matches their share of the national
population or exceeds this percentage, respectively.
There are particular explanations for the exceptionality of the SJP in this respect. As I previously
stated, the SJP is a transitional justice mechanism created as a result of the peace process between the
government of Colombia and the FARC-EP (a leftist guerrilla group).400 The Legislative Act 01 of 2017, a
constitutional reform that legally structured the SJP, ordered that: “The jurisdiction shall be conformed
according to criteria that allow the fair participation between men and women, guarantees nondiscrimination, and respects the ethnic and cultural diversity.”401 Moreover, the Presidential Decree 587 of
2017, which regulates the creation of the selection committee for the judges for the newly formed
jurisdiction, mandates: "The Tribunal and each one of its chambers shall be formed with gender equality
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criteria and respect for the ethnic and cultural diversity.”402 As a result, the institutional design of the SJP
considered that ethnic and cultural diversity factors in the magistrate selection. This difference seems to be
the main reason for the higher levels of Afro-descendant and indigenous persons’ presence at that level of
the SJP.
As I previously stated, the SJP did not provide data on its ethno-racial composition beyond the
magistrate level. Different interviewees mentioned that the level of Afro-descendant representation at the
judicial employee level is higher in this judicial institution than in other high courts. Although, some of
them were careful to mention that, despite the significant level of presence, Afro-descendants are still
underrepresented at the SJP. One interviewee, who has significant experience working at this jurisdiction,
commented: "But I would not say that we are 100% represented at the SJP […] there is an appropriate
margin of representativeness, but it is not the same that I would say that is adequate concerning this
institution. Nevertheless, there is a little more [presence].”403 Similarly, another described that at an open
meeting of the institution, which most employees attended, no more than 20 black persons [including all
types of positions] could be counted,404 and a third one mentioned that, to the best of his knowledge, none
of the auxiliary justices of the SJP was Afro-descendant,405 which seems to indicate that the level of Afrodescendant presence at this institution might not be as high among judicial employees as it is among the
group of magistrates.
Ethnic communities took additional steps to guarantee that the representation of indigenous and
Afro-descendants in this institution was not confined to the group of magistrates. During the free, prior and
informed consultation process undertaken to approve the statutory bill that would make the SJP operative,
the representatives of black communities asked the government to add an article to the bill that
operationalized the SJP that stated that the SJP's employees would be appointed based on several criteria,
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including "gender equity [and] cultural and ethnic diversity." They also asked to add ethnic inclusion
language, mentioning that “At the conformation of the SJP’s staff, the inclusion of persons of ethnic peoples
and communities with knowledge and expertise about the fundamental rights of ethnic groups shall be
guaranteed.”406 Although the first reference (consideration of gender equity and ethnic and cultural
diversity in the selection of the staff) was included in several provisions of the resulting statutory law, the
second one (specifically calling for inclusion measures for members of those communities) was excluded
from the final text of the law.407
These fair representation clauses in the legal instruments that crafted the composition of the
jurisdiction were the result of the mobilization effort of the indigenous and Afro-descendant movements.
Ethnic leaders worked tirelessly for the introduction of an ethnic chapter in the peace accords. They also
bargained for the appointment of minorities to positions in the transitional justice institutions.408 One of the
interviewees, who had significant experience working with the Afro-descendant ethnic movement,
mentioned that, amid the peace negotiations, ethnic organizations lobbied for the inclusion of Afrodescendant and indigenous persons in the SJP. Ethnic leaders successfully argued that, since these
populations were some of the most harshly affected by the internal armed conflict in Colombia, they should
be present inside the institutions created to resolve the conflict.409
The distinctive character of the SJP does not end with its composition. It also applies to its
institutional design and procedures.410 The peace accords did not only secure the inclusion of an “ethnic
perspective” into this institution’s work,411 but also the SJP’s magistrates contributed to this process by
using the institution’s internal regulations to create an ethnic commission, which has the purpose of
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guaranteeing the implementation of the ethno-racial perspective in this transitional justice mechanism.412 I
emphasize that the SJP magistrates who belong to ethnic groups are automatic members of this commission,
along with other functionaries of the jurisdiction.413

5.2. Data on the composition of intermediate tribunals

In the case of intermediate tribunals, I will divide the assessment into two segments, referring, first,
to the situation of the magistrates and, second, to the situation of the judicial employees.

5.2.1.

Superior tribunals of judicial district

There is a total of 33 superior tribunals of judicial district in Colombia, distributed across the
national territory. According to the data of the Superior Council of the Judicature, these tribunals represent
a total of 467 magistrate positions. I could obtain data about 345 magistrates’ gender and about 264
magistrates’ ethno-racial identity. These last figures are the ones that I will use as the point of comparison
for our assessment of gender and ethno-racial composition, respectively. The number of registries about
gender is lower than the total number of magistrate seats. The Superior Tribunals of Barranquilla,
Bucaramanga, Manizales, Popayán, Santa Marta, Valledupar, and Villavicencio either did not respond to
the rights of petition or did not provide the required information about the gender composition. In the case
of ethno-racial identity, this number is even lower since the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá (which has 81
Magistrates), provided data about the court members' gender breakdown but not about its ethno-racial
composition.

412
413

Acuerdo 001/18, marzo 9, 2018, Jurisdicción Especial de Paz. [J.E.P.] (Colomb.) art. 103.
Id.
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5.2.1.1. Magistrates

Magistrates’ numbers vary drastically from one court to another, with the biggest court having a
total of 81 Magistrates and the smallest courts having only three.

Number of superior tribunals of judicial district's
magistrates [2018]
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5.2.1.1.1.

Gender composition

In the superior tribunals of judicial district, women occupy 117 out of the 345 seats we could obtain
gender information about, accounting for 33.91% of all magistrates. In consequence, women appear to be
significantly underrepresented in these tribunals. They are a little more than 50% of the national population,
and a similar share of the number of attorneys with valid licenses.

Number of superior tribunals of judicial district's
magistrates vs. number of women magistrates [2018]
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Percentage of women magistrates in the superior
tribunals of judicial district [2018]
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5.2.1.1.2.

Ethno-racial composition

I obtained data about the ethno-racial identity of 245 magistrates. Of these, 9 were Afrodescendants, with 5 of them being Afro-descendant women. Afro-descendants represented around 3.67%
of all the magistrates I have registries about, being significantly underrepresented in this level of the
judiciary as well. They are approximately 10.62% of the national population, according to the 2005 national
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census. Afro-descendant Magistrates are present in Superior Tribunals of Arauca (1 out of 3), Buga (2 out
of 14), Medellín (1 out of 54), Quibdó (1 out of 3), San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina (3 out of
3), and Sincelejo (1 out of 5). Interestingly, Afro-descendant women are slightly more numerous than Afrodescendant men. There is an Afro-descendant magistrate in each of the Superior Tribunals of Arauca, Buga,
Quibdó, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, and Sincelejo.

Number of superior tribunals of judicial district's
magistrates vs. Afro-descendant magistrates [2018]
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Percentage of Afro-descendant magistrates in the
superior tribunals of judicial district [2018]
Superior Tribunal of Yopal

0%

Superior Tribunal of Tunja

0%
20%

Superior Tribunal of Sincelejo
Superior Tribunal of Santa Rosa de Viterbo

0%

Superior Tribunal of San Gil

0%
100%

Superior Tribunal of San Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina

33%

Superior Tribunal of Quibdó
Superior Tribunal of Riohacha

0%

Superior Tribunal of Pereira

0%

Superior Tribunal of Pasto

0%

Superior Tribunal of Pamplona

0%

Superior Tribunal of Neiva

0%

Superior Tribunal of Montería

0%

Superior Tribunal of Mocoa

0%

Superior Tribunal of Medellin

2%

Superior Tribunal of Ibagué

0%

Superior Tribunal of Florencia

0%

Superior Tribunal of Cundinamarca

0%

Superior Tribunal of Cartagena

0%

Superior Tribunal of Cali

0%
14%

Superior Tribunal of Buga
Superior Tribunal of Armenia

0%
33%

Superior Tribunal of Arauca
Superior Tribunal of Antioquia

0%

0%
20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Percentager of Afro descendant Magistrates

[Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

Regarding the ethno-racial breakdown of superior tribunals of judicial district’s magistrates, not a
single tribunal informed having indigenous magistrates, which indicates that indigenous persons may be
completely absent from this part of the Colombian Judiciary.
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5.2.1.2. Judicial employees

In the case of judicial employees, the superior tribunals of judicial district reported a total of 797
judicial employee positions. In addition to the tribunals that did not provide data about their composition,
the superior tribunals of Bogotá and Pasto did not report on the gender and ethno-racial identity of the
judicial employees that occupy these positions. The Superior Tribunal of Cali (which has 58 judicial
employee positions) provided data on the ethno-racial distribution of judicial employees but did not include
the data on the total number of women judicial employees. In conclusion, I had information about the 739
judicial employees' gender and 797 judicial employees' ethno-racial identity.

5.2.1.2.1.

Gender composition

Number of superior tribunals of judicial district's
judicial employees vs. women judicial employees
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Out of the 739 judicial employee positions whose gender was reported, 407 were informed to be
women. Women comprise approximately 55.07% of judicial employees in the Superior tribunals of judicial
district, having surpassed gender parity levels.

Percentage of women judicial employees in the
Superior tribunals of judicial district [2018]
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5.2.1.2.2.

Ethno-racial composition

According to the answers that the courts provided, 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees are
working for the superior tribunals of judicial district. Afro-descendants are approximately 3.51% of the
judicial employees in these tribunals, being significantly underrepresented when compared to their share of
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the national population (10.62%). Of those 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees, 20 are women. Afrodescendant women are approximately 71.42% of all Afro-descendant judicial employees working in these
tribunals. Only four Superior Tribunals reported having Afro-descendant judicial employees: Cali (11 out
of 58), Medellín (1 out of 165), and Quibdó (8 out of 12) and San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina
(8 out of 10). Only two tribunals reported having Afro-descendant men judicial employees: Cali with 6,
and San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina with 3 of them.

Number of superior tribunals of judicial district's
judicial employees vs. Afro-descendant judicial
employees [2018]
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Afro-descendant judicial employees in superior
tribunals of judicial district
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Finally, only a tribunal reported having an indigenous judicial employee, who was also a woman.
One indigenous judicial employee is occupying a position out of 797 reported.

5.2.2.

Administrative tribunals

There is a total of 26 administrative tribunals in Colombia, distributed across different regions of
the national territory. According to the Superior Council of the Judicature, 175 magistrates work at these
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courts. I obtained gender and ethno-racial data about 110 of these magistrates, which will be the total
number to compare the ethno-racial composition of Administrative tribunals' magistrates. The
administrative tribunals of Atlántico, Chocó, Nariño, Quindío, and Risaralda either did not respond to the
information requests or did not provide the requested data. The Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca
only reported data about the composition of some of the judges and their staff members. Since the data was
incomplete and it was not suitable for analysis, I excluded it. I will, first, present the data regarding
magistrates, and, second, the data concerning judicial employees.

5.2.2.1. Magistrates

Regarding the number of magistrates per court, the biggest court in our analysis had 15 Magistrates
and the smallest only three.

Number of administrative tribunals' magistrates [2018]
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5.2.2.1.1.

Gender composition

Women occupy 34 out of 110 judicial magistrate seats in the administrative tribunals, accounting
for 30.9% of the total number of magistrates. Women appear to have less representation in the magistrate
positions in administrative tribunals than in similar positions of the superior tribunals of judicial district
(33.91%).

Number of administrative tribunals' magistrates
vs. women magistrates [2018]
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Percentage of women magistrates in administrative
tribunals [2018]
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5.2.2.1.2.

Ethno-racial composition

Out of the 110 magistrates we could obtain ethno-racial data about, only three of them were Afrodescendant. The Administrative Tribunal of Magdalena has one Afro-descendant magistrate (who is also a
woman) out of four. The Administrative Tribunal of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina has two
Afro-descendant magistrates out of the three that compose the entire panel (one of them is a woman, and
the other one is a man). Thus, Afro-descendants comprise about 2.73% of Administrative magistrates, being
significantly underrepresented in this part of the judiciary if one considers that they comprise 10,62% of
Colombia's national population. This representation level is even lower than the one they had for the group
of magistrates of the Superior tribunals of judicial district (3.67%).
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Number of administrative tribunals' magistrates vs.
Afro-descendant magistrates [2018]
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Percentage of Afro-descendant magistrates in
administrative tribunals [2018]
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As it happened with the superior tribunals of judicial district, indigenous persons appear to have no
representation at all in the group of magistrates of the administrative tribunals.

5.2.2.2. Judicial employees

The administrative tribunals informed a total number of 525 judicial employee positions, unevenly
distributed among the different tribunals. The Administrative Tribunal of Magdalena did not report data on
judicial employees, and the Administrative Tribunal of Valle del Cauca only reported data about judicial
employees working in the magistrates' chambers. Since the number of employees working in chambers is
usually higher than those working for other parts of a tribunal, I decided to include the data reported for the
Administrative Tribunal of Valle del Cauca.

Number of judicial employees in administrative
tribunals [2018]
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5.2.2.2.1.

Gender composition

Women accounted for 326 of the total number of judicial employees reported in the administrative
tribunals (525), which translates into a percentage of women representation of 62.1%. Similar to what
occurs in the superior tribunals of judicial district, where 55.07% of judicial employees are women, women
seem to be overrepresented among administrative tribunals' judicial employees.

Number of administrative tribunals' judicial employees
vs. women judicial employees [2018]
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5.2.2.2.2.

Ethno-racial composition

The information requests' responses indicate that there are 13 Afro-descendant judicial employees
in the administrative tribunals. Since the total number of judicial employees reported was 526, the
percentage of Afro-descendant representation among administrative tribunals' judicial employees is roughly
2.47%. Afro-descendants are significantly underrepresented among this group. They are also more
underrepresented among judicial employees of Administrative tribunals than among judicial employees in
superior tribunals of judicial district. Only four administrative tribunals reported having Afro-descendant
judicial employees: Bolívar (3 out of 45), Caldas (1 out of 23), San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina
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(7 out of 13), and Valle del Cauca (2 out of 36). Of the 13 Afro-descendant judicial employees reported in
the different Administrative tribunals, 9 of them are women, and they work in all four tribunals who
reported having Afro-descendant judicial employees.

Number of administrative tribunals' judicial employees
vs. Afro-descendant employees [2018]
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Finally, none of the administrative tribunals informed having indigenous judicial employees, which
means there is not a single one reported within the total of 525.
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Percentage of Afro-descendant judicial employees in
the administrative tribunals [2018]
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5.2.3.

Data on the general composition of the judiciary

As I mentioned before, I did not send information requests to the lower courts (circuit and municipal
courts). However, the Superior Council of the Judicature provided additional information concerning the
composition of the Colombian judiciary in terms of gender and type of appointment disaggregated by
judicial sectional (a geographical administrative subdivision). The additional information did not provide
disaggregated data on an ethno-racial basis. According to Superior Council of the Judicature, as of October
10, 2018, there was a total of 32,298 judicial servants in all judicial sectionals (this information excludes
the high courts). Of these, 17,371 were women (53.78%) and 14,927 were men (46.22%).
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5.2.3.1. Magistrates and judges

In the case of functionaries (magistrates and judges), there was a total of 5,354 judges and
magistrates in the intermediate and lower courts of Colombia, of which 2,780 (51.92%) were women and
2,574 men (48.08%). The total number of career judges and magistrates was 2,880 (53.79%), the number
of those in provisional positions was 2,412 (45.05%), and there were 62 (1.16%) in temporary positions.
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When the gender and the type of appointment are crossed, women occupy 42.67% of the career
magistrate and judge positions at these levels, 54.10% of the provisional positions, and 64.51% of the
transitory positions. In contrast, men occupy 57.33% of the tenured magistrate and judge positions, 45.89%
of the provisional positions, and 35.48% of temporary positions. Conversely, 47.75% of women judges and
magistrates in these levels of the judiciary occupy career positions, 50.70% occupy provisional positions,
and 1.55% occupy temporary positions.

5.2.3.2. Judicial employees
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There was a total of 26,944 judicial employees in these levels of the judiciary, of which 12,174
were men (45.08%) and 14,797 were women (54.92%). The total number of career judicial employees was
11,949 (44.35%). The number of those in provisional positions was 14,273 (52.97%). There were 722 in
temporary positions (2.68%). When gender and type of appointment are crossed, women occupy 52.21%
of career judicial employee positions, 56.87% of provisional positions, 60.80% of temporary positions. In
contrast, men account for 47.79% of career judicial employee positions, 43.11% of provisional positions,
and 39.2% of temporary positions. Conversely, 42.16% of women judicial employee positions in these
levels of the judiciary occupy career positions, 54.88% occupy provisional positions, and 2.97% occupy
temporary positions.

5.2.4.

Interviewees’

perceptions

on

the

level

of

Afro-descendant

representation in the Colombian judiciary

Some respondents manifested their perceptions about the level of representation that Afrodescendants have in the Colombian judiciary. Interviewees commented that, even though levels of Afrodescendant presence can vary from one region to another, across the country, Afro-descendants are scarce
in judicial institutions. Some respondents assessed their level of representation as void.414 An Afrodescendant judge, mentioned: "I do not want to speak only about the judiciary. I think that in the different
branches of government, in essence, [our presence] es minimal; this is, the percentage of Afro population
in these places continues to be very low.”415 Another one, an Afro-descendant judicial employee, suggested
that there are very few Afro-descendant judges in the country, especially when compared to the number of
litigants of the same ethno-racial background.416 Similarly, some of the indigenous participants also
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reported a similar situation in the case of indigenous persons, whose presence in the country’s courts was
qualified as “very low.” 417
Perhaps one of the best ways to dimension the low level of representation that Afro-descendants
have in judicial institutions in Colombia is a comment made by one of the interviewees (an Afro-descendant
judge with several years of judicial experience). She mentioned: "[a judicial employee] asked if I knew
Afro representatives in the judiciary of Cartagena. She asked me yesterday. I fell asleep thinking about
whom I knew in the judiciary who was Afro, and I do not know, I mean, I could not name any, I could not
remember [any].”418

5.3. Preliminary conclusions

Based on the data gathered through the interview process and the site visits, it is possible to
conclude that Afro-descendants seem to be underrepresented among Colombia's judicial institutions.
Furthermore, this country's judicial system seems to take the shape of a stratified structure according to
ethno-racial and gender factors.
From the gender perspective, the Colombian judicial system can be described as a pyramid, in
which women’s level of representation in judge and magistrate positions is less significative at the higher
courts and increases as one goes down onto the base of the pyramid (glass ceiling). Although women
represent approximately half of attorneys with valid licenses in the country, they comprise only 35% of the
high court magistrates. They are underrepresented in all high courts except in the SJP. At the intermediate
level of the judiciary, women are still underrepresented, but less so than in the higher courts. In the superior
tribunals of judicial district they are 33.9% of magistrates, and in the administrative tribunals 30.9% of
magistrates. When the intermediate tribunals are considered jointly with the lower courts, women represent
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51.92% of magistrates and judges in the intermediate and lower levels of the judicial pyramid, which
indicates that they may even be a majority among the lower court judges. Women magistrates and judges
in the intermediate and lower levels of the judiciary tend to occupy positions that are less stable in terms of
the continuity of the jobs, as only 46% of them are in career positions, whereas 50.70% are in provisional
and 1.6% are in temporary positions, respectively.
In the case of judicial employees, the situation is similar. According to the data that the courts
reported, women account for 45% of auxiliary magistrate positions and 55% of high court judicial employee
positions in the high courts—this last percentage does not include the SJP. At the intermediate level, women
occupy 55% of superior tribunals of judicial district’s judicial employee positions, and 62% of
administrative tribunals judicial employee positions. Furthermore, when the intermediate tribunals and the
lower courts are considered jointly, women comprise approximately 55% of all judicial employees in these
levels of the judiciary. As it happened with women judges and magistrates, women judicial employees tend
to have more precarious jobs in terms of the type of appointment. In these levels of the judiciary, only
42.6% of women are in career positions, whereas 54.88% are in provisional positions, and 2.97% are in
temporary positions. In conclusion, women tend the have lower levels of representation at the higher ranks
of the judicial pyramid, have a more robust level of representation as judicial employees than among judges.
Also, they occupy provisional positions at a higher rate than tenured positions.
From the ethno-racial perspective, despite data being scarcer than in the case of gender, it is possible
to conclude that Afro-descendants are, in general, significantly underrepresented in Colombian judicial
institutions. Unlike in the case of women, whose presence in the judicial institutions tends to increase as
one goes down to the lower levels of the judiciary, the available data seems to suggest that the Afrodescendant level of representation tends to remain steadily low in the high and intermediate levels of the
judiciary. Not a single Afro-descendant person was reported in the group of magistrates, auxiliary
magistrates, and judicial employees in the constitutional court. Interviewees tended to agree that in the other
high courts (except for the SJP), Afro-descendant magistrates were only a few, as it was also the case of
black judicial employees. At the intermediate level, Afro-descendants were reported to comprise 3.67% of
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magistrates and 3.51% of judicial employees in the superior tribunals of judicial district; and 2.73% of
magistrates and 2.47% of judicial employees in the administrative tribunals.
The SJP is a particular case. In this court, Afro-descendants have attained a level of representation
similar to that of their share of the national populations, and indigenous peoples have surpassed it. Although
there is no significant data on the ethno-racial composition of the lower courts, my impression is that Afrodescendants account for only a dearth the total number of magistrates and judges in Colombia. Although
they might be more common among judicial employees, they could still be underrepresented among this
group. Outside of the SJP, I could only find information concerning a single indigenous person working at
a high or intermediate court, which seems to indicate that indigenous peoples are almost entirely excluded
from the judicial institutions in Colombia.
With this preliminary conclusion, I will proceed to discuss the impact of geography on the
composition of judicial institutions in Colombia.

6. The impact of geographic location on the composition of judicial institutions in Colombia

I will comment on how geographical location impacts, and even conditions, the representation of
Afro-descendants in the judicial institutions of different regions of Colombia. In order to accomplish this
goal I will provide an introduction to the relationship between race and region in Latin America, introduce
the research findings on the relationship between the ethno-racial composition of courts and geography,
and analyze regional differences in the ethno-racial composition of courts in Colombia.

6.1. An introduction to the relationship between race and region in Latin America

Afro-descendants are asymmetrically distributed across the Latin American region. Not only the
number of people of African ancestry varies from country to country, but also from one region to another
within the same country.
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Hebe Clementi asserts that the current geographic distribution of the black population in Latin
America can be traced back to colonial times, as their current location within the region tends to correspond
with the production sites that used enslaved African workforce.419 Sugar, cacao, tobacco, and cotton were
some of the industries that more heavily relied on enslaved work, and therefore, regions hosting these
industries tend to have larger Afro-descendant populations.420 Furthermore, nation-specific historical
processes also contributed to the unequal distribution of Afro-descendant populations. The significant
presence of Afro-descendants in parts of the Caribbean coast of Colombia is commonly believed to be a
consequence of the tradition of cimarronaje (African enslaved persons' escape from slavery) and the
existence of palenques (free enclaves for cimarrones) during the colonial time.421

Source: Colombia, Ministry of Culture.422
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The construction of mestizaje in Colombia has been central to the development of the national
identity. Mestizaje has not unfolded homogeneously across the country's regions either. Since colonial
times, differences in demography, geography, and socio-economic context influenced the process of racial
mixing and the narratives around it.423 Peter Wade writes:

What this amount to is that in the process of Colombian society constituting itself spatially, or
becoming concrete in space, regions were created, and these had very different racial mixes. In short,
at the very general level, race became regionalized. The Andean highlands emerged as a whitemestizo region with Indian-white mixtures being common. The Pacific coast became a mainly black
region. The Caribbean coast developed a tri-ethnic mix with strong black and Indian heritage in the
lower classes and some pure black and Indian enclaves. And the Amazon region remained
predominantly Indian. There is a distinctive spatial pattern to the overall structure of Colombian
nationhood and its racial order.424

In addition to demographic differences, as Nancy Applebaum notes, spatial frontiers in Latin
America tend to correlate to "racialized ideas of progress and modernity.”425 Applebaum argues that
regional differences in Latin America are racialized. Certain racial groups are concentrated in specific areas.
The regions where indigenous peoples of Afro-descendants live are often considered backward when
compared to those that are inhabited by “whiter” populations.426 As an example, Barbara Weinstein
describes how, in Brazil, the region São Paulo and its inhabitants, commonly known as “Paulistas,” are
associated with the ideas of industriousness, development, progress, and whiteness.427 This narrative tended
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to downplay the role of Afro-descendants in the history of this Brazilian state. The discourse that argued
for the Paulista superiority was particularly intense from 1931 to 1932, during the Getúlio Vargas
provisional government, coinciding with the 1932 revolution.428 During this period, São Paulo intellectuals
and political leaders publicly exalted the virtues of Paulistas, which they deemed superior to the inhabitants
of other regions of Brazil, and especially those of the North-East, where many Afro-descendants live.429
In the particular case of Colombia, Peter Wade explains that the country developed a “cultural
topography of race,”430 in which region served as a proxy for race. Regional differences and identities often
work as forms of expressing cultural and racial hierarchies in a formally colorblind manner, while
concealing race’s meaningful and material effects. Tianna Paschel asserts that:

Colombia's highlands were widely considered the place of beauty, industriousness, and whiteness,
while its coasts were associated with laziness and hypersexuality. Such entanglements between race
and region reflected not only a symbolic national imaginary but also an underlying material reality
in which black Colombians found themselves disproportionately in the poorest of regions. To be
sure, the states that were largely abandoned by the state were also the ones with higher
concentrations of black Colombians, such as the Chocó. Today these remain the poorest in the
country. Nevertheless, these regional inequalities are often naturalized, seen as a reflection of moral
and intellectual differences between the people who inhabit them rather than as a consequence of
racialized state policies.431

In Colombia, as in other countries of Latin America, naming regional differences is a coded form
for the naming of race. Regional stereotypes often disguise racial stereotypes, and racial hierarchies are
embedded in the language of regional superiority. With these ideas in mind, I will describe how region and
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race seem to interact concerning Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions. First, I will discuss
some of the regional gradations of race that I found during my data collection process in Antioquia, Chocó,
San Andrés, Bolívar, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño. Second, I will provide some preliminary conclusions in
this respect.

6.2. Medellín, Antioquia

Antioquia is a region located in northwest Colombia. The majority of its territory is situated in the
Andean section of the country, with a smaller part (Urabá) extending onto the coastal regions.432 Antioquia
is the second most populous region of Colombia, only led by Bogotá, the capital of the country. According
to the 2005 census, the region has approximately 5,600,000 inhabitants.433 10.59% of the population is
Afro-descendant.434 Its capital is Medellin, a city of approximately 2,343,000 people.435 According to the
2005 census, 6.5% of Medellin’s population is Afro-descendant, and 0.1% is indigenous; the rest is
primarily white/mestizo.436 Antioquia’s economy represents a significant share of the national GDP, The
region hosts some of the largest companies in the country.437 The provision of public services is adequate.
Medellín hosts several higher education institutions, some of which occupy the top positions of the national
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university rankings.438 There is a multiplicity of law schools with different levels of quality and cost in
Medellín.439
According to the interviews and the site visit that I conducted in this region, Afro-descendants are,
in general, absent from the judicial institutions of Antioquia and, particularly, Medellín. According to the
data collected through the rights of petition, only 1 of the 85 magistrates of the Superior Tribunal of
Antioquia, the Superior Tribunal of Medellin, and the Administrative Tribunal of Antioquia was reported
as Afro-descendant. Similarly, one of the attorneys that I interviewed in the city of Medellín mentioned:
“The Palace of Justice of Medellin has 26 floors, and in those 26 floors I think you cannot find 20 Afrodescendants working for the judiciary, and if you do find them working for the judiciary, if you find a judge,
which I am still to do, I think that would be too many.”440 This comment represents not only the generalized
perception that Afro-descendants are virtually nonexistent in courts of this region, but also that when they
are present, they usually occupy judicial employee stations, instead of judge positions. Another respondent
warned that at a party held for the magistrates and judicial employees of one of the city’s tribunals, she
could only count 4 Afro-descendant persons within a group of over 100 attendees.441 A third interviewee,
with several years of experience in the criminal law litigation, commented that he could only remember
two Afro-descendant judges in the group of approximately 30 in circuit courts for the criminal jurisdiction
in Medellín. Furthermore, he declared that he had not met a single Afro-descendant judge in the group of
approximately 40 criminal municipal courts of the city.442 This impression was later corroborated by
another interviewee, who affirmed that he knew that there was only one Afro-descendant judge in all the
municipal criminal courts of the city.443
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During my visit to the judicial complex in the administrative center of La Alpujarra, which hosts a
large number of courthouses, I could see by myself that Afro-descendant judges are scarce in Medellín.
Although Afro-descendants are more common in the judicial employee positions, they still account for just
a few per floor. This situation contrasted with the quantity of Afro-descendant lawyers, detainees, and users
of judicial services, which were more numerous.
Some of the respondents explained the limited number of Afro-descendants on this region’s courts
based on demography. One of the interviewees expressed that she had encountered only a few Afrodescendant judicial employees at the courthouses, which could be attributed to the numeric minority
condition that Afro-descendants have in the country.444 Another one, a judge with several years of
professional experience, expressed that it was regional, rather than national demographics, which explained
this level of Afro-descendant presence on Antioquia's courts. She mentioned: "What happens is that I am
located in the city of Medellin, and in the city of Medellín, the Afro population is not the majority anyway.
I do not know what the answer would be if you were doing this interview, perhaps, in the Pacific, in Valle
del Cauca, or maybe in Chocó.”445 A third respondent mentioned that during his tenure as a judge in
Medellín, he could only remember 4 or 5 Afro-descendant litigators and immediately mentioned that he
considered that this was: “a low number because, even though this is a region that comes from a majority
of white people, Chocó is very close by.”446 Likewise, another interviewee, while referring to the ethnoracial composition of the legal profession in this city, declared: "In relation to the lawyers, there are very
few, very few Afro-descendants in this part of the country where I work. Isn´t that right? Contrary to what
happens in Chocó, where the great majority is Afro-descendant.”447
An issue that I see in the demography argument is that judicial selection processes are held at a
national level. Candidates from all over the country may apply to judgeships in any region of the country.
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In general, there is no residence requirement. Furthermore, even though the Afro-descendant population in
Antioquia, and particularly Medellin, is not as high as it is in other regions, it is not as low as these answers
might suggest since approximately 10.59% of Antioquia's population is Afro-descendant. I think that these
answers also convey the projection of a stereotype concerning the ethno-racial identity of Antioquia's
population, especially when compared to the region of Chocó. Unlike Chocó and other coastal areas that
are often described as black people's land (tierra de negros), Antioquia is typically considered to be the
opposite: A land with a strong mestizo identity. The use of demography to justify Afro-descendant absence
from positions of power is not endemic to Colombia either. In her empirical study about race relations in
Brazil, France Twine described how participants in her study explained the absence of black persons from
positions of power in their community by referring to demography. They alleged that since whites were the
majority in the specific locations where they lived, it was foreseeable that they would occupy the power
positions.448
This idea of racialized regions also comes attached to other more prescriptive racial stereotypes.
While the coastal regions are often thought of as the land of depravity, backwardness, and poverty within
national discourses about the regions, Antioquia is often portrayed as a land of progress, productiveness,
and entrepreneurship. I want to stress that I believe that demography is, of course, a significant part of the
explanation of the regional variances in Afro-descendant presence in judicial institutions in Colombia.
However, I also think that the low levels of presence that this group has on Antioquia's courts cannot be
explained solely on this basis. The comparison that is often made between Antioquia and other regions (and
especially concerning Chocó) is not only cemented on demographic distinctions; it is also the affirmation
of a racial stereotype.
Antioquia is labeled as a region of mestizaje and its deterministic advantages. In contrast, Chocó is
characterized as a region of blacks and its subsequent misfortunes. In this respect, Peter Wade contrasts
how the regions of Chocó and Antioquia are often described as two opposite sides of a coin concerning the
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depiction of racial identities and hierarchies in the country. Although both regions present high levels of
racism, in the case of Chocó, racism tends to be materialized through the oppression of a black majority by
a white minority. In Antioquia, racism was present thorough the "denial of blackness." This trait was
symbolically erased from the imaginaries on the region's identity and character and physically erased by its
absorption by the general population.449

6.3. Quibdó, Chocó

The region of Chocó is located on the Pacific coast of Colombia, near the border with Panamá.
Claudia Mosquera et al. explain that the alienated space that Afro-descendants have occupied in Colombia
forced them to develop different strategies for survival, including their migration (starting in the 18th
century) to parts of the national territory that the elites, located at the center of the country, did not
control.450 This migration took place primarily along the Pacific coast of the country.451 Over time, Afro
Colombians founded small villages at the riverbanks and near mining areas of the Pacific basin. In these
places that the state deemed unexplored territories, Afro-Colombians developed their own culture,
traditions, and ways of economic production,452 with a distinct black ethnic identity emerging as soon as
the early 19th century.453 In the 20th century, the Pacific coast attracted substantial economic interests,
predominantly concerning extractive industries,454 which endangered Afro Colombian’s possession over
the territories they had now occupied for decades, but over which they had no legally recognized rights
until the enactment of the 1991 Constitution.455
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In contrast to Antioquia, Afro-descendants comprise a significant portion of Chocó's judicial
servants. Although the Administrative Tribunal of Chocó did not provide information in this regard, the
Superior Tribunal of Quibdó reported having that one-third of the magistrates (1 of 3), and two-thirds of
judicial employees (8 out of 12) of that court were Afro-descendant. Moreover, as I could observe during
my site visit to the Palace of Justice of Quibdó, Afro-descendants have a significant presence in the region's
courts. This impression was corroborated by the interviewees, who affirmed that Afro-descendants'
presence in the courts of Chocó is substantial,456 with some even qualifying it as “very high.”457 However,
indigenous presence in this region is as low as in the intermediate tribunals and the majority of high
courts.458
From my perspective, the level of Afro-descendant representation at the tribunal level is still low
if one considers that approximately 73% of the inhabitants that Chocó had in 2005 were Afro-descendants
(285,964 out of 388,476).459 Moreover, I believe it conveys a specific racial stratification in the region's
judicial institutions. The higher positions in Chocó's judicial systems continue to be occupied by whitemestizo persons in a region where the majority of the population is black. Some of the interviewees
highlighted this situation. One of them asserted, with a sense of strangeness: "I know, for example, that the
Magistrates of the Tribunal of Quibdó are White."460 This assertion emphasized the contrast between the
ethno-racial composition of the region and that of the tribunal. Another participant described the
stratification of the judicial institutions by using the expression "managing the ghetto,” to describe how, in
Chocó, Afro-descendant judges are often found in the low level of the judiciary and the most remote
areas.461
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Some participants suggested several explanations for the sizable level of representation that Afrodescendants have inside this region’s judicial institutions. One of them asserted, for example, that judges
prefer to stay in their native regions and that, the case of judicial employees, most of the persons who apply
to merit section processes come from the region where the vacancies are located.462
Another aspect that appears to be relevant is the possibility of accessing higher education in Chocó.
Unlike other majority-Afro-descendant regions of Colombia, in Quibdó there is a public university that
hosts a law school.463 This aspect noticeably facilitates access to legal education in this region when
compared to other Afro-descendant areas. Some interviewees from Chocó mentioned that they graduated
from this university. Nevertheless, some participants stressed that, although they had access to legal
education, the quality of such education was not particularly good.464 Also, according to the participants,
the costs of studying law in Chocó were higher than in other public universities in Colombia.465
A striking feature of Chocó is the idea that the high level of representation that this group has in
judicial institutions is, at least in part, a consequence of the undesirability of this region for people coming
from the central part of the country.466 In simpler terms, interviewees suggested that there is a high number
of Afro-descendants working in judicial institutions in Chocó because white-mestizo people from the
interior of the country do not want to work there. Several participants used the expression “punishment” to
reflect how white-mestizo judges from the interior of the country thought of the idea of living in Chocó.467
In this respect, one of the interviewees stated:

Another determinant factor is that many judges and magistrates from the center of the country do
not want to go to these areas, because they are far, the access is difficult, [and] they have their

462

Interviews 6 and 13.
Universidad
Tecnológica
del
Chocó,
Diego
Luis
Cordoba,
DERECHO
https://www.utch.edu.co/portal/es/menu-prog-academicos-derecho.html (last visited Mar 17, 2020).
464
Interview 8.
465
Interviews 8, 35 and 36.
466
Interview 35.
467
Interviews 9, 34 and 43.
463

143

(2020),

families. Then, there are experiences of many magistrates that have been appointed for the Superior
Tribunal of Quibdó but were not capable of adapting there, or they found that [this place] is very
complicated and end up asking to be reassigned to another location. Then, because of that, vacancies
are much more open and available for locals.468

The undesirability of Chocó seems to manifest in other ways as well. An Afro-descendant judge,
with several years of experience working in this region, mentioned that it was widely known that judges
who came from other regions to work in Chocó preferred not to settle in this region. Instead, they commonly
flown back-and-forth from their places of origin, sometimes even seeking accommodation in Quibdó by
days. They do not have a permanent residence in Quibdó.469 These “traveling judges,” were referenced not
only in Chocó but also in other places such as Tumaco and San Andrés.470 Besides, similar practices were
reported to occur in other public institutions, besides the judicial branch.471
These findings seem to fall in line with previous research on racial relations in Chocó. Peter Wade
describes this region as being at the bottom of the Colombian racial order, as it is commonly seen as a place
characterized by scarcity, geographic isolation, and blackness.472 Chocó is commonly imagined as a place
where nature is rough. Humidity, copious rain, high temperatures, and the jungle ecosystem create
conditions that make survival difficult and the living conditions miserable.473 Wade also explains that
besides poverty and geography, blackness is often seen by Colombians as another hardship of Chocó.474
All of these circumstances have historically made Chocó an undesirable place to live for most Colombians,
and especially for those living in the White-mestizo regions of the Andean highlands. Wade writes about
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how Europeans did not settle in Chocó in significant numbers during the colonization process, but rather
approach to this territory with particularly extractive purposes:

Chocó was, for them, unpleasant and unhealthy; for their purposes, impermanent settlement sufficed
for mining enterprises, and settlement in the area's small urban centers was sufficient since they
could engage in lucrative commerce without having to invest much in infrastructure or public
service of any kind. The blacks remained there precisely to avoid the whites and because colonial
society outside the area was unaccepting of them as blacks as they were unprepared for it after years
of slaving in the mines.475

Because of these imaginaries, Chocó is often perceived as the “natural place for blackness” in
Colombia. Thus, the region is usually targeted by racism disguised as regionalism. As Tianna Paschel
explains referring to her fieldwork in Colombia:

Because I am African American and Colombians saw me as black, people would typically guess
that I was from the southern Pacific Coast or the Atlantic Coast, two regions are known for having
a black population. However, neither region was seen –as the Chocó was—as the space of original
or pure blackness. When I would ask why they hadn’t guessed of Chocó, countless cab drivers,
doormen, shop-keepers, and friends of friends would explain to me that my facial features were "too
refined" (finos) or my skin color too light for me to be from the Chocó. These were meant, of course,
as compliments, that I was supposed to gracially accept.476

Because of all of these reasons, it is not strange that white-mestizo judicial servers from the interior
of Colombia might see Chocó as an undesirable place to live or work. This undesirability contributes to the
significant level of Afro-descendant representation on this region’s courts. I should emphasize that
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situations of direct racial discrimination seem to be rare in Chocó, something that interviewees explained
as a result of demography. Since the majority of the population of Chocó is black, the perception of
prejudice tends to be lower.477 Instead, people from Chocó experience structural discrimination in their
region and overt discrimination when they travel to other areas where Afro-descendants are less
numerous.478 This divide might explain why Paschel's experience in the taxicab occurred in the city of
Bogotá, which has a small Afro-descendant population.

6.4. The Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina

The Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina is a group of islands located on
the Caribbean sea, approximately 720 Km off the coast of Colombia and 110 Km off the coast of
Nicaragua.479 The Archipelago has nearly 68,200 habitants, of which roughly 18.7% self-identify as black,
mulatto, Afro-descendant, or Afro Colombian, and 35.7% self-identify as Raizal.480 The Raizal (native
Afro-descendant population) presence in the archipelago is the result of the English colonization of these
islands, as West African and black population from Jamaica were brought in the condition of slavery to
work in this area.481 The Raizal people developed a particular type of culture that is defined by the Protestant
religion, the English creole language, and traditions that include elements of the British, Caribbean, and
African populations.482
The case of San Andrés is an exception to the general rule of Afro-descendant underrepresentation
on Colombian courts. As several of the interviewees mentioned, and I could also observe directly during
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my visit to the San Andrés, Afro-descendants are a significant portion of the total number of judges,
magistrates, and judicial employees in the archipelago. According to the data provided by the courts, Afrodescendants occupy all the magistrate positions (3) and 80% of the judicial employee positions (8 out of
10) of the Superior Tribunal of San Andrés; and 66.66% (2 out of 3) of the magistrate positions and 53.85%
of judicial employee positions in the administrative tribunal of this region (7 out of 13).
One of the judges I interviewed, who had been actively engaged in different professional activities
with the majority of the judges in the archipelago, calculated that out of a total number of 22 judges and
magistrates seats in the region, Raizals occupy approximately 12, which is slightly more than 50%.483
Similarly, according to what I could witness during my visit to the main courthouse of the island, Afrodescendants also occupy a majority of the judicial employee positions in this region.484 This significant
level of Afro-descendant presence on courts seems to be relatively recent.485 One of the interviewees
mentioned that before the 2000s-decade, Afro-descendants only exceptionally occupied judge positions on
the island. After this period that their number started to grow until it reached significant levels. This
comment about the recent change in the composition of San Andrés' courts seems to corroborate previous
reports on the issue. In 2004, a report from the CEJA had stated that:

on the island, of a total of eight judges (with common jurisdiction) and six magistrates (with special
or appeals jurisdiction), one can only find in San Andrés’ Municipal Court a half-native woman (on
her father’s side). Also, not one of the seven prosecutors working on the island was of Raizal origin.
Finally, in the Center for Technical Investigation (CTI –a Prosecutor agency that carries out judicial
investigations) from a total staff of approximately five people, only one was Raizal.486
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Despite the significant number of Afro-descendant—and specially Raizal—judges and judicial
employees in the archipelago, it is essential to mention that there is still a considerable number of whitemestizo judges in this region, most of which came from the continent. According to the participants, it is
not rare practice that judges coming from the central areas of the country do not resettle themselves in San
Andrés (similarly to what happens in the region of Chocó). This situation creates several problems from
the perspective of the interviewees. In general, they questioned the efficacy and legitimacy of the
administration of justice in these areas.
Among the different reasons that explain the significant level of representation that Afrodescendants have in the judicial institutions in San Andrés, the creole language proficiency requirement is,
perhaps, the most salient. Article 310 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution determined that San Andrés
would have a specific law to govern different aspects of the life of the archipelago, including limitations
for circulation and residence, controls of population density, the protection of the cultural identity of the
region’s native communities, among others.487 In fulfillment of this constitutional mandate, the Colombian
Congress issued Law 47 of 1993488, which is commonly known as the “Special Statute of San Andrés.”
Article 42 of this law establishes that in San Andrés, both English, which is commonly spoken by the native
communities of the Archipelago, and Castilian (Spanish), the language of the majority of the Colombian
population, shall have the status of official languages. Additionally, article 45 of the statute declares that:
“Public employees who exercise their functions within the territory of the Archipelago department and have
a direct relationship with the public, must speak the Spanish and English languages.”489 This particular
requisite of being proficient in English (which some respondents interpret as having to be creole English
specifically) also applies for judges and judicial employees. In general, the participants of the study seemed
to agree that this unique language requisite was partially responsible for the higher level of representation
that Raizals have in the judicial institutions of San Andrés. This requirement gives native people of the
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region a particular advantage for accessing positions within the judiciary. Nevertheless, the interviewees
also mentioned that the public authorities do not strictly enforce the language requirement in the
archipelago. Some judges from the continent are in their positions despite not speaking English, much less
creole English.490 Some participants affirmed that seating judges had been removed from their positions
for failing to meet this requirement in the past. However, participants agreed on the fact that this requisite
is continuously overlooked.491
Albeit being located in San Andrés, the judicial institutions in this region are in many aspects
administratively dependent upon the judicial administration of the region of Bolívar, which is situated in
the continent. This type of administrative dependency from institutions located in other regions is not
uncommon in areas with high levels of Afro-descendant population, and it can also be found in other
institutions besides the judiciary. San Andrés' dependency upon institutions located in the continent creates
discomfort among some native judges in the archipelago. Locals allege to have experienced contempt from
judicial administrators in Cartagena because of their origin.492
Another reason why the hierarchical structure and administrative dependency is relevant for this
research is because of how provisional judges are selected. The institution that selects the judges has a
significant influence on who will fill out a vacancy. The selection of provisional magistrates in the superior
and administrative tribunals of San Andrés fall within the competencies of the Supreme Court of Justice
and the State Council, respectively, located in Bogotá. The participants' perception is that the selection of
white-mestizo magistrates to intermediate tribunals leads to the selection of non-native judges to lower court
vacancies in the archipelago. This effect occurs because magistrates are in charge of selecting provisional
judges for the lower courts. Therefore, the center-periphery relations are of particular significance in this
regard.493
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Judicial employees, in addition to the language requirement, also need to comply with a residency
requirement to serve in the archipelago’s courts. Since San Andrés has specific migration and population
density controls, people who are not from the archipelago need to meet a number of requirements to move
to this region. A directive from the Superior Council of the Judicature—Administrative Chamber (Acuerdo
No. 574 of 1999) established that the persons who wish to apply to positions in courts located in the
Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina, need to prove that they speak English. This
requirement is additional to residing in this region, which must be proved with a certification issued by the
Office for the Control of Circulation and Residency of San Andrés (OCCRE).
The residency requirement applies to judicial employees, but not to judges. The Constitutional
Court's ruling C-530 of 1993 declared that the specific norms incorporated in Legislative Decree 2762 of
1991 (which regulates the population density of the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa
Catalina) should apply with restrictions in the case of the national public servants that exercise jurisdiction
or public authority. This exception includes judicial authorities who enter the islands to exercise their
functions, in which case the temporary resident card has a function of a mere registry, instead of population
control.494 This means that judges who are not San Andrés’ residents do not need to comply with the
temporary residency card requirement.
An additional factor that helps to explain the significant level of representation that Afrodescendants have in the judicial institutions of San Andrés is undesirability of this region as a place to work
for people of the interior of the country. One of the interviewees, while referring to San Andrés, mentioned
that many people from other areas of the country were not interested in occupying positions in judicial
institutions in San Andrés, given the restricted nature of public services and recreational activities in the
archipelago.495 Another participant mentioned how the high costs of residing on the island also deterred
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people from other places from coming to San Andrés to reside.496 A third explained that San Andrés
possesses the good attributes of a Caribbean island, but also has significant difficulties, especially for people
who are not used to the living conditions of the island.497 San Andrés does not possess aqueduct or sewerage
systems for the entire region.498 According to some respondents, the government's priority has been to
improve the necessary infrastructure in tourist areas.499 Most people in the archipelago use rain as the
primary source of water supply and have septic tanks to deal with drainage.500
Similarly, another aspect that is relevant for understanding the unusual situation of San Andrés
regarding Afro-descendant representation in the judicial system is the absence of law schools in the
Archipelago. San Andrés does not have a single law school on its territory and that the only option to study
law is to leave the region and move to cities in the continent.501 This alternative is often only available for
individuals who come from families that have the economic capacity to relocate their children to a major
city and to cover the tuition and other educational costs. My impression is that the people of San Andrés
face some of the most significant challenges to access legal education in Colombia, given their geographical
location and the costs associated with traveling between San Andrés and major cities in Colombia. I think
that that the reason why the difficulties in accessing legal education do not seem to have a sensible impact
on the level of presence of Afro-descendants in the judiciary of this region is that the size of the judiciary
in San Andrés is significantly small. Furthermore, there are some affluent residents of the archipelago who
can afford to send their children to universities on the continent.
Another aspect that needs to be considered is that, except for the SJP, San Andrés is the only context
in which I could find any form of social mobilization regarding the issue of Afro-descendant representation
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on judicial institutional in particular, and in the public sector in general. In San Andrés, this mobilization
has extended for decades and has had different demands at different points in time. In the late 1990s,
attorneys from the archipelago requested the Superior Council of the Judicature to allow them to sit for the
judge-selection exam in the archipelago. Until that point, they had to travel to the continent to take the
test.502 Their efforts were fruitful. Since then, lawyers who wish to take the eliminatory exam to become
judges can do so without having to leave the region.503
Different interviewees mentioned that around the 2000s-decade, San Andrés' lawyers requested the
Superior Council of the Judicature to select local judges to fill out court vacancies in the region. In their
view, this is the leading cause of the significant level of Afro-descendant presence on the courts of San
Andrés.504 One participant mentioned that:

In the country, [Afro-descendant representation on courts] it is deficient, but in San Andrés is high.
That is the product of a fight that years ago some leaders, lawyers, undertook, as they appeared
before the Superior Council to request that native people were allowed to become judges, and not
only to occupy judicial employee positions but also of functionaries [judges and magistrates].505

Before this moment, Afro-descendants were working for the courts, but in low-rank positions.506
This social mobilization consisted of protests before the courthouses, petitioning before central
governmental and judicial authorities, meetings with representatives of the Superior Council of the
Judicature, marches, demonstrations, among other actions.507 According to the participant’s accounts, the
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result of these efforts was the designation of native people in provisional magistrate positions in the
tribunals of the archipelago, which, in turn, designated natives as provisional judges in the lower courts.508
These mobilization actions that can be framed within a broader type of social mobilization aimed
at protecting the natives' cultural traditions and rights, including the use of their creole English language.
In this respect, some of the interviewees mentioned that teachers, religious leaders, students, and the general
population have also participated in the marches since it is a social concern that is was not limited to judicial
institutions nor judicial servants.509
I consider that, in addition to protecting the cultural rights of the native population, mobilization
efforts are also a manifestation of a deeper fight over resources and, particularly, employment opportunities
in a region where stable high-earning jobs are not always for grasp. This situation became clear to me after
finding out that public demonstrations took place immediately after it was announced that several locals
that occupied judicial employee positions in the archipelago were going to be replaced in their jobs by
people coming from the continent. This decision led, according to her account, "for judicial employees to
come together and have a powerful protest, demanding that the local people's right to work and the special
norms were respected. At that time, the Council of the Judicature did not follow up with its decision to
remove them [the locals] from their positions.”510

6.5. Cartagena, Bolívar

The region of Bolívar is located in the Caribbean region of Colombia. According to the 2005
census, Bolívar was the third region of Colombia by the percentage of the Afro-descendant population, only
behind Chocó and Valle del Cauca. 26.75% of Bolívar’s population (1,836,640 inhabitants) was Afro-
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descendant.511 Cartagena is the region’s capital and a special administrative district. The city is located in
the northern part of the region. Cartagena is a major domestic and international tourist destination.
According to the 2005 national census, Afro-descendants comprise 36.1% of the city’s population, which
means that they are more numerous in the city than in the region as a whole.512 This figure might be a low
estimate, given the census limitations to collect ethno-racial data in this region and across the country.513
The University of Cartagena, which is public, has a law school.514 Moreover, several other institutions offer
law programs of different quality levels.515
In the data obtained through the rights of petition, not a single magistrate of the Superior Tribunal
of Cartagena or the Administrative Tribunal of Bolívar was reported as Afro-descendant. When considered
together, only 2.72% (3 of the 110) judicial employees in both of these courts were counted as Afrodescendant. The lack of Afro-descendant representation among the group of judges seems to extend to other
municipalities in the region of Bolívar and into the lower courts of Cartagena.516 One of the interviewees,
who used to work for one of the courts in this city, commented that he “sees with awe the absence of Afrodescendant persons in the judiciary, at least in Cartagena,”517 which he described as a "Ciudad de negros"
(city of blacks), and mentioned that Afro-descendants are scarce even in judicial employee positions in the
city’s courts.518 Likewise, another interviewee, who attended the judicial formation course in Cartagena,
mentioned that she could not remember any Afro-descendant persons in her judicial preparation course.519
Despite these accounts, my reading of the situation of Afro-descendant representation in the city’s
courts was slightly different. I visited different judicial buildings in the city’s historic center. Although
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Afro-descendants were far more numerous on the streets than inside courthouses, they had a certain level
of presence on the courts. During my visit to the intermediate tribunals, I could see several Afro-descendant
judicial employees working in these courts, at least more than the three that were reported by the courts in
their response to the rights of petition. I think that my perception of greater Afro-descendant representation
on Cartagena’s courts, when compared to the perception of the interviewees and the courts, could be due to
the complexities of racial self-identification in Cartagena.520 I ponder that when the interviewees (and
potentially the judicial servants who responded to my right of petition) described the low levels of Afrodescendant presence in these courts, they were making specific reference to those that self-identify as such.
One of the participants emphasized that:

One can go and watch, and take a walk by the courthouses, and see that the judges, at least that selfidentify as Afro, are very few, very few the ones we see. They are mostly judges that do not have
practically any form of ethnic connection as such or that self-identify as part of a particular ethnicity,
which indicates that it is very low the level of people working as judges that are, that self-identify
as Afro, Raizal, and Palenquero.521

Furthermore, he added: "We can see a couple of cases at least in the tribunal’s labor or
administrative chambers, I have seen [some], but I haven't seen that they had self-recognized as such"522 In
contrast, during my visit to the courthouses, my reading of courts' ethno-racial compositions did not depart
from their staff's self-identification, but rather from hetero-identification based on phenotypical identifiers
vis-à-vis skin color. I think that differences in the method for identifying Afro-descendancy (selfidentification v. hetero-identification) were partly to blame for this diverging assessment.
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In my experience, self-identification in Cartagena is particularly complex when compared to other
regions of Colombia. Despite the high Afro-descendant population in this region, the mestizaje and
blanqueamiento narratives seem to be exceptionally resilient. People who are clearly labeled as Afrodescendants are those who have particularly marked black phenotypical features (darker skin, tight hair),
or who have a clear black ethnic identity. This is the case of the Palenquero people, situated in the proximity
of the city.523 As a participant from this city mentioned: “The impression that it creates in me is that being
black [in Cartagena] is to be darker.524
I should clarify that, despite these differences in the appraisal, I concur with their overall impression
that Afro-descendants do not have an adequate level of representation in Cartagena's courts, at least when
compared to their share of the city's population. This situation becomes evident when one considers that
the 36.1% figure (that according to the census corresponds to the percentage of Afro-descendant population
of Cartagena) also departs from self-identification, which possibly means (as experience dictates) that the
number of Afro-descendants in Cartagena might be much higher.525 Some interviewees seem to coincide
with this reading, as one of them affirmed that “if we stick to phenotypical traits, the representation is not
very high,” while referring to the situation of both judges and judicial employees.526

6.6. Cali and Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca

Valle del Cauca is located in Western Colombia. Part of this territory lies in the Pacific Basin.
Another part is located in the Andean region of the country. According to the 2005 census, 26.75% of the
population of this region is Afro-descendant (1,090,943 out of 4,052,535).527 Cali, Valle del Cauca’s
capital, is located in the Andean part of the region and is the third-most populous city in Colombia with
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2,244,000 inhabitants in 2005.528 Cali hosts a high number of businesses and services, being an epicenter
for commerce and industrial production. In Cali, 26.2% of the population self-identified as Afro-descendant
in 2005.529 In addition to Cali, during my fieldwork, I also visited the city of Buenaventura, located on the
coast of Valle del Cauca. Buenaventura is the principal seaport of Colombia. A majority of goods imported
to Colombia and exported to other countries pass through this city. Buenaventura is, just as Cartagena, a
“city of blacks.” According to the 2005 census, 88.5% of the 362,000 residents of this city are Afrodescendant.530
In the data collected through the rights of petition, the Superior Tribunal of Cali reported having
zero Afro-descendant magistrates in the group of 37 that seat on that court, and 11 Afro-descendant judicial
employees in a group of 58 (19%). The Superior Tribunal of the neighboring city of Buga, in the same
region, reported 2 Afro-descendant magistrates in a group of 14 that compose that institution (14.29%).
Paradoxically, this same tribunal reported not even a single Afro-descendant in the group of 58 judicial
employees that serve on that court. In the case of the Administrative Tribunal of Valle, none of the 12
magistrates was reported as Afro-descendant, and only two of the 36 judicial employees were counted as
part of that group (5.56%).
One of the interviewees, who has experience working for the judiciary in this city, mentioned that,
as an example of the low level of Afro-descendant representation on courts in Cali, only 3 out of 21
administrative judges in the city fell in this category,531 a figure that a second interviewee confirmed.532
Another participant estimated that only three of the 18 circuit labor judges, and one of six small labor
conflict judges were Afro-descendant. He added that there could even be certain types of specialized courts
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that do not have any Afro-descendant judges serving in them.533 A third one mentioned that, despite having
a more substantial presence than in most cities in Colombia, Afro-descendants' presence in Cali's courts
was still low.534 The low Afro-descendant presence in Cali’s courts appears to extend even into the group
of judicial employees, as one of the interviewees remarked the limited number of blacks occupying this
type of position.535 Despite the little representation that at the judge-level Afro-descendants seem to have
in Cali’s judicial institutions, some of the participants manifested their perception that Afro-descendants
seem to have better opportunities in Cali than in other cities of Colombia.536
In the case of Buenaventura, the situation seems to be similar.537 One of the participants narrated
that, approximately 4 or 5 years ago, many of the judges in the city were not from Buenaventura (also
implying that they were also not black).538 Another one, an attorney, with several years of experience
litigating in the city, mentioned that in Buenaventura:

[The situation] is regrettable. I do not know any Afro-descendant judges. I do not know any. I have
been litigating there for years, and I have not seen the first. A few years ago, I started seeing black
[judicial] employees, but it is very little; sporadic the Afro-descendant participation. You see, per
court, a maximum of two Afro-descendant persons. The rest are mestizo, the majority named by
finger [expression meaning nepotism]. I imagine that recently some [positions] were filled out by
merit selection and well, in that case, it does not matter who the person is. It should be the one who
wins the process. However, the situation in Buenaventura is unfortunate. Imagine that […] the
majority of the staff is mestizo, being an Afro-descendant territory, with a majority of Afrodescendant population, the majority of judges are mestizo, the employees are mestizo, and they do
not live in Buenaventura.539
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It appears that in Buenaventura, there is a significant division in the ethno-racial composition of
the group of judges and judicial employees. One participant warned that Afro-descendants occupied judicial
employee positions and mestizos coming from other cities occupied judge positions.540 Another interviewee
suggested that this situation is related to how provisional appointments are made in this region. The Superior
Tribunal of Buga, located over 100 Km away, can provisionally appoint judges to fill out vacancies in
Buenaventura. Participants believe that this type of appointment limits the possibilities of local attorneys
to occupy judge positions in this municipality.541 From the participant’s perception, the Superior Tribunal
of Buga has favored non-residents at filling out vacancies, which impacts black presence at these
institutions.542 Another one agreed with this opinion. He stated that the reason for this preference towards
mestizo candidates was because the inner circle of the tribunal magistrates was mostly mestizo, which meant
that the people they knew and decided to appoint also shared this identity.543 However, another interviewee
had a different reading on this aspect. He mentioned that it was not due to the provisional positions, but
rather the tenured positions, which could explain the low level of Afro-descendant representation among
Buenaventura's judges. In his view, people who passed the merit selection process chose Buenaventura as
their place of work.544
The fact that power positions, such as judgeships, in majority-black towns happen to be occupied
by whites is not surprising if one considers previous literature about this topic in Latin American cities. In
the case of Ecuador, for example, Beck et al. (reverberating the work of Whitten) mention that even in
towns where the majority of the populace was black, "whites, mestizos, or mulattos ran all the
administrative and commercial centers, and the only elected black officials were rural police.”545
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An important aspect to consider about Cali is that the leading public university of the city, the
University of Valle, does not have a law school.546 Many respondents considered that access to high-quality
legal education was more difficult in this region than in others.547 The lack of an adequate public education
offer meant that only those who could afford to attend a private university could have access to high-quality
legal education. A similar situation takes place in Buenaventura since the two leading universities with a
presence in the city (the University of Valle—Pacific branch, and the University of the Pacific) do not offer
law programs.548
In the city of Buenaventura, just as it happens in Quibdó, there were also reports about “traveling
judges." These judges decide not to resettle in Buenaventura, but rather maintain their residences in Cali or
Tuluá, and only come to Buenaventura during the week for work.549 This situation was problematic for the
interviewees. They interpreted it as a sign of contempt for the city and its people. One of them commented
that the mestizo judges from outside of Buenaventura do not move to this city because:

They do not like the black [way] of organizing. They do not like Afro traditions. They are there
because they have an economic opportunity, that is because they have a chance to go [there] and
make a good salary, good benefits. However, they hate it there […] They see of Buenaventura: the
corruption, the ugly streets, the dirty streets, the lousy food, everything that is bad about
Buenaventura. I am not from Buenaventura, but I am an Afro-descendant. I have had a strong
connection with that place, and I am troubled to find out about the comments [that judges make].550
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Moreover, one of the interviewees also mentioned that mestizo judges who come to work in
Buenaventura tend to dissociate themselves from the local population, as "when they arrive at that territory
they only meet with their people, among them.”551

6.7. Tumaco, Nariño

The last region that I visited in fieldwork was Nariño, located in the southwestern part of Colombia,
on the border with Ecuador. Just as in the case of Valle del Cauca, part of Nariño's territory is located on
the pacific coast, and another part in the Andean region of the country (la sierra). This division sharply
marked the distribution of the population according to race and ethnicity. Although in Nariño 18.05% of
the population was reported as Afro-descendant in the 2005 census (270,433 of the 1,498,234
inhabitants),552 in Pasto, the region’s capital city located on the Andean portion of the region, the percentage
of Afro-descendants was only 1.6% of the total population. In contrast, the largest Afro-descendant
municipality in Nariño is Tumaco, located on the coast, in which 88.8% of the 179,000 residents were
reported as Afro-descendants.553 In this city, I conducted my final site visit and concluded my fieldwork.
According to the data collected through the rights of petition, none of the 11 magistrates of the
Superior Tribunal of Pasto are Afro-descendants, and the court did not provide information concerning the
ethno-racial composition of its staff. Likewise, no data was reported on the Administrative Tribunal of
Nariño, also located in Pasto. Respondents concurred in that there are very few Afro-descendant judges in
Tumaco. One participant, who has significant knowledge of the composition and work if the judiciary in
this city, mentioned: “Yesterday, when you called me and told me the topic of your research, I started
thinking: How many Afro-descendant judges do I know here, in Tumaco? And I continued to think, and I
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do not remember any.”554 Moreover, the respondent also pointed out that, despite the number of local Afrodescendant lawyers in Tumaco, a similar situation occurs with judicial employee positions, most of which
(but not all) are occupied by professionals from Pasto. This answer implied that they are white or mestizo.555
I could see this directly during the site visit I conducted to the courts in this city, as most of the judicial
employees and judges I could see in this building were white or mestizo, unlike the majority of Tumaco’s
inhabitants.
Just like in Buenaventura, in Tumaco, there is not a single university that offers a law program.
The leading university with a presence in the city (the National University of Colombia—Tumaco branch)
does not offer this type of academic program, which limits the possibility of the local population to access
legal education or positions in the judiciary.556
Similarly to the situation of Quibdó, Tumaco and other municipalities of Nariño's coast seem to be
locations where people from the interior of the country do not want to go and work. These municipalities
struggle with the lack of resources, infrastructure, services, and also with the significant impact of the
internal armed conflict. The internal armed conflict has been particularly hard in this region because of its
strategic location near Colombia's southern border, which makes them strategic points to the
narcotrafficking business.557 One of the interviewees, who worked as a judge in one of these municipalities,
mentioned that she chose to work there in a provisional post because nobody else wanted to work there.558
Moreover, she narrates that the position that she ended up occupying had been offered to several of her
colleagues at the court where she used to work as a judicial employee, but:

Everybody said: ‘No, I will not go. What will I do over there? No, it is bad. How can you even think
about it? […] that faraway place, distant from the hand of the lord…’ And I said: ‘I will go!’ and
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effectively, I went to work to a municipality that has […] that has horrible roads, that has an electric
grid, but where there are black-outs all the time, that does not have [running] water, that has illegal
mining, in which the river water has mercury in it… in some horrible conditions and it was because
nobody else wanted to go there.559

In Tumaco, the presence of "traveling judges" was also reported. One of the interviewees described
that the judges of Tumaco: "Do not live here. They do not know our realities. They do not feel the issues
of this place. They feel that they come to deliver a service because they have to. Because they got an
opportunity, but with the aspiration of one day moving back to Pasto."560 Moreover, just as in Chocó,
participants mentioned the idea that working in Tumaco is a type of punishment.561

6.8. Analyzing regional differences in the ethno-racial composition of courts in
Colombia

As we could see in the previous sections, there are a significant number of ways in which
geographical location and race intertwine to help to create regional differences on the ethno-racial
composition of Colombia's judicial institutions. Some of the most relevant are:

6.8.1.

Demographic differences among the country’s regions

As I previously mentioned, ethno-racial groups are not evenly distributed across the different regions
in Colombia. Therefore, it is natural for the demographic differences in terms of the ethno-racial
composition of the country's regions to have a sensible impact on the composition of the judicial institutions
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therein located. Afro-descendants seem to have a sizeable level of representation on the courts of regions
such as Chocó, where 73.6% of the population share this ethno-racial identity, but lack a significant
presence in the courts of Antioquia, an Andean region where only 10.59% of the population was reported
to be Afro-descendant.562
Additionally, other demographic differences, such as the presence of ethnic-Afro-descendant
population, also influence the level of representation that this group possesses in the judicial institutions of
a particular region. In certain parts of the country, such as the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and
Santa Catalina, legal instruments for the protection of ethnic groups, may have the effect to secure, at least
to a certain extent, Afro-descendants’ representation on the courts of some regions.

6.8.2.

The institutional dependency relations between central and peripherical
areas of the country

Geographic location is also essential for discussing the issue Afro-descendant representation on
Colombian courts because of the administrative dependency of peripherical regions upon central regions.
Regions with high levels of Afro-descendant population are, in most cases, peripherical areas. This status
is not the exclusive effect of their location within the national territory. It is also due to their weight in the
nation's economy, politics, and government presence. Due to these conditions, regions with large Afrodescendant populations have historically had a relation of administrative dependency not only with the
country’s capital (Bogotá) but also with other regions where the institutional presence of the state is
sufficient. These regions, which I describe as central, host state institutions in which decisions impacting
peripherical regions are often made. This relation of dependency between central and peripherical areas of
the country influences the ethno-racial composition of the courts since the designation of judges that will
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serve in the periphery of the country is made by institutions located in central regions. Moreover, institutions
tend to privilege candidates that are not local nor Afro-descendants for filling out judicial vacancies.

6.8.3.

Regional differences in access to services and structural discrimination

Access to certain services and structural discrimination also seem to play a significant role in explaining
the regional differences in the Afro-descendant representation on courts. As I explained before, regions that
have high levels of Afro-descendant population are commonly located in peripherical areas of the country,
where the provision of specific goods and services is scarce. This is the case of education and, particularly,
legal education. Certain regions with a high concentration of Afro-descendants do not have universities
hosting law programs. Also, as some of the interviewees stressed, the quality of higher education in these
areas is significantly lower than in the big urban areas located in the Andean (mostly white-mestizo) section
of the country. Having a law degree is indispensable to become a judge and, in some cases, to occupy
certain judicial employee positions. Thus, regional differences in terms of access to education have a
sensible impact on black representation in courts.
Paradoxically, the deficiencies in certain essential services in regions that Afro-descendants
densely populate seem to be a factor that, under certain conditions, could enable higher levels of access to
judicial positions for Afro-descendants. In this respect, people from the interior of the country often reject
working in peripherical areas of the country due to the severe living conditions in these areas. Also, many
interviewees mentioned the idea that people from the central part of the country (mostly white-mestizo
areas) being sent out to work in regions such as Chocó was seen as a type of punishment that should be
avoided at all costs. In synthesis, the lack of interest of white-mestizo people from the interior of the country
to occupy court positions in neglected areas seems to have the effect of enabling Afro-descendants to hold
positions that they usually cannot occupy in other areas of the country.
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6.8.4.

The conflation of racial and regional identities, and the persistence of
racial stereotypes

Another aspect that helps to explain the regional differences in the access to judicial positions for
Afro-descendants is how regional and racial identities get conflated within the national public discourse,
and how racial stereotypes are commonly masked as—allegedly acceptable—regional stereotypes. Given
the uneven presence of the Afro-descendant population in Colombia, race, and region and inextricably
intertwined. This is the reason why, for example, it is not uncommon to hear that Afro-descendants who
live in Andean cities are often questioned about their regional origin. It also explains why regional identities
are often used as a coded way for the naming of race. Subsequently, regional stereotypes are also commonly
conflated with racial stereotypes. Some regional stereotypes, such as those that accuse people of the coastal
regions of being lazy or corrupt, are charged with racial undertones. In these areas of the country, a
significant part of the population in Afro-descendant. These racial and regional stereotypes play a
significant role in determining not only who can have access to a particular judicial position, but also where.
For example, in Antioquia, where blackness is commonly depicted as foreign and disconnected to the
identity and demographic composition of the region, Afro-descendant presence was minimal.

6.8.5.

Lack of self-identification among the Afro-descendant population in
certain regions

An additional condition that seems to contribute to the regional differences in the ethno-racial
composition of judicial institutions in Colombia is the way racial self-identification appears to be less
prominent among the Afro-descendant population of specific regions. In this respect, as I commented when
discussing the specific situation of Cartagena, some Afro-descendant persons who are working inside
judicial institutions do not self-identify as such. This situation is closely linked to the particularities of
ethno-racial identities in Latin America. The lack of self-identification restricts the conversation about
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Afro-descendant representation on courts and, I believe, can be a vital element to consider at explaining the
apparent low levels of Afro-descendant presence in the courts of some regions.

6.8.6.

Social mobilization around Afro-descendant representation on courts

A final aspect that needs to be considered is the impact that, in certain instances, social mobilization
has had on the level of representation of Afro-descendants in judicial institutions. As I explained concerning
San Andrés, several interviewees seemed to connect the high levels of Afro-descendant presence on the
courts with the activism displayed by the region's leaders before the Superior Council of the Judicature and
other state institutions. According to the participants, social mobilization calling for a more inclusive
judiciary is one of the leading causes for the presence of Raizals in San Andrés' courts. A similar situation
seems to happen in the SJP, although not from a geographic perspective. The sizable level of presence that
indigenous persons and Afro-descendants have in this court appears to be, at least in part, the consequence
of the social mobilization efforts of the ethnic movements to attain representation in the transitional justice
mechanism. In contrast, the lack of social mobilization around the issue of Afro-descendant presence on
the courts in other regions could also help to explain the limited level of Afro-descendant presence in these
areas.
In the following chapter, I will discuss some of the factors that are potentially responsible for the
low level of Afro-descendant representation on Colombia’s courts and the racial stratification of the judicial
system.
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III.

“We need to prove we are capable; despite the fact we are black”: Factors contributing
to Afro-descendant underrepresentation on Colombia’s courts and the stratification of
the judicial system

In this chapter, I will discuss some factors contributing to Afro-descendant underrepresentation and the
stratification of the judicial system in Colombia. My purpose is not to present a "list of causes" of Afrodescendant underrepresentation on the courts of Colombia. Such a taxonomical process would require a
multiplicity of interdisciplinary studies that exceed the scope of this dissertation. Rather, my purpose is to
explore a group of conditions that might help to explain the low level of presence that Afro-descendants
have in judicial institutions in this country, which should be further analyzed and tested in future research
endeavors on this matter.
I will refer to the following aspects: The statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants; the overlapping of
race and class forms of oppression in the Afro-descendant population; the inequalities and difficulties to
access education and, particularly, higher education; the interaction of race- and gender-based forms of
oppression; the influence of race, color, and identity; the inequalities and disparate impacts of judicial
selection mechanisms; and the systemic racial discrimination within judicial institutions and in the legal
profession.

1. The statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants

A factor that seems to be closely linked with the low level of Afro-descendant presence on judicial
institutions in Colombia is the absence of data on this regard and, more extensively, the great challenge that
statistical invisibility represents for the equality claims of subordinated ethno-racial groups. The lack of
ethno-racial data concerning the composition of the Colombian judiciary is an element that contributes to
the Afro-descendant representation on the courts because it facilitates the concealment of this problem. The
limitations in data collection on ethno-racial identities in the judiciary facilitates that the racial homogeneity
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of the judicial system continues to go unnoticed and unchallenged. Ethno-racial statistical invisibility is a
powerful tool to maintain racial subordination. The lack of ethno-racial statistics empowers the
misperception that race is not an issue that needs to be researched in the mestizo nation. This understanding
leads to a vicious cycle: Statistic invisibility hides racial disparities in Latin American countries, which, in
turn, justifies the lack of data collection on race and ethnicity.
Regarding the impact of statistical invisibility on ethno-racial groups, Hugo Ñopo mentions that
the absence of data is partially to blame for the lack of more substantive research on income inequality
affecting minorities in Latin America. Ñopo affirms that the lack of census data disaggregated by ethnicity
and the under-registry of people belonging to ethnic minorities in public records and identity documents “is
a sign of the inferior situation in which ethnic minorities often live”.563 Likewise, Rita Segato suggests that
acknowledging race in Latin America should be considered as a form of decolonial action.564
During the interview process, several participants made references to statistical invisibility and the
deficiency in reliable data on ethno-racial identities in the judiciary as problem to establish Afro-descendant
representation on the courts. One of them sustained that ascertaining the level of Afro-descendant
representation on the courts was difficult due to the lack of data collection on the ethno-racial composition
of the courts.565 Others noted that there was also an absence of race-related data concerning the people who
came before the courts to resolve conflicts, which represented a significant barrier for establishing whether
the justice system similarly treats Afro-descendant and not-Afro-descendant litigants.566
The problem of Afro-descendant statistical invisibility is not either new, particular to Colombia, or
exclusive of the judicial sector. This situation is rooted in a long-lasting tradition present in the region of
excluding minorities and rendering them invisible. Mara Loveman explains that modern states use
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population classifications to know and understand those who are part of the societies they govern, as well
as to impose burdens and grant benefits.567 In Latin America, ethno-racial classifications’ use in censuses
has depended on large scale socio-political coordinates related to the construction of modern national
states.568 Loveman remarks that most national censuses that took place in the region after independence
included questions about race or color.569 Most countries included race-related questions in at least one of
their censuses in the first part of the 20th century, too.570 In this period, "Latin America's census reports
often equated national progress with racial progress. In turn, racial progress meant the 'whitening'
populations."571 Thus, censuses of this period tended to emphasize aspects such as immigration and
mestizaje rates, which were believed to be good indicators of demographic improvement.572
The second half of the 20th century saw a rapid decline of race or color questions in the Latin
American national censuses.573 Loveman describes that, unexpectedly, the exclusion of racial classification
questions from national censuses in this period seems to be linked to the decline of ideas that served as
grounds for collecting data on race. These decaying ideas included the validity of concept of race and the
belief that a country's racial composition is connected to its national progress.574 In this period, Afrodescendants became invisible in the national census. In contrast, indigenous people, continued to be
classified based on their cultural difference.575 Due to this situation, "by the 1960s only two countries
(Brazil and Cuba) still included racial variables in their censuses."576
Mala Htun mentions that “though Brazil and Cuba had collected data on race/color for many
decades, only in the 1990s did an additional country—Colombia—begin to collect data on
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Afrodescendancy.”577 It took until the last decades of the 20th century for Latin American countries to
reintroduce questions about race in their censuses and to provide visibility to their Afro-descendant
populations once again.578 In recent years, social and political changes in the region led to the constitutional
recognition of new rights for Afro-descendant populations.579 This change has contributed to greater
visibility of this group in different countries. In the 2000s decade, approximately half of the countries of
the region had included ethno-racial variables in their national censuses.580
Despite this shift towards Afro-descendant statistical visibility, Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel
express that assessing the population numbers for this group is not an easy task in Latin America.581 Even
recently, many countries' national censuses do not collect information on this variable. Furthermore, in
countries where this information is collected, "the response of the interviewee is conditioned by a number
of factors, such as income and education levels, awareness of negritude, and the need for ‘whitening.'"582
The World Bank suggested that there are considerable challenges in the collection of data about Afrodescendants in the Latin American region. Many countries in this part of the world deny ethno-racial
discrimination and block the collection of data on this population.583 The mestizaje's description of Latin
American countries as both racially homogenous and racially harmonious has been used to assert that
collecting data on Afro-descendant populations could constitute an act of racial discrimination in and of
itself.584
Edward Telles remarks that, in Latin America, race and ethnicity have a multi-dimensional nature.
The measurement of such characteristics in the region's population depends on different aspects: "How
ethnoracial questions are worded, which categories are used, and who answers the question."585 Telles urges
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Latin American states to consider using tools that do not only depend on self-identification for monitoring
racial inequality and discrimination since a person's race is often determined through perception.586
Moreover, he asserts that two people who self-identify as members of the same racial group (e .g. mestizo,
negro, indígena) could face unique situations of discrimination based on skin color differences.587
In the case of Colombia, Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea mention that, following the enactment
of Law 70 of 1993, the 1993 national census included a question on ethnic identity.588 This question
intended to solve the problem of statistic invisibility of Afro Colombians, using the territorial and cultural
characteristics that would define an ethnic group as a way of counting them. However, the census of 1993
ended up undercounting Afro Colombians.589 Even the governmental agency in charge of conducting the
census—DANE—recognized that the ethnic question had a bias that benefited indigenous peoples. Many
respondents declared that they belonged to an ethnic group without specifying to which one, which made
it very difficult to differentiate between Afro-descendant and indigenous respondents.590 Moreover, this
census's ethnic question did not ask people to report on their skin color. The lack of a color question was a
problem because, as the government later declared, many Afro Colombians did not see themselves as being
part of an ethnic group, which in the end explains why only 1.52% of the national population was counted
as black.591 In conclusion, as Barbary and Urrea explain, it is unlikely that Afro Colombians can be made
statistically visible under the concept of ethnic groups since the idea of ethnicity is still artificial and
unknown for many of them. The category of race is still the one that has a more significant impact.592
The problems affecting the 1993 census seem to persist even today. In November 2019, the
Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics—DANE—released the preliminary results of
the 2018 national census, which presented a dramatic decrease in the number and percentage of the Afro-
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descendant population in the country when compared to the 2005 census.593 According to the DANE,
whereas, in 2005, 4,311,757 persons counted as Afro Colombians in the census, in 2018, this number was
only 2,982,224, which represents a decrease of approximately 30.8% of the counted Afro Colombian
population.594 This decrease is not due to external factors, such as mass migration or deaths. The DANE
recognizes that the geographical reach of the census, the difficulties with the application of the ethno-racial
question, and the low self-identification levels among the Afro Colombian population are likely causes for
this decrease. The astounding decline in the counted number of Afro-descendants provides an example of
the problem of statistical invisibility of this group and the difficulties that arise when one tries to collect
data on ethno-racial identity in this context. Furthermore, Edward Telles mentions that the estimates of the
Afro-descendant population in Colombia jump dramatically depending on the type of mechanism used for
counting them:

Estimates based on PERLA data varied from 19.4 percent obtained by asking the 2005 census
question on self-identification, 18.6 percent using the open-ended question on racial identity, and
15.1 percent based on the number of respondents who claimed to have black or African ancestors.
Given the size of the data set, there is about a 3 percent range of error, but the relative sizes using
these three criteria remain.595

Likewise, Tianna Paschel describes that there are different official estimations regarding the
percentage of the national population that is Afro Colombian, with some as low as 1.52% and some as high
as 26%.596 Differences in the estimations are partially a consequence of the lack of consistency of ethnoracial data collection in national censuses: "Between 1,905 and 2,005, only four of Colombia's eleven
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national censuses included a question aimed at counting its black population."597 All these censuses
provided significantly different measurements about the share of the national population that is Afro
Colombian. The censuses of 1912 and 1918 concluded a 6% of Colombians were Afro-descendants. The
1993 census concluded that only 1.5% were so, while the 2005 census delivered a percentage of 10.5%.
These radical changes seem to be the effect of situations such as reclassification, shifts on the definitions
of who counts as Afro Colombian, as well as changes in the census question about ethno-racial identity.598
In conclusion, there is a significant problem of statistical invisibility affecting Afro-descendants in
Colombia and, more extensively, Latin America. I consider that the lack of reliable data on the ethno-racial
composition of judicial institutions and the Colombian society is a relevant factor that might help to explain
the problem of Afro-descendant representation on judicial institutions and the racial hierarchization of the
judicial system. The lack of data in this respect prevents public officials, civil society, and academia from
engaging in an informed conversation about the limited presence that minorities have on the court system,
which, in turn, limits potential actions to address the situation.

2. The overlapping of race and class forms of oppression in the Afro-descendant population

Socio-economic inequality is the second aspect that helps to explain the low level of Afrodescendant representation in judicial institutions. More precisely, the correlation between subordinated
ethno-racial identities and low-class status. The ECLAC has pointed out that race and class are two forces
that shape the hierarchization of Latin American societies.599 A person’s class status may result from the
accumulation of race-based privileges or burdens throughout the years—or even across generations.600
Mala Htun states that in most Latin American countries, race and class divisions tend to overlap with each
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other. This phenomenon leads to the racial dimensions of inequality to remain invisible since they are
explained as class differences that, some argue, can and should be resolved through universal social
programs.601
Discussions about class issues and socio-economic inequality were prevalent during the interview
process. Participants were outspoken about how Afro-descendants faced significant levels of poverty across
the country and were located in the lowest ranks of the socio-economic system.602 Class factors were
relevant at characterizing the experiences that interviewees had in their access to the legal profession and
at attaining positions within judicial institutions. Participants pointed out that socio-economic disadvantage
undermined Afro-descendants' access to high-quality legal education.603
Afro-descendant participants were candid about their own experiences of class inequality, with
several of them describing that they grew up in low-income families and that had to work and study to be
able to attend college. Many were the first professionals in their families, had to go into debt to pay for
school, and faced financial limitations that severely conditioned the selection of their professions and the
universities they attended. Some feared they could not finish school due to a lack of funding or had to study
at night. Most of them grew up in impoverished neighborhoods that have severe limitations in access to
public services. Some reported that their parents were illiterate or employed in manual labor positions. Most
of their peers became technicians instead of professionals.604 Scholarships and other forms of academic
awards played a decisive role in the access to education for many of these professionals. Some of them
explained that this was, perhaps, the only way in which they could have had access to higher education.605
Several of the accounts also described situations of inter-generational economic disadvantage and
how these conditions shaped their paths toward education and employment. This issue was noticeable, for
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example, in how many of the respondents mentioned that their parents were teachers,606 which is a type of
position that Afro Colombians commonly use to climb up the socio-economic ladder, or in the different
accounts in which the participants referred to low-class experiences as a source of motivation to attain the
highest possible level of education: A participant mentioned:

When I had four years of age, I already know how to read. I do not remember myself before I could
read. That is because of my mom. When she was little, she lived in a town on the Pacific coast of
Nariño called [name of town]. My mom was born in a rural area of the municipality of that town. I
mean, she lived there a big part of her infancy. Later on, she left that town and went working as a
domestic worker in Cali. She arrived at that house to be a domestic worker, but at that time, it was
a truly rough time in which domestic work was very similar to slavery. However, she did get to a
family that, when they found out she did not know how to read, registered her at night school. My
mom was also very insistent about that. She wanted to go because she wanted to study. She wanted
to learn how to read. My mom learned how to read when she was 15 years old. Then, she was
obsessed with the idea that she was going to die, and her daughters would be left out without having
learnt how to read. Because of that, all of my games were with letters. While everybody else had
building blocks to play with, I had letters to learn, so I learned how to read since I was very young.
My mom taught us how to read to my sister and me. She had this obsession that we had to know
how to read. She was obsessed with the idea that we had to finish high school and then go to college.
I mean, it was like neurolinguistics on the go. My sister and I studied. We studied a lot.607

Alvaro Bello and Marta Rangel mention that many Afro-descendants in Latin America do not
possess means of production and have been forced to leave their ancestral territories to find better economic
opportunities.608 Likewise, Sérgio Costa and Guilherme Leite note that “on average, Afro-Latin Americans,
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in particular women, have a shorter life expectancy, live in poorer conditions, have lower levels of formal
education, and have more limited access to public services than the Latin American population as a
whole.”609 In 2017, the ECLAC issued a report on the rights situation of Afro-descendants in Latin
America, in which it verified the situation of structural inequality that this population faces in the region.610
The institution highlighted Afro-descendant women's particular concerning condition. Black women face
particular challenges in the enjoyment of their rights when compared to other women.611
The ECLAC also pointed out that Afro-descendant populations in Latin America tend to be located
in urban areas.612 The indicators of poverty and extreme poverty are higher among Afro-descendants than
among the non-Afro-descendant population.613 This situation of deprivation seems to be correlated with
the types of employment and compensation they receive in the labor market.614 Similarly, In 2018, the
World Bank released a report in which the institution asserted that despite the importance of Afrodescendant inclusion for the future of the Latin American region:

Afro-descendants are disproportionately represented among the poor. In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Panama, Peru, and Uruguay combined, Afro-descendants represent 38 percent of the total
population, but about half of all the people living in extreme poverty. They also have fewer years of
education and are more often victims of crime and violence. Despite their growing visibility, they
are still vastly underrepresented in decision-making positions, both in private and in the public
sector. They also have fewer chances of social mobility, as they are 2.5 times more likely to be
chronically poor.615
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The World Bank recognizes that there has been a significant poverty reduction among the Afrodescendant population in the region during the last decade. Nevertheless, this institution also highlights that
Afro-descendants have beneficiated less than whites and mestizos in terms of poverty reduction rates.616
Because of this gap in the poverty reduction rates, the World Bank stated that “poverty is over twice as high
for Afro-descendants in Brazil and three times higher in Uruguay, and over 10 percentage points higher in
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.”617 Therefore, children born in Afro-descendant families in the region are
more likely to be poor, which decreases their opportunities in life.618 Additionally, Afro-descendants have
fewer chances of social mobility than other ethno-racial groups, as "they are 2.5 times more likely to be
chronically poor."619 This situation creates a "poverty trap" that Afro-descendants can hardly scape. Other
aspects worsen this condition of vulnerability, such as rural-urban divide and gender inequalities.620
The dreadful perspective on Afro-descendant socioeconomic status is shared by Hugo Ñopo, who
asserts that ethnic groups in Latin America are significantly disadvantaged when compared to white
persons. According to Ñopo, Afro-descendants have higher poverty rates, lower access to public services,
do not have adequate political representation, encounter difficulties for accessing employment, and face
significant discrimination.621 Likewise, Tianna Paschel and Mark Sawyer emphasize that Afro-descendants
are among the most economically disadvantaged groups in Latin America, a region with very high levels
of poverty.622

616

AFRO-DESCENDANTS IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF INCLUSION, supra note 138 at 21. (The report
warns: "Thus, although Afro-Peruvians and Afro-Uruguayans saw extraordinary annualized poverty decreases of 7
percent and 10 percent respectively in the 2005– 15 period, non-Afro-descendants experienced annualized decreases
of 9 percent and 14.5 percent respectively, widening the relative distance between the two groups in each country.")
617
Id. at 21.
618
Id. at 22.
619
Id. at 22.
620
Id. at 22.
621
ÑOPO, supra note 563 at 6.
622
Tianna S. Paschel & Mark Q. Sawyer, Contesting Politics as Usual: Black Social Movements, Globalization, and
Race Policy in Latin America, 10 SOULS 197–214, 201 (2008). (Noting that “In addition to state repression, Black
populations have also faced the problem of poverty. Afro-descendants are among the poorest in the Americas, a region
with more inequality than any other region in the world. While activists are frequently middle class, the mass of the
population struggles for everyday survival. Most Latin American countries have very small Black middle classes that
might support sustained mass racial social movements., at the same time, scholars—Black and otherwise, from Latin
America and abroad—have played an essential role in supporting social movements”).

178

Despite the significant overlapping of race and class subordination, I should mention that a part of
the participants of the study seem to come from privileged backgrounds. 25% of respondents who provided
data about the institutions where they completed high school informed that they graduated from private
schools. 75% declared that they graduated from public school. If one uses this information as a proxy for
class, this could mean that least a quarter of them seem to have grown up in middle-class or above contexts.
Nevertheless, certain participants who came from middle and upper-middle-class families indicated
that they were exceptions to the general condition of socio-economic exclusion that prevents Afrodescendants from accessing legal education and judicial employee positions.623 The impact of class
privileges was also sensible in individual accounts. A woman Afro-descendant judicial employee described
a sensible difference in the treatment that Afro-descendant judges receive in comparison to other lessaffluent people with the same ethno-racial identity. The participant mentioned: "When you are a judge, and
eventually become a magistrate, people see you differently. Yes, you are black, but you are seen differently.
When a magistrate arrives in certain places, he arrives with his bodyguards. I arrive with my backpack, and
let's say that things change a little."624 In contrast, some participants affirmed that they had experienced
discrimination because they were presumed to be due to their ethno-racial identity.625
The overlapping of racial subordination and low-class status seems to be one a reason for Afrodescendant underrepresentation in judicial institutions. Afro-descendants have, in general, less access to
good-quality education, fewer employment opportunities, and more restricted professional networks. These
conditions ultimately limit their chances to become judges and judicial employees—I will discuss some of
these aspects in greater detail in the following sections. Similarly, class status seems to be a factor to
consider not only to assess whether Afro-descendants have adequate access to judicial positions, but also
which Afro-descendants do. As I could observe during the interview process, a high-class status undeniably
facilitates Afro-descendants' access to judicial institutions since class privileges can help to remove some
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of the race-based obstacles that they experience when they try to reach such positions. Thus, race and class
intertwine to define the stratification of judicial institutions in Colombia.

3. Inequalities and difficulties in accessing education and, particularly, higher education

Deeply connected to the previous element, another aspect that was very prominent in the
interviewee's accounts concerning the potential reasons for Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the
judicial system was the multiple difficulties that this group experiences in accessing education and,
especially, high-quality legal education. Afro-descendant access to legal education is another field in which
the problem of statistical invisibility presents significant challenges to my research. As described in chapter
1 of the manuscript, I submitted an information request to the Ministry of Education. I asked for data
concerning the number of law programs authorized to function in the country and of students in each one
of these programs disaggregated by gender and ethno-racial identity. I inquired about the total number of
graduates in the past five years disaggregated according to the same identity characteristics and also asked
about affirmative action programs for women, indigenous persons, and Afro-descendants.
In response to my petition, the Ministry provided information concerning the number of active law
programs, currently enrolled students, and graduates from the 2013-2017 period, and even presented
disaggregated data by gender for the number of enrolled students and graduates. However, as it happened
in the case of the judiciary, no data was provided regarding ethno-racial identity in higher education
institutions. The Ministry of Education declared:

With respect to the ethnic identification data, we indicate you that the information report of the
population by ethnic group is based on self-recognition and self-identification processes, and the
completion and reporting of the variable before the information systems of the National Ministry of
Education is responsibility of the higher education institutions in accordance with article 7 of the
Decree 1767 of 2006. Currently, the ethnic identity variable shows a high level of underreporting
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by the institutions. In consequence, the statistics that are obtained from this variable do not represent
the totality of the attention of this population in the country's higher education system.

The Ministry recognizes that even though the data collection instrument does include an ethnic
identity variable, universities are failing to comply with their duty to report this information, which, in turn,
leads to a general underreporting of the ethno-racial composition of higher-education institutions. No
additional information was provided about why the universities did not provide such information, nor
concerning whether the Ministry has taken any action to increase compliance of this reporting duty.
Given the lack of data, I also submitted information requests directed to a group of universities
located in different cities of the country to try to obtain at least some data concerning the composition of
the student body and faculty. The criteria for selecting these institutions was that they had graduated
Constitutional Court magistrates. I sent these rights of petition to the Externado de Colombia University,
the University of Medellín, the University of the Andes, the National University of Colombia, Javeriana
University, the University of Antioquia, Our Lady of the Rosary University, the Free University of
Colombia, the University of the Atlantic, the University of Caldas, the Latin American Autonomous
University, and the University of Cartagena. The University of Medellín, Javeriana University, the
University of the Atlantic, and the Latin American Autonomous University did not respond to the petition.
Besides, only the University of Cartagena, Our Lady of the Rosary University, Externado de Colombia
University provided data about the ethno-racial composition of the student body in their law programs.
In all the institutions that reported data, Afro-descendant students appeared to be scarce. This
assertion that seems to be equally true for the University of Cartagena, located in a Caribbean coast city
where a significant portion of the population (36.1%) is Afro-descendant,626 and in Our Lady of the Rosary
University and Externado de Colombia University, both located in Bogotá, where the Afro-descendant
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population is low (1.5%).627 Despite the differences in demography, the level of Afro-descendant presence
among the law student body in all three universities looks to be lower than the one corresponding to their
share of the population in the city where they are located. Furthermore, the University of Caldas provided
data concerning the ethno-racial composition of the law school faculty, asserting that Afro-descendants or
indigenous persons occupied none of the 35 faculty positions in the university's law school (including fulltime and partial-time faculty).

Institution

Ethno-racial composition of law student body [2018-2019]
Number of Number
of Number
of Number
of Number
of
enrolled
women law AfroAfroindigenous
law
students
descendant
descendant
law students
students
law students
women law
students
925
544 (58.81%) 51 (5.51%)
23 (2.48%)
13 (1.41%)

Number
of
indigenous
women law
students

University of
4 (0.43%)
Cartagena
Our Lady of Approx.
Approx.
16 (1.31%)
Missing data
15 (1.22%)
Missing data
the Rosary 1225.628
671629
University
(54.8%)
Externado
1744
1043
12 (0.69%)
8 (0.46%)
12 (0.69%)
5 (0.27%)
de Colombia
(59.81%)
University
[ Source: Answers to the rights of petition. The main researcher conducted the number's tabulation]

Many participants referred to the limited number of Afro-descendant students at higher education
institutions as well.630 Several of them pointed out that during their time in law schools, the number of
Afro-descendant students was in very low, with some of them even stating that they had the experience of
being the only ones in their respective classes.631 A similar situation happened in the case of indigenous
interviewees, who described the experience of being “the only indigenous person” in their class.632 An
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Afro-descendant judge who attended a private law school in a majoritarian Afro-descendant city in the
Caribbean region, mentioned:

I think I was the only Afro-descendant in my class. I refer to brown people (gente morena).
Obviously, among the Afro-descendants, some of us have more melanin than others. However, in
my class, and I tell you, that is a good question, during the five years I attended [law school], I think
I was the only Afro. The darkest in the classroom.633

However, the actual number of Afro-descendant persons enrolled in law schools could be higher
than the one that participants report since n this context, too, self-identification becomes a limitation to
assess representation.634
The World Bank has declared that there has been significant progress regarding Afro-descendants'
access to education across the Latin American region. This improvement has benefited the general
population in Latin American countries. However, noteworthy access barriers persist.635 Afro-descendants
still have considerably worse educational accomplishment levels than other groups (64% of Afrodescendants versus 80% of non-Afro-descendants at primary level).636 This disparity persists regardless of
socio-economic status.637 Education gaps are more prominent in secondary and tertiary education and had
not been reducing in recent years.638 Afro-descendants not only have higher secondary education dropout
rates but also account for only 12% of the people with tertiary education degrees, despite representing a
quarter of the population over 25 years of age in the region.639
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The limited number of Afro-descendant students in law schools seems to be concerning in public
and private universities alike, and particularly severe in "elite" institutions.640 In the case of private
universities and particularly expensive private universities, the low level of Afro-descendant presence
seems to be directly linked to the elevated tuition costs. In the case of public universities, the low Afrodescendant access appears to be connected to the law school admission processes. In public universities,
applicants' selection tends to heavily rely on standardized tests that, some participants believe, play against
candidates who graduated from public schools, where the quality of education is perceived to be worse.641
One of the participants mentioned: “Well, I was admitted to a public university, which is, contrary to what
one might think, pretty hard for a public school student to study in a public university. Those who can pass
the test are those coming from good schools."642
There are exceptions to the general perception of Afro-descendant absence from law schools in
Colombia. Some participants mentioned that a significant portion of their law school class was Afrodescendant.643 The lack of statistical data in this respect does not allow me to identify these universities
fully. Nevertheless, my perception is that these institutions tend to be private universities located in areas
with particularly numerous Afro-descendant populations. According to participants, in these institutions,
the quality of education is not good.644
Regarding the quality of higher education that Afro-descendants receive, some respondents pointed
out that this was, in general terms, of inferior quality, given the economic restrictions to attend high-quality
private universities and the educational deficiencies in primary and secondary education.645 One of the
interviewees asserted:
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[Afro-descendants face] all the difficulties, all the difficulties, because the universities from which
they graduate are not the best. They do not attend [name of prestigious private university]; they are
not those prestigious universities. They do not attend [name of prestigious private university]. They
are universities with deficient academic standards. Above all, in many private universities in
Cartagena, on the [Caribbean] coast, we are just a few black persons who can attend the [name of a
prestigious private university]. For example, due to the high cost of these universities. Then, we are
forced to attend to low-quality universities, where the cost of the semester is 2 or 3 million pesos,
which is easier to cover.646

Another participant declared:

I attended a university in the province. It was a university that educates legal professionals. In that
respect, in that context, I acknowledge that the conditions in which our university educates students
are not the best. That is not only my case, but the case of all communities located on the outskirts
of the country. Of course, there are Afro Colombians that can have access to great opportunities and
attend outstanding universities, the best in the country. However, probably the economic position
of their parents that facilitates such a situation, or their academic performance allows them to find
someone to fund them. That is not the common denominator. The common denominator is to attend
a university in a province that offers average, almost low, quality of education, and with those skills
go out into the professional world to try to defend everybody’s interests.647

Most Afro-descendants in Latin America do not have access to high-quality education, much less
to institutions of education that consider culture, language, and religious particularities of Afro-descendants
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who have a particular culture.648 In 1992, only 2% of the students at the University of São Paulo were
black.649 Also, in Brazil, Afro-descendant children:

have greater difficulty in entering, remaining in and progressing through the educational system and
keeping up to the standards set for their age group. They also attend worse-quality schools, the result
of all this being that they are more likely to be failed or to fall behind the standards set for their age
group than are white students.650

Parallelly to the issue of the quality of education, some participants noted that Afro-descendants
have limited access to institutions that are known for graduating lawyers who later occupy positions in the
judiciary.651 They asserted that certain law schools have contact networks or specific profiles that enable
their alumni to enter the judiciary.652 Some suggested that there are informal hierarchies that play out at the
Colombian courts’ recruitment practices and personnel selection.653 The universities that seem to have these
particular connections with the judicial branch appear to be, in a majority of cases, high-cost private
institutions.654
Class status heavily conditions Afro-descendants’ access to higher education. Given the high cost
generally associated with legal education, and the limited resources that most Afro-descendants possess,
some of the participants referenced having to work and study to be able to afford attending university,
which, in many cases, forced them to study at night or under conditions that delayed their graduation.655
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Scholarships, fellowships, and affirmative action programs played a significant role in enabling
access to higher education for certain Afro-descendants and facilitated their access to postgraduate
programs.656 Some participants declared that without these types of awards, it is unlikely they could have
been able to become lawyers.657 A similar situation happens with public universities, in which the costs of
attendance are more accessible for low-income students.658 Nevertheless, scholarships were sometimes
partial, which led to some Afro-descendant law students to use loans or other forms of funding to cover
their education costs.659
In the field of affirmative action programs, several Latin American countries have made significant
progress to better guarantee access to education for Afro-descendant populations. The most notable
example is Brazil, where Law 12,711 of 2012 put in place a system of quotas for public federal universities
for Afro Brazilians.660 The program takes into consideration different criteria and reserves 50% of seats for
students graduating from public schools and who come from low-income backgrounds. Within this
percentage, it creates a quota for Afro-descendant and indigenous students, corresponding their share of the
population in the respective state.661 Following this law, some universities established independent
affirmative action measures for graduate programs.662 These initiatives are also independent of the benefits
established in Law 11,096 of 2005, which establishes scholarships for students from low-income families
to attend private universities.663
In the case of Colombia, affirmative action and scholarship programs for Afro-descendants have
been modest. Decree 1627 of 1996 established a special system of education loans for low-income Afro
Colombians with outstanding academic performance and educational achievement.664 Additionally, some
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universities have established independent affirmative action programs. However, most of them are
relatively limited in their scope.665 In this regard, although according to the Ministry of Interior,
approximately 60 Colombian universities and institutions of higher education offer scholarships and other
incentives for Afro-descendant students, these tend to provide only partial funding or, in the case of quotas,
only reserve a few seats per academic program or department.666
The urban-rural division and the geographic location condition effective enjoyment of the
education service. As I explained in chapter 2, some regions that concentrate large Afro-descendant
populations (e.g., San Andrés, Tumaco, and Buenaventura) do not have any law schools, which constitutes
a significant obstacle for the group's access to legal education. A judge from an Andean city of Colombia
commented:

If you are in a city like Medellín, you can quickly get a postgraduate degree after another. In a few
years, you can get a post-graduate degree in family law, in administrative law, in civil law, in
criminal law. You can get 5 or 6 postgraduate degrees. In the end, every one of them gives you a
score [in the selection process]. If you are living in a region that does not offer postgraduate degrees,
if you are working there, if you have your initial degree, some postgraduate degrees you did online,
or are traveling to other cities, if that is where you are living and have your professional activity,
that supply, that supply of knowledge, and the supply of this type of studies are not available.667

This comment exemplifies how inequality in access to legal education constrains the possibility of
some Afro-descendants to acquire the academic credentials necessary to have access to judicial positions.
As I explained in chapter 2, Afro-descendants comprise a significant part of the population in peripherical
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areas of the country, which means that they often lack an adequate provision of services, including
education. In this respect, an interviewee declared:

It is known that there are vast differences between an alumnus of the University of the Pacífico or a
university in Barranquilla or Cartagena, and an alumnus of the University of Antioquia, EAFIT or
the University of Medellín. The opportunities are different. Maybe because of the conditions of
development of those cities and the peripherical conditions of ours. Therefore, we do not have the
same training, nor the same opportunity to, for example, having similar conditions to compete for
those positions, at least through a merit-selection process.668

The barriers to access higher education often leads to forms of migration.669 Many of the
participants asserted they had to leave their cities and regions of origin because they could not receive
higher education there. I call this phenomenon "educational migration.670 One of them mentioned: "My
process to become a lawyer started by having to leave my city of origin [name of the city], in the region of
Chocó, because by the time I was in school there were no universities in that geographic area that offered
a law program."671 In certain situations, these experiences of educational migration are inter-generational.
Some participants explained that their parents underwent migration processes due to this same reason.672
Most of the migrating students move to central cities of the country, such as Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, or
Cartagena, where the educational offer is robust.673 As one might expect, class status often conditions the
possibility of migrating to study in other cities due to the significant costs associated with educational
expenses, relocation, and establishment in a new city.674 A participant mentioned:
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In San Andrés, access to education is not easy because of the costs. It is an economic matter, and
well, also social. For youths, everything is fast. However, financially, it is very demanding because
the parents had to create another home [in a different city] to send their child to. Even if it is to a
dormitory, they have to cover the room, board, tuition, and additional expenses. That is tough.675

Likewise, class status also conditions the destinations of educational migrants. In some cases,
middle-income families send their children to cities where they can reside with family or friends, or where
their older siblings have already relocated to. This decision lowers the costs associated with this practice.676
Furthermore, many Afro-descendants who become educational migrants face significant financial
hardships to cover their maintenance and school-related costs.677 They also undergo processes of uprooting,
given the difficulties to afford the costs associated with visiting their families and the cultural clash they
experience in their new homes. An Afro-descendant woman judge in a Caribbean city of Colombia stated:

The students, thanks to the great effort of our parents, had to go for the entire year because we did
not have the opportunity to come back home in June. At that time, there were not the same
communication alternatives that you see today, much less the transport systems that you see today,
with lower fares. At that time, it was costly. Our parents had to send us away in January, and we
could come back in December to spend Christmas with our families.678

A final element to consider is discrimination in this specific setting. Although I will refer more
extensively to the issue of racial discrimination within judicial institutions and the legal profession in the
final section of this chapter, I would like to highlight some aspects regarding racial discrimination
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experiences in the context of higher education. Participants pointed out not only to situations of structural
discrimination and socio-economic inequality,679 but also to events to overt racial discrimination during
their time at law school.680 In this respect, a woman Afro-descendant judge living in the city of Bogotá
described that while she was a law student, she experienced multiple situations of discrimination from
faculty, which ultimately led her to transfer to another university. She mentioned that:

The last straw was that one day I had a final exam, in which we delivered a group paper, and that
was the final grade. When they returned our paper, next to the names, there were the grades.
Nevertheless, she [her partner] got a five, and I got a four. I said: 'this must be a mistake' because it
was only one paper, there was not oral defense, just the paper. Then I went to talk to the professor
with my classmate and we told him: 'We think that there was a mistake, because you gave her a five,
and you gave me a four'. The answer that the professor gave me was: 'you should be thankful that I
gave you that grade because you know that at this university black people do not study [enough],
and what they do is to lean on white people to be able to pass the classes, so you should thank me I
gave you a 4.' At that moment I knew I was in the wrong place and that I needed to leave.681

The discriminatory language was a collective experience in the lives of Afro-descendant students.
One of them mentioned that during her time in law school, other students called her “pelo de alambre”
(wire hair),682 another participant described how even faculty tended to call her "Negrita" (little black
girl),683 and a third one referred to the frequent use of racially biased expressions in the classroom that
tended to go unnoticed, to the point of describing how one of her classmates, a white-mestizo attorney
working on human rights law, during one of the classes said:
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Excuse me! [there were three Afro-descendant students in the same class, including the participant],
but I have always believed that the people from the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts complain a lot.
If they are poor is because they are lazy. They do not want to work and decide to cry over it instead.
Black people only like parties and buzz.684

Several participants, particularly women, had experiences in which they were confused with
cleaning services employees at their places of education, due to their gender and race.685 Discrimination
manifested through the denial of Afro-descendant’s contributions to knowledge and society, too. One of
the interviewees described that when he proposed to have a seminar on African philosophy at the university
where he studied, the school administrators replied by denying that African philosophy existed at all.686
The participant commented that: "In education, the exclusion of knowledge, history, and contributions of
black people is widespread.”687 Moreover, participants coincided that they did not receive any sort of
training regarding ethnic rights or Afro-descendants' rights while they were in law school since such
academic offer did not exist.688 Participants suggested that experiences of discrimination undermined their
academic performance and affected their relationships with their peers, to the point of not being able to say
their names in class without fear.689
I consider that racial discrimination in education plays an essential role in explaining the situation
of Afro-descendant underrepresentation in the judiciary. Experiences of discrimination do not only exclude
people from educational settings; they block their access to different positions and impair the development
of their academic potential in institutions of higher education. The World Bank has asserted that the
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differential educational outcomes between Afro-descendants and non-Afro-descendants in Latin America
are, in part, the effect of ethno-racial discrimination:

Discrimination plays a vital role in explaining some educational gaps and outcomes. Education
systems across the region fail to promote the recognition of Afro-descendant identities; on the
contrary, they contribute to promoting stereotypical and folklore-driven representations. Lack of
public funding, inadequate facilities and class materials, and unsupported faculty are other factors
that have been found to limit the performance of Afro-descendant youths and children. Afrodescendant families also face obstacles in covering school-related expenses, including tuition,
transportation, and school supplies.690

In conclusion, the role of education inequalities, racial discrimination in education, and the
difficulties in accessing higher education are factors that appear to be contributing to the
underrepresentation of Afro-descendants in Latin American courts. Additional research efforts should
analyze the relative weight that this variable has on this problem.

4. The interaction of race- and gender-based forms of oppression

Similarly to what occurs with class dynamics, gender directly influences the issue of racial
stratification of judicial institutions in Latin America. Gender subordination played a sensitive role in the
participants’ responses (particularly of women’s responses) concerning the ethno-racial composition of
Colombian judicial institutions and in the answers offered to the rights of petition. This entanglement of
race and gender is not surprising. As Peter Wade asserted, these two categories have historically been
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intertwined.691 This bond between race and gender in Latin America is deeply related to the mestizaje
narratives. During colonial and post-colonial periods, the mestizo nation project demanded the acceptance
of a specific type of interracial relations (those involving white men and indigenous and black women) and
the rejection of others (the relations between black and indigenous men and white women).692 Furthermore,
Tianna Paschel remembers that the cult of mestizaje has also created a smokescreen behind which the sexual
coercion and violence against African and indigenous women hide.693 Because of this historical relation,
Wade asserts that, in Latin America, race and sex, instead of being seen as categories that intersect, should
be understood as conditions that mutually constitute one another.694 He argues that in social orders where
race is used as a form to stratify society based on ancestry, the control of human sexuality and, mainly,
women's sexuality is critical to maintaining such stratified order in place.695
There are two main ways in which race and gender seemed to interact during the data-collection
process: The intersectionality of race and gender discrimination and the differences in the judicial
institutions’ treatment of race and gender.

4.1. Intersectional race and gender discrimination

Afro-descendant women participants narrated how their gender and race placed them in a position
of considerable disadvantage in the legal profession and within judicial institutions. An Afro-descendant
judge stressed the differences in life experiences that Afro-descendant men and women encounter in their
lives. These differences shape their access to the legal and judicial positions. She mentioned that: "It is not
the same, it is not the same, for an Afro man judge than for an Afro woman, I believe that these are also

691

Peter Wade, Debates contemporáneos sobre raza, etnicidad, género y sexualidad en las ciencias sociales, in RAZA,
AMÉRICA LATINA 41–66, 50 (Peter Wade,
Fernando Urrea Giraldo, & Mara Viveros eds., 2008).
692
Id. at 50.
693
PASCHEL, supra note 33 at 5–6.
694
PETER WADE, RACE AND SEX IN LATIN AMERICA 2 (2009).
695
Id. at 58–59.
ETNICIDAD Y SEXUALIDADES: CIUDADANÍA Y MULTICULTURALISMO EN

194

different fights. For being women, we are seen as weak for this type of position."696 Some Afro-descendant
women participants had specific burdens since an early age. An Afro-descendant woman judicial employee
remembered that, during an informal conversation with a professor she had in law school, he told her: "you
have three problems: you are a woman, you are poor, and you are black. You need to study much more than
these other women [referring to her classmates]". This assertion came to her as a shock, but she eventually
agreed with her professor:

After some time, I realized that those three things that he had said were wisdom because being a
woman had already a burden, but being a black woman had an additional burden, and coming from
a family that has been socially climbing, but that still has not reached a certain [socio-economic]
level, had other complications.697

Moreover, participants tended to emphasize that black women's work and accomplishments are
consistently overlooked or underestimated.698 In this respect, one of the participants commented that:
"Being a black woman is a barrier in other people's minds to believe what I am, or to associate my profession
to my ethnic and gender condition".699
A particular area in which indigenous and Afro-descendant women tended to make visible the
specific burdens they face due to the interaction of their gender and racial identities was in the way in which
they needed to reconcile their family responsibilities with their work.700 Maternity was also a particularly
visible aspect, not only in the participants' narratives but during the interview process itself. During a couple
of interviews, I noticed that Afro-descendant women interviewees had brought their children to work or
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had specific time restraints associated with their parental responsibilities. In contrast, Afro-descendant men
appeared not to have this type of responsibility.
Certain stereotypes concerning black women also appeared evident during the interviews.
Participants mentioned how they were commonly confused with domestic workers and general services
personnel or felt that they could be stereotyped as such, as black women are commonly associated with this
type of labor.701 One of the participants explained that stereotypes make their way into the work
environment, which puts Afro-descendant women in an awkward position in professional spaces. She
mentioned: "The black woman [is seen] as the domestic worker, or as a woman that is very humorous or
sexually active. In the end, it is challenging that, once you move to a professional setting, you can transform
that imaginary".702 In certain instances, black men were the ones who engaged in stereotyping and
discrimination against black women.703 In the case of indigenous women, they also made references to how
they faced significant gender-based barriers in the interior of their communities. For example, they were
excluded from the possibility of participating in their traditional justice systems.704
These reinforced experiences of discrimination faced by Afro-descendant women (and indigenous
women) seem to be supported by previous research on intersectional discrimination in Latin America. The
ECLAC has pointed out that, in Latin America, gender, race, class, and ethnicity interact and alter how
different types of women experience discrimination and inequality.705 Social indicators, when
disaggregated in terms of sex and race/ethnicity, show that Afro-descendant and indigenous women fare
worse in different social metrics than other groups of women.706 These differences might indicate that race
could play a more determinant nature than gender at explaining their disadvantageous place in society.707
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The specific challenges and burdens that Afro-descendant and indigenous women face in the legal
and judicial professions were, sometimes, mentioned as a condition that motivated women to join judicial
institutions. These women acknowledged the symbolic relevance that their presence in these positions of
power could have for young Afro-descendant women and girls and the black women's social movement.708
I should state, however, that Afro-descendant women appear to be in similar, and sometimes,
slightly better positions than Afro-descendant men in terms of presence in the judiciary. Out of the 9 Afrodescendant magistrates reported for the superior tribunals of judicial district, 5 were women, and 2 out of 3
magistrates reported in this same category for the administrative tribunals were also Afro-descendant
women. In the case of judicial employees, 20 of the 28 Afro-descendant judicial employees reported for the
superior tribunals of judicial district were women, and 9 of the 13 Afro-descendants reported in these same
positions in the administrative tribunals were women. A similar situation takes place in the case of the SJP,
where 3 of the 4 Afro-descendant magistrates are also women.
However, interviewees' accounts seemed to emphasize the specific barriers that Afro-descendant
women face (when compared to Afro-descendant men) working in the judicial system. One could interpret
that these barriers manifest not as an aggravated barrier for Afro-descendant women to access positions in
the judiciary, but as specific situations of discrimination and exclusion in their lived experiences as legal
and judicial professionals. Also, although Afro-descendant women seem to be in a slighter better position
than Afro-descendant men in terms of access to positions inside judicial institutions, they also appear to be
heavily underrepresented in judicial institutions, as the general Afro-descendant population is.

4.2. Different treatment of race and gender by judicial institutions

Another aspect that I should mention is how race and gender compare to one another within judicial
institutions and the legal profession. There were several ways in which the different treatment of race and
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gender by judicial institutions became evident during the data collection process. The most palpable was,
perhaps, the dissimilarities in the available data concerning each identity category. The Superior Council
of the Judicature had data on the composition of the Colombian judiciary disaggregated by gender, the
National Registry of Attorneys had pre-existing data on the gender composition of the legal profession,
certain courts, such as the State Council, provided data concerning the gender composition of the institution.
However, these same institutions failed to provide similar data disaggregated by ethno-racial identity.
Besides, in their responses to the rights of petition, courts seemed to be more willing to discuss issues of
gender than issues of race. As an example, the Administrative Tribunal of Santander sustained: "The
corporation has always seen as vital the participation of women in the different positions [of the institution],
which materializes in the number of women that currently work in the institution, regardless of the existence
of a program or inclusion policy." At the same time, the tribunal avoided any mention of indigenous or
Afro-descendant persons.
In addition to these asymmetric treatments of race and gender, inclusion policies based on gender
have been more effective than ethno-racial inclusion policies in Latin American judiciaries in specific ways.
This greater effectiveness of gender inclusion policies is patent in aspects such as the establishment of a
gender commission for the Colombian judiciary, which publishes reports and promotes the inclusion of
gender perspectives into judicial decision-making.709 Another example is the gender quota law, which seeks
to guarantee a minimum level of women's representation (30%) in high-level state positions, including the
high courts.710
Similarly, respondents revealed different instances in which judicial institutions treated gender and
race differently. As an example, one of the participants described how, in the SJP, the idea of granting a
significant level of representation for women among the group of judicial employees faced less opposition
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that the idea of adopting similar policies for Afro-descendants and indigenous persons.711 This different
treatment was justified on the basis that it was easier to find qualified women to occupy positions at this
institution than it was to find qualified indigenous or Afro-descendant candidates for the same type of
positions. According to the interviewee: "… the matter is that many of the magistrates that were appointed,
when the ethnic topic was mentioned, [they] left the negotiation table when the characteristics of the
[auxiliary] justices were being discussed."712
This different treatment of race and gender inclusion claims seems to be consistent with previous
literature on this topic. Regarding the interactions between ethno-racial and gender-based social movements
in Latin America, Mala Htun describes how countries in the region have opted for an array of mechanisms
to guarantee these groups’ inclusion at an institutional level.713 The preferred options have depended on
factors such as country-specific political traditions and institutional designs, but also on the structural
characteristics of the groups that were trying to be included in society and public institutions.714 Htun asserts
that the easier it is to define the boundary of a group, the simpler it is “for political institutions to target
benefits and sort voters by group. When group boundaries are more ambiguous the application of groupspecific policies–whether on political inclusion or access to higher education–poses practical
difficulties.”715 The author targets a significant difference between ethno-racial groups and women in Latin
America. The boundaries used to differentiate between women and men tend to be (at least traditionally)
easier to mark than ethno-racial boundaries. Ethno-racial limits are more difficult to demarcate given the
extended levels of miscegenation, the complexities of racial classifications, and the history of race
relations.716
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Htun identifies several significant differences between the path that women and ethno-racial groups
in Latin America have taken in order to conquer political inclusion policies.717 She mentions that since
class and race divisions tend to overlap in this part of the world profoundly, race-based affirmative action
measures may appear threatening to national ruling elites. These policies could introduce new class interests
into the democratic debate, in contradiction to the elite’s wishes.718 This threat is not present in affirmative
action policies for women. Gander based policies do not experience similar class conflicts with men, as
their inclusion in political institutions does not necessarily lead to the incorporation of perceived
destabilizing class interests in these areas.719
In conclusion, the interactions of race and gender forms of oppression are fundamental to
understand the racial stratification of Latin American judicial institutions. This relation exceeds
intersectional analysis and the aggravated forms of discrimination that Afro-descendant women experience
since Judicial institutions' dissimilarly treat ethno-racial and gender identities. Courts appear to be more
receptive to produce information and engage in action to accommodate women's inclusion than Afrodescendant and indigenous' inclusion. Nevertheless, I should also be clear to assert that this differential
treatment may be negligible, if one considers the significant challenges that women inclusion and gender
justice face in the judicial system.

5. The influence of race, color, and identity

There were instances in which participants discussed the relevance of skin color and other physical
characteristics in their experiences in judicial institutions. As I explained in chapter 1, authors such as Anani
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Dzidzienyo,720 Eunice Aparecida de Jesus,721 Hebe Clementi,722 Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel,723
Tanya Hernandez,724 Elisa Larkin Nascimento,725 Peter Wade,726 and many others coincide in that skin
color plays a determinant role in the construction of racial subordination in Latin America. This role is so
essential that some of them have used the concept of pigmentocracy to define racial relations in this
region.727 Edward Telles expresses that in the case of Colombia, skin color and other phenotypic identifiers
seem to be more determinant (or a better predictor) of social status and the benefits and burdens associated
with it than racial self-identification.728 This situation repeats in other countries in Latin America, except
for Brazil, as "in all the PERLA countries, skin color was a more reliable predictor of racial inequality, with
the exception of Brazil, where identity and appearance tend to be more correlated."729 In this sense, racial
discrimination in Latin America appears to be more aligned with color differences than with ethno-racial
identity differences.
Some of the participants stressed that darker skin colors and other prominent physical traits commonly
associated with Afro descendancy are factors that can increase the risk of suffering discrimination.730 The
darker the skin, the higher the risk of being excluded or discriminated against, and conversely. A participant
described how one of her law school classmates seemed to inflict different forms of racial discrimination
based on phenotype against black persons. The interviewee described that:

We had a classmate who was also Afro [descendant], then that guy [the bully] believed that we came
in tones—not all blacks are the same—her hair color was similar to [the color of] petroleum, then
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that guy came and said to her: 'that black blouse, you cannot even tell the difference.' That was how
he rolled. And I used to tell him: 'but I am also black.' And he replied: 'No, you are not so black'
[referencing her lighter skin color]. Or certain things happened, like [he said]: 'No, you are black,
but you are smart; you are black, but you are pretty.731

Some participants also seemed to note that lightness in skin color not only allows for some degree
of racial privilege but could also facilitate whitening. Afro descendants who have lighter skin can more
easily transit into one of the mestizo racial categories and self-identify as non-Afro-descendant. People with
darker skin tones do not have such a possibility.732 On certain occasions, Afro-descendant interviewees
mentioned that specific facts (such as being light-skinned or coming from higher socio-economic
backgrounds) made them question the authenticity of their experience as Afro-descendants in the legal
profession and in their personal lives. A light-skinned upper-middle-class Afro-descendant woman attorney
living in an Andean city of Colombia stated:

When I was born, I was living in Laureles [name of an upper-middle-class neighborhood], and that
was it. So I feel bad saying that I am an Afro-descendent because I have not suffered it. I feel that
when [one] self-identifies before public authorities is to receive a benefit or something, and I do not,
for my economic position nor in esthetic terms [referencing her light-skin], manifest that.

I find particularly interesting about this account that the participant seems to directly connect the
"authenticity" of the Afro-descendant identity with a low-class status vis-à-vis equating being Afrodescendant to being poor. This narrative exemplifies the idea that "money whitens" that some scholars have
documented.733 The participant also acknowledged that her lighter-skin allows her to evade certain forms
of race discrimination, which appears to suggest that lighter skin Afro-descendant can more easily transit
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into intermediate racial categories. In this respect, the discussion about color discrimination is part of a
broader conversation about the self-recognition of the Afro-descendant population and the mobilization of
black identities.
As I had previously discussed, self-identification is a significant issue among Afro-descendants in
Latin America. Despite being racialized as black, many Afro-descendants will not identify with any Afrodescendant identity. Some respondents seemed to understand that the lack of self-identification as Afrodescendants was a form of avoiding further experiences of discrimination,734 while others read it as a
manifestation of shame and internalized racism. One of the participants used the expression “negros
vergonzantes” (shameful blacks) as a way to refer to Afro-descendants who actively seek not to be
referenced as black or try to underemphasize this part of their identities.735 In the respondent's views, the
origin of this "shame," is related to the meaning that blackness has in Colombia's history. He asserted that
to acknowledge one's African heritage is also to recognize the legacy of slavery and that, as the same
participant described it, "you came here in chains.736 Moreover, several interviewees discussed individual
trajectories towards self-recognizing as Afro-descendants and their battles amid this process.737
The embracement of Afro-descendant identity limits the debate about Afro-descendant
representation in the courts in different ways. For example, in the case of Cartagena, many Afrodescendants that work for the judiciary do not self-identify as such. Hence, the process of assessing the
level of representation that Afro-descendants have on the courts is more difficult, given the lack of selfidentification of the local population.738
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6. Inequalities and disparate impacts of judicial selection mechanisms

There has been limited research on the issue of Latin American judiciaries’ gender and ethno-racial
composition, including on how selection mechanisms influence certain groups’ access to judicial posts. In
the context of the U.S., however, several scholars have studied the impact of judicial selection mechanisms
on the composition of courts at the state and federal levels. Before referring to the specific findings attained
concerning judicial selection mechanisms influence on group representation on courts, I will briefly
summarize the U.S. literature on this topic. Despite the apparent differences in the judicial selection
mechanisms used in this national context vis-à-vis Latin America, I believe that this literature may
illuminate particular challenges that ethno-racial minorities face in their access to the bench.

6.1. U.S. literature on judicial selection mechanisms and their impact on women and ethnoracial minorities representation on the judiciary

One of the most salient points of academic debate regarding group representation on U.S. courts is
the relationship between minorities' presence in the judiciary and judicial selection mechanisms employed
to fill out vacancies. The question about whether certain judicial selection mechanisms create better
conditions for increasing the number of non-traditional judges has led to significant debate. Some authors
have criticized the use of particular selection mechanisms, such as merit selection, under the belief that
these mechanisms could make it more difficult for women and minorities to attain a seat on the bench.739
They argue that non-white-male judges "are not a part of the prior status quo or do not have the same
experiences or opportunities as do other judicial candidates, which militates against their chances of being
selected."740
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A paper published by Mark Hurwitz in 2010 argues that, although differences in judicial selection
mechanisms used to play a significant role in judicial diversity on courts, such effect has been vanishing
over time.741 The paper, based on a previously published work,742 suggests that, although in 1985 minority
judges had higher chances to sit on state appellate benches if judges were appointed by the state governor
instead of selected by a merit commission, by 1999 and 2005 minorities had the same chances of becoming
judges if a merit selection plan, a governor's appointment, or a judicial election mechanism was employed
fill out vacancies.743 The research, which looked at the composition of state appellate courts at different
points in time, concluded that "while there once may have been some correlation between selection system
and diversity, there no longer is any such relationship."744
Despite this, Sherrilyn Ifill objects to the benign nature of different judicial selection mechanisms
to enhance minority representation in the judiciary. In her view, empirical studies analyzing the effect of
different systems of judicial selection have produced conflicting results and have exclusively focused on
the number of women and minorities on the bench, disregarding the importance of structural impartiality—
different ideas and life experiences—to assess judicial diversity.745 Due to the controversial nature of this
topic, I will examine the relationship between the mechanisms used for judicial selection at the federal and
state levels and the representation of women and minorities on such benches.
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6.1.1.

Federal courts

In the case of article III judges, the process for selecting a judge to fill a vacancy consists of two
main steps: presidential nomination of the candidate, followed by a confirmation process before the
Senate.746 According to Sheldon Goldman, since the late 1970s, the confirmation of federal judges has
become increasingly contentious.747 The so-called "confirmation wars" are the result of a clash between
liberals and conservatives in Congress. Both groups are trying to ideologically align with their views on the
role of the judicial system to address politically divisive issues, such as sexual and reproductive rights,
crime, the bill of rights, among others.748 Kevin Johnson warns about how the polarization around judicial
confirmations is likely to continue in the future. Johnson points out that the ideological divisiveness
surrounding the confirmation processes will likely have a particularly harsh impact on minority judicial
nominees.749 He asserts that the ideological divisions in the confirmation processes have harmed minority
representation on the federal bench. Johnson argues that to select candidates who generate fewer
controversies in the Senate, the President will be inclined to nominate traditional candidates to the bench,
which could translate into a more homogenous judiciary.750
In the case of federal courts, non-white-male nominees have faced complicated confirmation
processes in the Senate, which some allege are the consequence of the legislature's discomfort with women
and minorities serving as judges.751 In the context of the Supreme Court justices' confirmation processes,
Kevin Johnson notes: “The process for a minority Supreme Court Justice has been nothing less than a
ritualized hazing of people of color that sends a clear message to the greater national community that racial
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minorities should be the subject of suspicion.”752 As an example, in the case of Sonia Sotomayor, Johnson
explains how, despite her outstanding credentials and history of moderation as a judge, she was the target
of accusations of engaging in judicial activism and holding anti-white bias.753 In his view, the confirmation
process before the Senate tends to be particularly harsh on minority nominees because the Senate uses the
confirmation as a way to determine whether or not the candidate has “assimilated into mainstream values
on race and civil rights.”754 Similarly, Linda Green remembers that the difficult confirmation process of
non-traditional nominees seems to be a constant, using Thurgood Marshall—the first African American
justice—and Louis Brandeis—the first Jewish justice—as examples of this situation.755
Regarding the confirmation process of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, Theresa Beiner
describes how it is likely that their diverse views on issues of public interest—such as race discrimination
and sexuality—led to difficult confirmation processes in the Senate. In the case of Sotomayor, the
difficulties arose due to her much-publicized "wise Latina" comments.756 In the case of Kagan, they were
the result of her views on LGBTQ rights, and especially her opposition to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy during her tenure as Harvard Law School's dean. Some used these positions as the basis to
describe Kagan as anti-military and even suggested she might be a lesbian.757
Theresa Beiner’s concern about Kagan and Sotomayor's confirmation processes are based on the
apparent contradiction between the political support for the idea of diversifying the judiciary—which is
partially based on the idea that women and minorities could bring new ideas to the bench—, and the
Senators attacks against non-traditional candidates because of their diverse opinions.758 Ultimately, Beiner
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asks whether the Senate's acceptance of women and minority nominees could come as a prize for nonwhite-male appointees' who do not openly support the agendas of historically discriminated groups.759
Discussing federal judges more broadly, Beiner claims that there has been "extended scrutiny of
female appointees,”760 and other non-traditional judicial nominees during their confirmation processes
before the U.S. Senate. During the Clinton presidency, white-male nominees for district court judgeships
required an average of 6 weeks less from the moment of their nomination to the moment when they were
granted a hearing before the Senate. They also needed 46 days less on average from the time of their
nomination to be confirmed as judges.761 This gap was even more significant in the case of appellate court
nominees, as white-males needed an average of two months less to be granted a hearing since their
nomination, and 146 days to be confirmed, counted from the same date.762 A similar situation took place
during the confirmation processes of George H.W. Bush’s judicial nominees, in which the Senate
democratic majority also delayed the confirmation of women nominees.763 According to Beiner, this
situation seems to have the effect of forcing the President to appoint women and minorities to the bench
that have a more traditional career path or more conservative political views, especially in the case of
democratic presidents.764
Similarly, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that the performance of a racial identity that can make
members of Congress feel uncomfortable is a factor that may hurt the confirmation chances of minority
candidates, as it could trigger negative racial stereotypes in the senators' minds.765 Moreover, Lazos Vargas
argues that these conditions could lead to a situation in which minority candidates who conform to white
behavior have higher chances of being confirmed to the bench than those who do not. This difference could
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result in the exclusion of critical voices of color—those that do not conform to expectations about how
racial identity should be actively performed—from the federal judiciary.766 In this scenario, according to
the Lazos Vargas, the substantive benefits of diversity are lost, since the presence of non-traditional judges
comes to the cost of leaving aside their perspectives.767 Furthermore, she criticizes how the discord in the
confirmation processes is limiting the presence of voices of color in the judiciary, both liberal and
conservative, which may ultimately limit the quality of the judicial decision-making process.768
Likewise, Lee Epstein et al. criticize the custom of requiring prior judicial experience for judicial
appointments to the United States Supreme Court.769 According to the authors, this type of selection
requirement reduces the level of career path diversity—which is highly influential in judicial decisionmaking. It also limits the ability of women and minorities to become justices, as their access to job positions
that give candidates an advantage to be appointed as judges is highly constrained when compared to white
men.770 Hence, they suggest that if the President were to consider appointing highly qualified lawyers that
had different work experiences, the pool of potential women and minority candidates would expand.771
Regarding the access of minority women to the Supreme Court, April Dawson states that, in past
decades, more non-ideological de facto requirements have been established for candidates who want to
become justices of the highest court in the country.772 These requirements include having a law degree from
an Ivy League school, possessing previous judicial experience at the federal appellate level, and even having
clerked for a Supreme Court justice. According to the author, the reiterated use of these requirements to
select Supreme Court candidates has had the effect of reducing the pool of potential candidates for this
court. Such reduction has particularly had a strong effect on women minority candidates due to conditions
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of discrimination in the legal profession. These candidates are less likely to fulfill these requirements than
white men.773 The author proposes specific alternatives to increase the likelihood of minority women to
become Supreme Court justices, such as including state court judges among the potential nominees for
these positions and using merit selection commissions to recruit potential candidates and ensure diversity
in the judiciary.774
Likewise, Carl Tobias has emphasized that the use of nominating commissions could have
facilitated the increasing women representation on the federal bench, as such instrument allowed greater
outreach to a larger pool of candidates for judicial positions.775 However, he also acknowledged the
importance of ideology during the nomination and confirmation process.776

6.1.2.

U.S. State Courts

One of the main difficulties of studying the relationship between judicial selection mechanisms at
the state level comes from the fact that virtually every state in the U.S. has a different process for selecting
judges. K.O. Myers explains that:

The judicial selection system is, for all intents and purposes, unique in each state. Both across and
within states, different methods are used to select (1) appellate judges and trial judges; (2) statewide
and local judges; (3) candidates who are eligible for initial terms; (4) judges who are eligible for
retention; (5) judges to fill seats at the end of a regular term; and (6) judges to fill interim vacancies
on the bench. In some states, like in Indiana, the selection method differs by county.777
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Regarding the selection of state supreme court judges, Kathleen Bratton & Rorie Spill studied the
influence of judges’ selection mechanisms on women’s representation on courts of last resort.778 Their
research used data regarding the selection of state supreme court judges from 1980 to 1996. It concluded
that "women are significantly more likely to be selected to a state high court when initially appointed."779
The authors suggested that appointive systems for judge selection tend to be better at securing gender
diversity on state supreme courts. Furthermore, such an effect was more salient when the appointive
governor was a democrat and when an all-male benches were to receive their first woman judge.780 They
also established that under appointive selection systems, "women are much more likely to be appointed to
an all-male court than to a gender-diverse court."781
Writing about the judicial selection in Virginia and South Carolina, Constance Anastopoulo &
Daniel Crooks suggest that the lack of transparency of judicial selection mechanisms, low wages, and the
politicization of judicial institutions make it more difficult for minorities to be represented in the judiciary.
These conditions discourage qualified minority lawyers from becoming candidates for judgeships.782 In the
case of the states that they examined—in which the entire process of judicial selection is in the hands of the
legislature—the authors argue that the legislature-controlled selection mechanism has turned out to be
reasonably effective at increasing minority representation levels in the judiciary.783 To improve such
situation, the authors suggest reducing the participation of legislators on merit-selection commissions;
determining a reasonable number of names sent to the ultimate selection organism; requiring merit-selection
commissions to consider decisions of a tribunal of ethics concerning candidates; and to allow participation
of the state bar association in the process of judicial selection.784
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From a different perspective, Sherrilyn Ifill opposes to the idea of states changing elective systems
of judicial selection for appointive systems. She explains that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,785 in which the court decided to strike down a provision of the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prevented judicial candidates from publicly expressing their views
on controversial issues, a heated debate arose on whether judicial elections could be reconciled with the
idea of judicial impartiality. There were also concerns about whether the court's decision in the case
mentioned above should be interpreted as an endorsement of appointive systems over elective systems of
judicial selection.786 Ifill suggests that, instead of moving away from elective systems, states should try to
introduce modifications to make judicial elections more compatible with the ideas of diversity and structural
impartiality.787 The author rejects the widespread implementation of appointive systems, arguing that such
judicial selection mechanisms could decrease the leverage that black communities have on the election of
judges. She believes that, in certain states in the South, this could mean that judicial election would not be
subjected to federal oversight under the Voting Rights Act.788 Moreover, she argues that such change could
further provoke dilution of the minority voting power, while not guaranteeing the retention of minority
judges in certain states.789
K. O. Myers asserts the need to improve merit commissions as a way to increase diversity on the
bench.790 According to the author, merit-selection systems have similar potential to create diverse
judiciaries than other judicial selection methods, such as judicial elections. Besides, merit-selection has a
particular advantage as it is possible to include diversity criteria for screening of candidates.791 The author
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suggests that diversifying the composition of merit-commissions themselves could have a positive impact
on improving diversity on the bench.792
Similarly, Leo Romero emphasizes the need to guarantee the legitimacy of judicial selection
mechanisms and particularly of merit-selection commissions.793 In his view, nominating commissions,
despite having significant control over the list of candidates to judgeships, are bodies that, for the most part,
lack accountability to the public.794 Therefore, the author proposes that appointive systems guarantee
minority and women's representation in the composition of nominating commissions and in the evaluation
and selection of candidates. Likewise, he argues that the selection process should be made as transparent
as possible in order the secure equal opportunity for different types of candidates.795 Finally, the system
should have accountability mechanisms to enforce the respect of diversity and transparency principles.796
Clara Torres-Spelliscy conducted an empirical study and interviewed members of nominating
commissions in different states.797 Her results indicate that although members of nominating commissions
are usually opened to the idea of increasing diversity in judicial institutions, “nonetheless, top candidates
from diverse backgrounds are not applying for, being nominated for, or being appointed to judicial openings
in proportionate numbers.”798 In her view, implicit bias could be the condition that prevents the appointment
of non-traditional judges to reach higher numbers.799 In order to increase the levels of political minorities'
representation in the judiciary, the author proposes several good practices, including acknowledging and
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taking action to neutralize implicit bias in nominating commissions; the active recruitment of potential
minority and women candidates to fill judicial vacancies; to include provisions in the statutes and laws
regulating nominating commissions that specify the role of diversity in the nominating process;
guaranteeing transparency in the process of receiving applications and formulating nominations; providing
commission members with training to better fulfill their recruitment and nominating task; introducing the
figure of "diversity ombudsman;" changing the law to guarantee diverse nominating commissions;
demanding nominees to have high standards of quality; raising judges' wages to attract better candidates;
and maintaining data of past applicants to keep track of the progress in the process of diversifying the
judiciary.800
In the particular context of state trial court judges, Linda Merola & Jon Gould published a
qualitative study in which they expressed that minority judges tend to emphasize the impact of networking,
mentorship, politics, and access to different types of resources in their success to be selected as judges.801
John Brittain & Kenneth Chandler arrived at similar conclusions regarding the factors driving successful
candidacies.802 The involvement of the candidate in political activities (partisan and not partisan),
campaigning activities, political networking, fundraising events, public image management, and even
advertising, as well as receiving political support from prominent figures in the legal or political systems
(e. g. bar associations, legislators, high court judges), were identified to have a significant roles in the
election of minority judges.803
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6.1.3.

Conclusions of the U.S. Literature

From the debates on judicial selection mechanisms and its relationship with minorities and
women’s representation on U.S. courts it is possible to reach certain conclusions: 1) Although at some point
in the past certain judicial selection systems—such as appointive systems—performed better at facilitating
the presence of women and minority on courts when compared to others, currently, different judicial
selection mechanisms may produce similar results in this respect; 2) in the context of the federal judiciary,
women and minorities nominated for article III courts have historically faced significant challenges—in
comparison to white-males—in their confirmation processes before the Senate; 3) the difficulties that
women and minorities encounter during congressional confirmation have worsen due to the increasing
partisanship amid the confirmation processes; 4) most authors agree in the need to reform existing judicial
selection mechanisms at the state level to improve the level of women and minorities’ representation on
courts, as well as the impartiality, transparency, and accountability of current judicial selection systems; 5)
transforming current judicial selection mechanisms may not lead by itself to improve women and
minorities’ representation on courts, as their level of representation if connected to other institutional,
social, economic and political factors, such as mentorship, networking and political capital.

6.2. Study findings on the impact of judicial selection mechanisms in Afro-descendant
representation in Colombian judicial institutions

Amid the qualitative data analysis, several findings arose concerning the impact of judicial selection
mechanism on Afro-descendant presence on Colombian courts. In order to convey these findings in an
orderly fashion, I will divide them according to the different types of judicial positions/judicial selection
mechanism they refer to.
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6.2.1.

High court magistrates

A common denominator in the accounts of participants regarding high court magistrates is the
emphasis on the political nature of selection mechanisms used for filling out vacancies.804 As I explained
in the preceding chapter, although different high courts have different selection processes and minimum
requirements for their magistrates, these are not career positions. In general, the selection process is not
particularly tailored to select the "most qualified" applicant. In words of one of the participants: “It is a
highly politicized process, in which it is required to have contacts or to belong to our society's power groups
[in order] to have access to those positions.”805 Similar to what happens in the case of U.S. Supreme Court
appointments, the high strata of successful candidates to high court magistrate positions in Colombia means
that Afro-descendants are virtually barred from the possibility of accessing such positions. This limitation
is a consequence of their lack the adequate connections and social capital necessary to be successful in the
selection process.806 In the case of potential magistrate candidates who live in the periphery of the country,
this situation can be aggravated by distance, as they rarely have access to the venues where the lobbying
for the selection of the final appointment takes place.807
The participants' generalized perception is that class status, political influence, a privileged
education, and elitism are forces that shape the selection process for high court magistrates. A process in
which, as a participant asserted: "There is not a selection power of the ethnic subjects.”808 An exception to
this reality is the SJP. In this particular court, ethnic identity was a specific criteria for the appointment of
the magistrates, which allowed ethnic organizations to participate in the conformation of the court
actively.809 One of the interviewees confirmed this intuition. The participant claimed that, despite having
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adequate credentials to occupy a high court magistrate positions, once he applied to fill out a vacancy, he
was not selected. In his view, this was the case because "the names [of those nominated] had been
previously selected.”810 Another interviewee described that in a previous process to fill out vacancies at a
high court, there were several Afro-descendant candidates but not a single one was even shortlisted for the
ultimate selection.811
The perception of nepotism in the high court magistrate selection is more concerning due to the
apparent lack of transparency. Not only the selection process is, in many cases, not completely visible to
the public, but also there is a deficiency of specific reasons to justify the selection of a candidate over
others.812 This worry resembles the apprehension that some U.S. scholars, such as Anastopoulo &
Crooks,813 have shown regarding transparency in the judicial selection process at the state level. Although
the works of these authors refer to the U.S. context, I believe they are relevant for the Colombian context
because of the similarities of both countries regarding the lack of public oversight and transparency over
judicial selection processes.

6.2.2.

Career magistrates, judges, and judicial employees

In general, interviewees appeared to have a better impression of the merit selection process than of
other selection mechanisms.814 Since the career judge selection process normally involves an exam,
participants see it as more objective. Some of the Afro-descendant participants working for the judiciary
stressed the impression that if it were not for the use of merit selection, it is unlikely that they would have
had access to their positions.815 An Afro-descendant judge in an Andean city of Colombia declared: "If
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there had not been a merit contest, I think I would have never become a judge or a magistrate because I am
a person that do not have many interpersonal relations with people that handle those types of appointments
directly."816
Certain participants, who attained their positions through merit selection processes, appeared to
display a particular type of pride for having accessed their positions that way since they believed it stressed
that their paths to the courts were transparent.817 Furthermore, some interviewees suggested the existence
of merit selection processes was a condition that enabled a greater level of representation for Afrodescendants in the judiciary, although my research is inconclusive in this regard.818 An Afro-descendant
judge in an Andean city declared: “Within the organs that do not have a [merit] contest, Afro-descendant
participation is void. It is zero because there is discrimination and, even if you demonstrate outstanding
skills and capacity, they do not stop seeing you as what it is: A black person, an Afro-descendant."819
Despite this situation, several participants manifested their distrust of the merit selection process to
fill out career position vacancies.820 The most common aspects subjected to criticism were the thematic
contents and abilities that were evaluated in the exam component of the merit selection process and the
issues related to the lack of mechanisms that secured judges’ cultural competency to deliver justice in ethnic
territories.821 Several participants argued that the contents and professional skills assessed in the exams had
little connection with those that one might expect from a competent judge.822 Some respondents also
criticized the definition of merit in these selection processes. They believed that the facially-neutral
definition of merit concealed a racialized conceptualization of this value.823 One of the participants asserted:
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Well, from the point of view, let’s say of career positions, we can say that the selection is based on
merit. However, we both know that merit is a subjective category. It is presented that way, but really
[having] merit is to be a white man. Everything you call merit is being a white man. And well, being
a white man is attending such university, of such characteristics. Generally, what they call having
merit is to be a white man, and, lately, with the strength that the [gender] equality aspect has
acquired, it can mean being a white woman, too.824

Participants also named invisible barriers to participate in the merit selection processes that appear
to affect Afro-descendant candidates disproportionately.825 Some of them asserted that access to the judicial
exam could be a problem for people living in rural areas and small cities, as candidates need to travel to be
able to sit for the test. Likewise, some participants also asserted that those who pass the test faced the reality
of having to constantly travel during a period of up to a year to participate in the course-contest phase of
the selection process, as courses are held in a few major urban centers of the country.826 The centralized
selection process creates significant obstacles for candidates living in peripherical regions and rural areas,
who need to travel to attend the classes and cover all costs related to transportation, lodging, and food.827
They receive no funding or financial support.828 In this respect, one of the participants, a mestizo judge in
an Andean city highlighted that while she was completing her merit selection process, she could observe
that:

People from Quibdó [a city with a majority of Afro Colombian population], for example, had to
complete the course in Medellín. This meant that they had to stay [in Medellín] Friday, Saturday,
Sunday, and Monday. They came from Chocó by plane since Friday. They stayed here from Friday
until Monday, attend the course, and then dealt with their chamber's affairs in Quibdó, once they
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went back, with all the difficulties of the financial costs that come with it, in a clear and notorious
disadvantage when compared to those of us who lived in Medellín.829

These costs can be very burdensome for many Afro-descendant lawyers, especially those who do
not have high incomes. A participant even asserted that he had to permanently relocate to another city to
participate in the course-contest phase of the merit selection process, given the costs and inconveniences
associated with the attendance to classes.830
Likewise, there have been reports of exams questions being discarded after applied in the test and
exams being wrongfully graded. This situation happened, for example, with the merit selection processes
undertaken to fill out judicial vacancies in the year 2018.831 Due to a mistake, the questions' order was
altered and then graded with a wrong answer key. The mistake led to several questions of the test being
incorrectly marked.832 Due to situations such as the formerly described, it is common that a high number
of lawsuits against the judiciary are initiated following the merit selection processes.833 These issues
ultimately make merit selection processes excessively long and extenuating for participants. According to
some of our interviewees, different administrative delays caused the merit selection processes through
which they became career judges to take as long as 5 or 6 years to conclude.834
Another common complaint had to do with situations of corruption and meddling in the meritselection process.835 Several participants manifested that they believed that the merit selection processes
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were not transparent and that corruption situations occurred with a certain frequency. One of the
interviewees, an Afro-descendant judicial employee, mentioned: "We cannot say that all merit contests are
tainted, but contacts are the most important part, let's say, in the reality of how things move."836 Another
one described a case involving his business partner who, after obtaining very high scores in the exam and
the course-contest components of the judicial selection process, was unable to become a judge. The
candidate received a low score in the interview component. Such low score, according to the interviewee,
seemed to be related to situations of corruption since the interview component is the one that can be more
easily manipulated.837 In this respect, several corruption scandals in all levels of the judicial pyramid have
shocked the Colombian judiciary in recent years, including cases of corruption affecting the merit selection
process for magistrates, judges, and judicial employees.838
I consider that this widespread perception of corruption is relevant for understanding Afrodescendant representation in judicial institutions because it can deter people from participating in the
selection process. Candidates believed that they would not stand a fair chance of being selected due to their
lack of connections and being outsiders to the circles of nepotism.839 For example, an Afro-descendant
judge in an Andean city of Colombia mentioned that she almost did not participate in a judge-selection
process because she was afraid that she might have to "sell her soul to the devil" to be successful in her
candidacy.840
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6.2.3.

Provisional magistrates, judges and judicial employees

In the case of the provisional magistrate, judge, and judicial employee positions, participants were
emphatic to highlight that nepotism played a decisive role in the filling out of provisional positions in the
judiciary.841 This aspect is not minor if one considers that by October 10th, 2018, approximately 45% of all
magistrates and judges and 53% of all judicial employees working at the intermediate tribunals and lower
courts were in provisional positions. According to the information that the Superior Council of the
Judicature provided, these positions account for nearly half of the judicial branch (excluding the high courts
and the Attorney General's Office). Although provisional appointments are expected not to last long, people
can occupy these positions lengthy periods. I could verify this reality during the interview process. Several
participants commented that they had been in provisional posts for years.842
I should emphasize that the Constitutional Court has issued several rulings aimed at decreasing the
level of discretion that judges and magistrates have the appointment of provisional judges and judicial
employees.843 However, in certain situations (e.g., when the eligibles’ list has been exhausted or expired),
the level of discretion of nominating authorities increases.844 These events open the door to nepotism.
Likewise, not all judicial authorities in charge of provisionally filling out vacancies might follow the
parameters that the constitutional court established. Some participants suggested that several nominating
judicial authorities knowingly decide to disregard these guides to benefit individual judicial servers.845 In
this respect, one of the participants mentioned:
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Some positions are occupied due to vacancies, and for those vacant positions, in most cases, [the
selection process] is if one knows a tribunal magistrate, if one knows a judge, if one knows someone
that can recommend you to have access to those spaces, which are, in many cases, very closed, very
scarce. Many times it is not necessarily contingent upon qualifications because there are many
highly qualified persons, but they do not know someone who can recommend them. They find it
very hard.846

The significant role that personal, familiar and professional relationships play in the selection of
provisional magistrate, judges, and judicial employees, seems to have a negative influence on Afrodescendant applicants in most cases, given their lack of the adequate contact networks for such endeavor.847
Moreover, as I had mentioned when I discussed regional variances of race, geographic location also plays
a vital role in this regard, as some participants stated that nominating judicial authorities, sometimes, tended
to prefer appointing people coming from their close circle to these positions,848 despite the fact that these
candidates were not from the geographical area or had any ties or experience in the places where they would
be sent out to work.849

6.2.4.

Free appointment and removal judicial employees

In the case of judicial employees that occupy positions of free appointment and removal, personal
and professional connections play a determinant role in their selection, as the deciding factor for the
appointment to one of these positions is the will of the nominating judge or magistrate.850 Low-class status
and racial segregation seem to be significant barriers in the access of Afro-descendant professionals to these
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positions since they lack the adequate social, professional, and personal connections that generate strategic
advantages to access these posts.851 In this respect, a mestizo judge in an Andean city described that she
had never hired Afro-descendants to work in her chambers because she selected her staff members from
the pool of recently graduated law students from the university where she served as an adjunct. Since the
number of Afro-descendant students at that institution was minimal, she never had an Afro-descendant
student to whom she could offer a job.852 Another interviewee suggested that one of the reasons why there
were so few Afro-descendants working as judicial employees for the high courts is because many of the
people who occupy these positions had previously served as ad honorem interns at these institutions.
Internships allowed them to gain visibility and develop networks that would later open the gates of judicial
employment.853 In the case of many Afro-descendant law students, this is not a possibility since they might
have studied in peripherical areas of the country and could not afford to move to Bogotá to undertake an
internship.854
The significant role that personal and professional connections play in the selection process for this
type of position also seemed to be confirmed by the fact that several of the interviewees that occupy these
jobs describe that previous personal relationships were determinant in their selection for such positions,855
and by the mentions that some interviewees made about how they found out about potential employment
opportunities at the high courts through their college friends, university professors, former employers, and
social contacts.856
A participant mentioned that, in the case of high courts’ free appointment and removal posts, the
potential appointment of more Afro-descendant magistrates could open the door for other Afro-descendants
to become judicial employees.857 He described this effect as a “rosca legítima” (an expression meaning
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legitimate nepotism).858 Another participant mentioned that at the court in which she serves, the arrival of
an Afro-descendant judge opened the door for other Afro-descendants to start working at this institution as
judicial employees. The new judge decided to appoint them to free appointment and removal positions.859
In conclusion, diverse problems affecting different selection mechanisms appear to be contributing
to Afro-descendant underrepresentation in judicial institutions. Among all the factors mentioned above, I
would like to stress the role that professional and personal networks have in the process of finding
employment in Colombia's judicial institutions. This situation appears to work against Afro-descendant
candidates significantly, given the impact that residential segregation, class inequality, and discrimination
has on their ability to acquire the proper connections for these positions, regardless of the type of selection
mechanism used to fill out vacancies.

7. Racial discrimination within judicial institutions and in the legal profession

The last factor that I consider relevant for explaining the low level of Afro-descendant
representation in judicial institutions in Colombia is the situations of racial discrimination at the interior of
the judicial system. Racial discrimination is a crucial aspect of this debate because it excludes people from
positions in the judiciary. Furthermore, discrimination influences the experiences of the Afro-descendants
already present in these types of professional settings and helps to keep the racial stratification of the judicial
system in place.
So far, I have discussed some instances in which judicial servers experience discrimination because
of their ethno-racial identity (e.g., in education) and how factors such as low-class status and the
intersectionality of race and gender transform these situations of exclusion for certain Afro-descendants. In

858
859

Id.
Interview 3.

225

the following pages, I will expand on this component of my research to present an image of the way racial
exclusion manifests within the courts and the legal profession.

7.1. Racial discrimination: From the streets to the bench

Before I introduce the findings concerning the issue of race discrimination against legal
professionals and judicial servers, I should state that, although race discrimination situations inside judicial
institutions and the legal profession are of particular interest for my research agenda, these expressions of
white supremacy are in a continuum with similar practices taking place outside of the courthouses. For
Afro-descendants, race discrimination does not start (nor end) at the doorsteps of the courthouses or law
firms. As I could attest from the interviews, Afro-descendant magistrates, judges, and judicial employees
face discrimination based on race inside of the courts as much as they do outside of them.
Participants were outspoken about the role that racial discrimination has played in their lives. Afrodescendant attorneys, judges, and judicial employees narrated experiences of racism against themselves
and their relatives:860 They were subjected to ridicule for being the offspring of interracial couples,861 they
were denied housing they could afford because the potential landlord was “not convinced” of their
credentials,862 they were questioned about why black men would refuse to dance at a party,863 they
experienced being the object of suspicion by strangers in the street despite having done nothing wrong,864
they have difficulties hailing taxis in the cities,865 and endure entire soccer games hearing “wellintentioned” expressions like “¡vamos mi negro!” (come on, my black man!) or worse,866 they have been
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called foreigners in their own land,867 and been the object of racially-charged regional stereotypes.868 While
in school, they were forced to clean the classrooms three times more often than their peers,869 and today,
as parents, they have to assert their children’s rights to wear their natural hair.870 In the case of women, race
discrimination also meant to be continuously labeled as domestic workers because of their skin color,871
being introduced to hair-straightening from an early age, sometimes under the argument that curly hair was
not hygienic.872 Some indigenous interviewees narrated similar episodes of discrimination, such as being
stopped by strangers on the street who asked for photos with their traditional attires,873 being questioned
about whether or not they used underwear,874 and even presumed to have supernatural abilities.875
Racist expressions were, perhaps, the most common type of discriminatory experience among
participants, as many of them expressed that hearing phrases such as “Negro ni el teléfono” (Black not
even for the phone),876 “eres negra, pero bonita” (You are black but beautiful),877 “¡negros tenían que
ser!” (You had to be black!), “negro que corre es ratero, blanco que corre es atleta” (a black who runs is
a thief, a white who runs is an athlete),878 “negro que no la caga a la entrada, la caga a la salida; pero la
caga” (a black person who does not fail at the beginning, fails at the end; but they fail),879 or simply being
called “black” instead of their names, was a recurrent experience in their lives.880 As previous literature on
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this topic has documented, situations of race discrimination, and particularly racist language, are common
in Latin America.881 In this regard, Tanya Hernandez mentions that:

In Latin America, where Jim Crow state-mandated exclusion never existed, racist speech about
Afro-descendants is ubiquitous and facilitates the social exclusion of Afro-descendants. In addition
to the term “negro” (black/negro) being derogatory, Afro-descendants are stereotyped and referred
to as inherently criminal, intellectually inferior, overly sexual, and animalistic. Because the
racialized stereotypes of Afro-descendants are pervasive, they are commonly understood to smell
like animals and, in particular, monkeys.882

Beyond listing situations of discrimination that Afro-descendants experience on a daily basis, the
point that I would like to emphasize is that, by the time they arrive at their positions inside judicial
institutions, these professionals have already undergone a lifetime of racist episodes. Some are small, and
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some are big, but all, in conjunction, condition how they deal with discrimination in the workplace and
inside predominantly white-mestizo institutions. Moreover, due to the multiplicity and repetition of these
racist experiences, they tend to be naturalized and commonly go unnoticed, even by those who experience
them.
Participants described similar situations of racial discrimination inside the courthouses and the legal
profession as those described in everyday life. In this respect, Afro-descendant judicial employees narrated
episodes of judicial employees saying phrases like: "They [Afro-descendants] are the ones who put on their
chains,”883 "there are people who are here because of affirmative action,”884 “it is good to know you got
assigned the case of the blacks,”885 “[they work at] the Caribbean rhythm,”886 “they [Afro-descendants] are
lazy and don’t like to work,”887 or calling colleagues “negrito” (little black man),888 or “india” (Indian
woman).889 Additionally, they also recounted situations in which judicial employees were confused with
cleaning services staff at the courthouse,890 white-mestizo judicial employees touched black judicial
employees' hair without their consent,891 magistrates had difficulties receiving their government cars
because those responsible for supplying them did not believe a black woman could have attained such high
station,892 a judge baptized a law firm integrated mainly by Afro-descendant lawyers as “the darkest law
firm in Cali,”893 and Raizal judicial employees were forbidden speaking English Creole at the courts in
their territories.894
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Participants emphasized the idea that most situations of discrimination were subtle, trying to
highlight the fact that they consisted of micro-aggressions or in the use of racially charged language that
often goes unnoticed or is deemed irrelevant by most Colombians.895 The subtle nature of racism in Latin
America means that it is often difficult to identify, even for the people who are directly affected by it, and
even more difficult to prove.896 This subtleness is particularly true in cases in which differential treatment
on account of race is not verbally linked to the victim's ethno-racial identity.897 In this respect, one of them
asserted that:

One feels it, but I would not dare to say: 'I can give you proof' because it is very subtle. Because it
sometimes is very camouflaged, very hidden in shape and even more, I insist, sometimes it is very
unconscious how it occurs. However, how can it be perceived? The person does not deal with you
the same way, that they make you wait, that the first reaction they have when you talk to them is the
voice tone in which they address you, see, the initial rejection, like that initial undermining. I
perceive it. I have seen it many times.898

Moreover, given the frequency of this micro-aggressions, some participants appeared to describe a
sensation of numbness that led them to allow these types of situations to continue to go unnoticed. One of
them asserted: “It comes a moment at which one wants to let it pass through to stop processing and
rationalizing it all the time because it makes you unhappy. However, when you understand it and learn how
to read it, you can hardly live calmed with it."899
Regarding the inconspicuousness of racism in Latin America, Tanya Hernandez sustains that
racism in Latin America is pervasive, commonly excused, and naturalized.900 Racial stereotypes and slurs
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are commonly used in everyday interactions, with people continually denying their discriminatory
content.901 Sometimes racist language is justified in the idea that it was used the intention to flatter or
compliment the person it is directed at, as if the benign intention could compensate from any harms arising
from it. Hernandez characterizes this belief as a remembrance of “slavery paternalism.”902 Moreover, when
extremely abhorrent cases of race discrimination take place, they are usually portrayed as if they were
isolated incidents that cannot be representative of the tolerant ethos of Latin American societies.903
Hernandez has also points out that despite Afro-descendants being historically marginalized and
excluded from social and public life, the prevailing narrative in the region denies the existence of racial
discrimination.904 Discrimination is frequently denied appealing to the idea of mestizaje, as a condition that
prevents the existence of racial discrimination, or by alleging that the region did not experience legally
mandated segregation as U.S.905 Several of the participants also used the U.S. history of racism to compare
it to the types of discrimination lived in Colombia, sometimes to minimize the seriousness of this problem
in their national context.906
As an example of the racial discrimination denial in Latin America, many Ecuadorian intellectuals
denied the existence racism in that country despite the pervasive idea of inferiority that was imposed upon
Afro Ecuadorians during the second part of the 20th century.907 Intellectuals sustained that, unlike in the
U.S. and South Africa, the black persons in Ecuador could enjoy public spaces and accommodations
without any limitations. In theory, they could even become high ranking public officials. Discrimination in
Ecuador, some intellectuals believed, could be a matter of class, but not of race.908 However, in Ecuador,
the work of social scientists has proven over time that “there are numerous stereotypes about black
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Ecuadorians that persist, such as a natural proclivity toward laziness, violence, and crime, as well as abilities
in music and sports.”909 Congruently, Marisol De La Cadena mentions that, in Latin America, racist
practices tend to coexist with a denial of racism, as racism is not perceived as such because it is not based
on phenotype but in cultural difference.910 Also, Peter Wade describes that, in Colombia, people tend to
repudiate the idea that the country has a severe race discrimination problem, especially one affecting the
Afro-descendant population.911
Previous literature has documented the many ways in which Afro-descendants face discrimination
and exclusion in the context of employment and public life.912 Limitations in access to education for Afrodescendants in Latin America translate into disadvantages for this group in the employment market.913 The
World Bank has pointed out that Afro-descendants join the job market unevenly when compared to other
racial groups, due to factors such as limited education and lower return of their education investments.
Because of this situation: “Afro-descendants have higher levels of unemployment in all countries, and
among those employed, a larger share of them work in low-skilled occupations.”914
Besides, Afro-descendants also face significant income gaps, which are related to a lower
remuneration in their jobs when compared with similarly qualified non-Afro-descendant colleagues. The
members of this group encounter glass ceilings in their occupations and are commonly denied
promotions.915 Regarding income inequality, Hugo Ñopo asserts that, even though earning gaps between
men and women and ethnic-minorities and majorities have been decreasing over time, “the pace at which
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they are doing so, however, does not seem commensurate with the pace at which women, indigenous people,
and Afro-descendants have been acquiring education and human capital.”916
Discrimination in employment is prevalent in Latin America. In the case of Brazil, Graziella Da
Silva & Elisa Reis conducted a study in which they evaluated the perceptions of discrimination of black
professionals in Rio de Janeiro.917 The authors conducted a total of 80 semi-structured interviews with
black and brown (pretos e pardos) professionals in that city between the years of 2007 and 2008. The
interviewees in the study narrated situations that the researchers would later describe as “generalized
prejudice” and “particularized universalism.”918 These two phenomena refer to the fact that, even though
there are high levels of prejudice, people are more likely to identify discrimination in anonymous/public
interactions than in the context of private/personal relationships, in which racism remains invisible or
cannot be talked about.919 Moreover, the study accounted for some of the difficulties that respondents faced
when they tried to address racism in the context of Brazilian society and that they felt that their experiences
of injustice are more associated with race than class status.920 However, Da Silva & Reis also describe that
respondents did not believe that these incidents of discrimination impacted their social mobility since
participants considered that their situation was similar to that of lower-class white persons, being the result
of their class status.921

7.2. Presumption of incompetence and the requirement of extra effort

One of the most visible ways in which racial discrimination against Afro-descendants manifest itself
inside judicial institutions is through a presumption of incompetence. This expression refers to the feeling
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of distrust in their capacities, credentials, and the value of their work that many Afro-descendant
professional experiences, despite their personal accomplishments, professional achievements, and
contributions. The concept of presumption of incompetence had already been used in previous scholarly
works. Angela P. Harris & Carmen G. González coined this term to describe the experiences of women of
color and low-income women in academia.922 The term refers to the many ways in which they are
disadvantaged because they do not meet the "distinctly white, heterosexual, and middle- and upper-middleclass" demographics and culture that dominates academic settings.923
According to several participants, this lack of trust in Afro-descendant aptitude for work and
intellectual capacity was manifested in different behaviors and instances.924 One of the participants, who is
acquainted with the put in march of the SJP, mentioned that during the debates at the interior of this judicial
institution, magistrates showed their discomfort with the idea of adopting special measures to secure Afrodescendant presence at this court.925 These magistrates had the impression that there were few qualified
minority candidates to fill out positions at the SJP. The participant mentioned that:

Hence, the inclusion of ethnic personnel has faced many more obstacles than the gender aspect.
Why? Because there is an idea that the positions are available, but there are no qualified candidates.
That was one of the big discussions we had even with some auxiliary magistrates that said that
'There should not be an ethnic quota because the ethnic [candidates] are not qualified. The gender
quota, of course, there is plenty of qualified women, but the ethnic aspect that would be to do them
a favor.' I cannot tell you more because I could get fired.926
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Like other forms of racial discrimination, the presumption of incompetence is a type of
disadvantageous treatment that accompanies Afro-descendant attorneys during most of their professional
lives.927 An attorney I had the opportunity to interview mentioned that, while he was working as an inhouse lawyer for a company, his colleagues distrusted his capacities for the position he was occupying
despite being found the most competent person for the job.928 Likewise, he also mentioned that during the
time that he worked as a litigator, he would be hired over phone-call to litigate cases. On a few occasions,
when his clients met him in person for the first time, they would manifest their surprise about the fact he [a
black man] was the lawyer someone had recommended to them.929 Other participants also referred to
similar situations in which people would appear incredulous about the fact that they were attorneys,930 or
in which Afro-descendants were restricted in their access to positions due to the belief that they were not
competent because of their race.931 This happened to some Afro-descendant attorneys who studied law in
peripherical regions of the country but decided to practice in central areas of Colombia. These professionals
found significant obstacles finding employment due to the common belief that they were not well-qualified
despite not existing any proof about it.932 In this respect, regional and racial stereotypes seem to be conflated
in order to exclude Afro-descendant attorneys form legal practice.933
The presumption of incompetence appears to be an issue not only for staff selection but also in less
visible aspects, such as the surprise shown by people whom Afro-descendant professionals had interacted
with once they found out they were attorneys or judges934 Their race was, apparently, in contradiction with
their profession. This occurred to a participant who heard one of her colleagues saying that Afro-descendant
and indigenous lawyers do not know how you write well because they were better for orality.935 Such
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comment did only disregard black and indigenous professionals' academic credentials but also assumed that
their ethnicity made them unfit for the written word. Furthermore, the distrust in Afro-descendants’ skills
may also significant impacts in aspects such as promotions, as it was manifested by an Afro-descendant
woman working in the Caribbean region of Colombia, who asserted that she underwent difficulties climbing
up positions in her work of judicial employee because a mestizo magistrate (who was not from that region)
distrusted her abilities.936
In the case of indigenous participants, exoticism accompanies the presumption of incompetence.937
One interviewee affirmed that although her presence at the judicial institutions was consistently celebrated,
she felt her colleagues treated her more as an exotic symbol of inclusion than as a valuable member of the
team that could make substantive professional contributions.938 She described this experience as “epistemic
discrimination" due to the value that was given to certain types of knowledge above others.939
In my view, the presumption of incompetence is inextricably linked with racial stereotypes
concerning the intellectual capacity of Afro-descendants and the activities they are good at. One of the
participants also shared this position:

I believe that such an idea, such pigeonholing that exists about blacks being suitable only for
physical activities, for activities, for activities that require strength, but not for cognitive tasks, is a
historical stereotype. Many people will tell you: 'I have never thought such thing,' but at teatime is
a barrier that it has not been [broken]940

Furthermore, in Latin America, labor is racialized. Underprivileged ethno-racial groups tend to
have occupations that either reflect stereotypes or that offer low remunerations for arduous work.
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Concerning Brazil, for example, Álvaro Bello and Marta Rangel mention that at the turn of the 21st century,
"about 60% of black and mulatto men carry out manual work in industry, against 37% of white men. While
some 40% of black and mulatto women work as domestic servants, the figure for white women is just
15%.”941 Likewise, Carlos De la Torre describes how Afro-Ecuadorian men tend to have easy access to
employment positions that require physical strength, like construction, agriculture, or security guard
positions. In the case of Afro-Ecuadorian women, many of them work as domestic workers, and it is not
uncommon that several female members of the same family are domestic workers.942
My impression is that Afro-descendant legal professionals, judges, and judicial employees are
contradicting a deeply rooted stereotype concerning black intellectual inferiority by their mere presence in
judicial forums. Black bodies are transcending beyond the traditionally accepted occupational activities
(cleaning services, security services, the arts, the sports) and physical spaces (the rural areas, the poor
neighborhoods, prisons) in which blackness is allowed to exist. They are invaders of spaces and roles that
were a fortress for whiteness. Hence, this type of racial discrimination deeply connected to the subversive
act of refuting racial stereotypes.
This act of invasion can be burdensome for Afro-descendants in the judiciary and the legal
profession. The transgression can create the sensation of feeling like an “intruder,”943 due to the lack of
connection with the elite that has traditionally dominated such spaces. Likewise, in many cases, Afrodescendant presence in these “white spaces” is limited to just one or perhaps a few persons of this ethnoracial identity, which can produce a sense of isolation in the pioneers.944 The first Afro-descendant in a
university, a law school, a court, a tribunal, or a high court.945
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In addition, several participants manifested that they felt they had to do extra work (that was not
required for their colleagues) in order to counteract the presumption of incompetence that lay on top of their
work.946 A participant asserted that in order to be considered for positions, Afro-descendant applicants had
to present, in general, superior credentials to the ones of other applicants, as additional proof that would not
be required of a white or mestizo person.947 This "higher scrutiny" of their work is felt by judges and judicial
employees in aspects such as the double or even multiple reviews of their written documents by their
superiors,948 being frequently asked about which law school they attended, and even when inquired about
their law school grades.949 In this respect, a woman Afro-descendant judge mentioned:

What I am saying is that it is evident that for us [Afro-descendants] to get to those positions, we
need to do a superior academic and professional effort to the one that a mestizo person needs to do.
Then, what does need to be done? I would tell Afro-descendant persons that after they realize that
they need to make a more significant academic and professional effort, 'you are clear,' as we use to
say. You cannot measure yourself with the same bar you measure mestizos.950

One of the areas in which the Afro-descendant extra effort can be seen is in their aesthetics as legal
professionals and judicial servers.951 Several participants mentioned the need to be overly careful about the
way they dressed, wore their hair, and, in general, physically presented themselves, as this was one of the
most obvious ways in which they were scrutinized or treated unfairly.952 In this respect, the idea of having
to "play the part" of a judge, judicial employee or even attorney was widespread among participants, since
the failure to do so might mean facing uncomfortable or even discriminatory situations.953 For example, a
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participant reminded that while she was working as a judge in a small municipality on the Pacific coast, she
had to be very careful about how she dressed.954 On several occasions, people assumed that white people
present at the courthouse were the judges since they did not initially consider the possibility of a black
woman to occupy a judicial post, even in a majority-black community like the one in which the participant
lived.955
It is essential to highlight that the type of aesthetic requirements for Afro-descendants that I am
talking about exceeds those corresponding to the habitus of judicial servers or legal professionals. Perhaps
the most evident case I could find was the one of a participant who, while working as notificador –which
is one of the lowest-ranked judicial employee positions in the judiciary—praised himself of being “the only
notificador of any courthouse in Cali that wore a tie all the time,”956 since this was a practice that allowed
him to receive a “different treatment” from that dispensed to others in a similar position.957 Furthermore,
on some occasions, this aesthetic requirements for Afro-descendants consist of disguising or diminishing
the salience of their ethno-racial identity, as an interviewee in the city of Cartagena pointed out when she
mentioned: "You will not see a judge with curls in the judiciary. If she has curls or has an Afro, she will
smooth her hair.”958
In conclusion, Afro-descendant participants are presumed to be incompetent at their roles in the
judiciary and the legal profession. They are also subjected to double standards in the appraisal of their work.
These issues forced them to do extra work to be treated or valued in the same way as their colleagues. These
experiences can be synthesized in the word of an Afro-descendant judge, who asserted: "We need to prove
we are capable; despite the fact we are black.”959
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7.3. Mechanisms to cope with racial discrimination within the judiciary and the legal
profession

A final element that I would like to discuss regarding situations of race discrimination within
judicial institutions and the legal profession is how Afro-descendant lawyers, judges, and judicial
employees deal with such a problem and, correspondingly, how judicial institutions address these situations.
Before discussing this aspect, I should stress that the very discussion of racial discrimination in Latin
America is often avoided. Robin Sheriff sustains that in the case of Brazil, racism is silent.960 She describes
that the absence of discussion about race discrimination within families and among friends can be described
as a form of cultural censorship, which occurs across racial lines and social classes.961 Some authors also
link this refusal to debate racism to ignorance about the types of practices that could be cataloged as racist.
In this respect, Beck et al. report that, even though Ecuadorians are significantly aware of racial differences
among the population, a large percentage of Ecuadorians do not know what racism, race discrimination, or
racial prejudice are.962 Finally, as Tianna Paschel and Mark Sawyer describe, in Latin America, it is
common that people who claim to be the victims of race discrimination are often stigmatized as racist
themselves. They are often accused of "creating racism where it did not previously exist,” if they dare to
render discriminatory practices visible. Stigmatization contributes to the lack of denunciation and public
debate about racist practices.963
Participants referred to several mechanisms they used to deal with situations of racial
discrimination within judicial institutions. Paradoxically, one of the most common consisted of either
disregarding these situations or trying to refute the racist stereotypes with their behavior.964 In this respect,
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several participants seemed to enunciate the idea according to which they prevented being in a position in
which they could be discriminated against by excelling at their work or doing additional work.965 Some of
them went as far as to assert that “I am never discriminated against, but because I do not allow it to happen
to me,”966 implying that they had the power to prevent discriminatory situations from occurring to them by
using their high-quality work as a shield against prejudice.967
Some participants mentioned that they had rendered visible discriminatory acts. Also, in fewer
cases, institutional mechanisms had been activated to address these events.968 However, in a majority of
cases, the institutional channels failed to deal with the situation effectively, and those responsible
experienced little accountability.969 One of the interviewees mentioned that:

Not much has happened [with the discrimination reports] because usually the issue of
discrimination, although today we have a criminal statute, well, it is still seen as a very subjective
matter. I mean, that 'you imagined [the discrimination act],' that it is a mere opinion and that he [the
attacker] has a right to express himself.970

Due to the difficulties of making situations of race discrimination visible, and the apparent
inefficacy of the institutional mechanisms to address these situations, institutional responses to address
situations of racial discrimination appear to be equally week. An exception to the lack of institutional
response seems to be, once again, the SJP. Although several participants reported acts of racial
discrimination within this court, they also mentioned that there appeared to be a good faith effort of the
institution to address these situations and to prevent them in the future.971 Some participants referred to
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how this institution tried to train their staff on non-discrimination practices in the workplace, and some
senior staff members have publicly addressed specific racial discrimination events in this court.972 Although
additional actions could be undertaken inside the SJP to address situations of race discrimination, I consider
it important to recognize that there appears to be some institutional effort in that direction.
As a conclusion for this section, I would like to stress that racial discrimination practices appear to
have a decisive role in explaining the low level of representation that Afro-descendants have in judicial
institutions in Colombia. Racism appears not only to be creating obstacles for Afro-descendant legal
professionals to access positions within judicial institutions but, once they are inside the courts, it also
impacts the experiences and work of these professionals. With this conclusion, in chapter 4 I will discuss
the relevance and impact of Afro-descendant representation on courts.
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IV.

The foundations of Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions

In the preceding chapters, I introduced the debate on Afro-descendant underrepresentation in
Colombia's judicial institutions. I conveyed my empirical study findings on the level of presence that this
group has on the country's courts. Besides, I presented a list of conditions that, prima facie, seem to be
influencing the limited level of Afro-descendant presence on Colombian courts. In this chapter, I will
present the grounds for minority representation on courts, with a particular emphasis on Afro-descendants.
I will engage in answering two questions: What are the principal rationales invoked for calling for minority
representation in judicial institutions? What might be the potential effects of increased Afro-descendant
representation in judicial institutions? In order to accomplish this goal, first, I will present the grounds for
supporting ethno-racial and gender representation in judicial institutions. Second, I will discuss the potential
impact that excluded groups’ representation on courts might have on judicial decision-making. Finally, I
will debate on the particular aspect of whether strengthened Afro-descendant representation might have an
impact on diminishing racial discrimination in the judicial system.
In this chapter, I will introduce the participants' perception of the foundations of Afro-descendant
representation on courts and the perceived impact that women and minority presence in judicial institutions
may have on judicial decision-making. Additionally, I will reconstruct, in some detail, the central
theoretical debates in the U.S. academic literature about the reasons for group representation on courts to
analyze the participants' perceptions. I should make two clarifications in this respect. The first is that while
the participant perspectives are useful for understanding the current state of the debate about group
representation on Colombian courts, these views should not be determinative of a society's inclination to
lobby for excluded groups’ representation on courts. The citizenry's opinion is the one that should matter
in this respect since the population's perspectives are the ones that are decisive at assessing the legitimacy
of judicial institutions.
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The second is that I delve into the particularities of the scholarly debates because the qualitative
study’s participants presented several rationales that have been previously invoked in this academic
literature. Reconstructing these academic debates is essential because the study participants presented
similar contradictions and diversity of perspectives than scholars. Therefore, the academic sources might
help to theorize on the tensions arising from debating on minority representation in courts.
Although my dissertation focuses on the Latin American context, in this chapter, I will be referring
primarily to the U.S. academic literature in order to account for these scholarly debates. The reasons for
using U.S. sources as the main point of reference is twofold: First, U.S. jurisprudence has been significantly
influential on foreign courts—and especially Latin American Courts.973 Thus, the debates on group
representation on U.S. courts might influence future debates about women and minorities’ representation
in the Latin American judiciaries. Second, by contrast to the Latin American context, minority
representation on courts have been the object of extensive research and debate in the U.S. legal and social
science academia. Consequently, a large portion of the evidence and arguments produced in this area have
been based on the U.S. experience.
Before I begin, I shall also iterate a terminological clarification. For the most part, academic debates
about the presence of women and minorities in judicial bodies have been held under the conceptual
framework of "diversity." The expression "judicial diversity" has become a paradigm to enunciate the
inclusion of women and minorities on courts. A judiciary is diverse when the numbers of women and
minorities on courts reach meaningful levels. Some authors use this term to also encompass other types of
subordinate identity groups (e.g., LGBTQ persons, persons with disabilities, religious minorities) and
individuals with career paths that most judges have not traditionally pursued before their appointment to
the bench. Despite the traction of the judicial diversity terminology, I consider that this framework is
inadequate for my inquiry since it separates the debate of subordinated groups' underrepresentation from
its historical roots. This framework ignores the conditions of discrimination and inequality that led to the
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exclusion of traditionally marginalized persons from public and private institutions. As Athena Mutua
explains:

The concept of diversity, as many critics have noted, is deeply problematic as currently
conceptualized because it disconnects diversity from historical racial and gender injustice, among
other things. In addition, in practice, few of the many who pledge loyalty to the idea, seem
committed to doing the hard work of reorganizing social and institutional priorities to ensure
diversity or even to tracking any potential progress where changes have been made. This is
undoubtedly the case in the context of "diversifying the judiciary," particularly among the state
judicial benches.974

Thus, while many scholars use the concept of “judicial diversity” at explaining minority presence
on courts, I will use the framework of representation to refer to their studies. When I use the word
representation, I will be referring to the presence of a particular group in an institution or group of
institutions. This idea of representation corresponds to Hanna Pitkin's explanation of the concept of
descriptive representation.975 Descriptive representation ensues when the composition of a representative
body corresponds to that of the represented group; when the representative mirrors the represented, as it is
an act of "standing for."976

1. The foundations of ethno-racial and gender representation in judicial institutions

In this section, I will analyze the different grounds identified by participants and found in the
preexisting literature for justifying gender and ethno-racial representation in judicial institutions. Several
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rationales have been used to argue for the need to increase minority representation in the judiciary. I will
try to differentiate among them. However, I must warn the readers that study participants and scholars
usually subscribe to several types of justifications at once, as these are not mutually exclusive. Besides,
different types of rationales tend to intertwine with others, making it difficult to distinguish among them
clearly.
I could identify three main grounds for women and minority representation in judicial institutions:
Role model rationales, altered or improved decision-making rationales, and fairness and legitimacy
rationales. Additionally, during the qualitative study, I identified an additional rationale: Equality in access
to resources. I will move on to explain the content of each one of these.

1.1. Role Model Rationales

Some participants of the qualitative study endorsed the idea that Afro-descendant representation in
the judicial institutions was necessary due to the symbolic value of their presence in judicial institutions.
This rationale was evident, for example, in an interview with an Afro-descendant judicial employee. She
discussed how black women in a particular community were very excited to meet a black woman magistrate
that visited their neighborhood since they had not met any black woman judge before.977 The participant
underlined the importance of these types of appointments for dismantling racial and gender forms of
prejudice: “It is a chance to break stereotypes: that blacks do not think, that they cannot be in academic
spaces.”978 Likewise, another participant stressed the symbolic effects of Afro-descendant representation
on courts with regards to the image of the country, mentioning that the lack of black judges portrayed
Colombia as a country that did not have a black population.979
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Furthermore, an Afro-descendant woman magistrate sustained that she decided to become a judge
because other black women had asked her to do it since there were very few people like her in similar
positions. She asserted that the symbolic role that an Afro-descendant woman serving as a magistrate might
have on younger black women and girls was decisive for her decision.980 Another participant, an Afrodescendant attorney, also stressed the relevance of this rationale, by mentioning that she decided to become
a lawyer following the steps of another Afro-descendant attorney that served as her career inspiration.981 In
summary: According to participants, role model rationales are important grounds for women and minority
representation on the courts, given the symbolic nature of the judicial function in society.
Analogously, in the academic literature, the importance of judges as role models for lawyers,
specific communities, and the society is one of the most invoked—and less controversial—rationales to
justify gender and ethno-racial inclusion policies in the judicial system. Theresa Beiner explains that:
“Diversity on the bench also ‘provides role models for those historically excluded.’ Women judges
themselves agree that they serve as positive role models for women attorneys. These judges also have
encouraged other women to become judges.”982 Non-traditional judges fulfill a symbolic role, encouraging
members of the community to overcome obstacles and pursue leadership positions in public service. Like
Anna Blackburne-Rigsby asserts: “Minority role models in the judiciary are symbolically important to
encourage other individuals with diverse backgrounds to join the bench.”983
Sylvia Lazos Vargas articulates the role model rationale for diversifying the judiciary in terms of
symbolic representation. In her view: “In appointing minorities or women with ‘rags to riches’ stories, the
appointing executive makes a statement about his or her values, more specifically, the executive's belief
that leadership in American government should be accessible to all citizens, regardless of their
background.”984 Nevertheless, Lazos Vargas warns that symbolic representation, which usually acquires
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most relevance when the first non-traditional judges are appointed to a particular court, tends to be used as
a way to deny the need for structural changes in the judicial system.985 Token appointments are presented
as proof of the effectiveness of the merit system already in place.
An obvious critique of this type of rationale is whether or not the idea of minority and women
judges as role models is—by itself—sufficiently powerful to justify state action to ensure a certain level
representation for these groups in the judicial system. Some might argue that the mere symbolic effects of
having more women and minority judges are not enough to justify special measures, unless other types of
benefits could come out of such representation.

1.2. Altered or improved judicial decision-making rationales

Altered or improved decision-making rationales assert that an increase in minority representation
on courts could lead to a transformation in the content of judicial decisions. Several participants articulated
various versions of the altered or improved decision-making rationales.986 Interviewees asserted that the
lack of Afro-descendant presence on Colombia’s courts might prevent the development of actions to
address social inequality in the country,987 and that an increase in the number of Afro-descendant judges
might bring new perspectives to the bench on social justice issues.988
In some cases, participants suggested that these potential changes in the judicial decision-making
process might be the result of a better capacity of Afro-descendants to empathize with people in unfavorable
social conditions since they might have personally experienced them.989 Nevertheless, in general,
participants rejected the idea that Afro-descendants are different as judges when compared to individuals
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from other ethno-racial groups.990 Interviewees commonly articulated anti-essentialist narratives, relying
on principles of formal equality, or naming the judicial activity’s impartiality duty.991 As a response to my
question concerning the interaction between his ethno-racial identity and his role in the judiciary, a high
ranking Afro-descendant judicial employee, responded with the phrase: “The law has no color.”992 Despite
this assertion, participants appeared to be well-aware of jurisprudential and legal theory debates about the
issue of judicial discretion in the decision of cases.993
Some respondents were careful to explain that while they believed the judicial system could
beneficiate from having more Afro-descendant judges, such benefits would not stem from their identity but
from the use of their experiences and perspectives in their roles within the judiciary. In this respect, one
interviewee mentioned:

I believe that the ideologic, political pluralism that the judiciary has can also be expressed in that
way, and it can be, let’s say, enriched that way. Not because the Afro-descendants must have a
certain [x] ideology. What I believe is that in those social contexts, I think, the life experience that
one has conditions in many forms how one sees life, sees things, understands the law, sees social
conflicts. Then, those people may contribute a lot. We could say the same of the white or mestizo
races, or of any other person. I believe that in that sense, there must be an important balance.994

Likewise, it is interesting that some participants appeared to be more receptive to the idea that
gender might influence judicial decision-making than they were to the same idea about race. As an example,
an Afro-descendant attorney living in an Andean city of Colombia asserted that, while he did not think that
the race of the judge could influence judicial decision-making, gender might. He believed that cases in
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which women judges or prosecutors were involved in criminal cases involving certain types of crimes
(possibly violent crimes committed against women), they might act differently from men judges or
prosecutors.995
In the case of indigenous participants, they seemed, in general, more skeptical about the potential
influence that ethnic identities could have on judging.996 They stressed the fact that, in the majority of cases,
judges with ethnic identities are not in their positions because of that reason and that the formalistic and
regulated nature of the judicial activity would prevent them from relying on their ethnic identity for the
execution of their functions.997 Nevertheless, an indigenous participant acknowledged that, in some areas
of the law—as the newly created SJP—, there could be a more significant opportunity for ethnic identities
to impact judicial decision-making. In their view, this effect might be a consequence of the significant
presence of Afro-descendant and indigenous magistrates and judicial employees on this court and the
thematic nature of this jurisdiction (apparently referring to the specific impact that the internal armed
conflict had had on ethnic communities in Colombia).998
An essential element to consider in the case of indigenous participants is that, prima facie, they
seemed less inclined than Afro-descendant participants to subscribe to the idea that they are representatives
(in the substantive sense) of their ethnic group. This difference is significant. Indigenous participants
asserted that their role within the judiciary is not to “channel the perspective” of their people, but rather to
open doors and facilitate dialogue between traditional indigenous authorities and the majoritarian system
of justice.999 As an example, an indigenous participant declared: “One could tell: ‘Oh wow, I am the
representative of the indigenous peoples.' [But] One is not the representative, one belongs to a people and,
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with dignity, will continue to strengthen that here. However, there are the [traditional] authorities there.
One must open ways for their active participation and coordination." 1000
In the specific case of the SJP, which is the high court with the highest level of minority
representation in the country, even though the magistrate selection process was sensible to gender and
ethnic diversity criteria, in compliance with the Legislative Act 01 of 2017, the Constitutional Court, in the
ruling C-080 of 2018, clarified that:

In consequence, although the magistrate selection responded to 'equitable participation between men
and women criteria, non-discrimination guarantees, and respect for ethnic and cultural diversity'
(section 11 of transitory article 7 of the Legislative Act 01 of 2017), these do not represent the
populations to which they belong to, despite their gender, ethnicity or culture had been considered
in their selection. As judicial authorities, they are subjected only to the rule of law and the
Constitution.1001

The former means that, at least in the legal sense, the transitional justice magistrates should not be
considered representatives of their identity groups, due to the need to guarantee judicial independence.
However, the former does not preclude the possibility that magistrates incorporate in their decisions the
knowledge and values that, under the rule of law, might respond to their lived experiences as women, Afrodescendants or indigenous persons.
Given the diversity of opinions concerning this rationale, it is crucial to analyze it through the lenses
of the existing literature on this topic. Altered judicial decision-making rationales have been—without any
doubt—the ones that have received more considerable attention, and have been the main object of critique,
in scholarly debates. Although some authors have suggested that the effects of more women and minority
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representation in the judiciary on case outcomes could be understood out of common sense, others have
stressed the need for empirical verification of such causation. As I will explain in the next section, social
scientists have carried this endeavor.1002
Assessing the impact of women and minorities' representation on judicial decisions has
implications. Perhaps the most visible is that they might further demystify the judicial function. Traditional
understandings of the judicial role claim that judges decide cases bound to neutrally apply legal norms.
There is a prohibition of using personal values in the decision of cases instead of the law.1003 As Theresa
Beiner describes, the assumption is that "if all judges should theoretically apply neutral principles alike,
then admitting that there is a difference in how judges vote based on background factors such as their race
and gender undermines the entire myth (or, perhaps, goal) of a neutral and impartial judiciary."1004
Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth discuss three models of judicial decision-making for predicting the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: The legal model, the attitudinal model, and the rational
choice model.1005 The legal model is a spectrum of theoretical positions that share "the belief that, in one
form or another, the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light of
the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, and/or precedent.”1006 The
archetypical example of the legal model is the mechanical jurisprudence school of thought, according to
which judges are supposed to act as operators who apply legal rules in an almost mechanic fashion.1007 In
contrast, the attitudinal model defends the idea that “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts
of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of justices.”1008 Finally, the rational-choice model
encompasses a broad set of approaches that perceive judges as rational actors. This model rests on two
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assumptions: First, judges may come out with a fluid hierarchy of preferences at deciding cases. Second,
judges would choose from their available options aiming to obtain as much satisfaction as possible from
their decision-making.1009 In addition to the three models already discussed, Theresa Beiner explains that,
recently, some academics have incorporated in their analysis the effects of institutional factors on decisionmaking by using strategic theory in their study of judicial behavior.1010 According to this approach, which
builds on rational-choice theory, internal and external factors and actors have the potential to influence
judges' decisions on legal disputes.1011
A part of the literature that has adopted altered or enhanced decision-making rationales for
increasing minority representation on the bench have taken Segal & Spaeth's attitudinal model as a point of
reference,1012 under the belief that such a model is compatible with the legal realism and critical legal
studies' approaches to judicial decision-making.1013 In this sense, Theresa Beiner suggests that racial and
gender representation could also lead to ideological inclusion, as life experiences—which are mediated by
race and gender—have the potential to influence political ideology.1014
However, both legal scholars and political scientists have elevated sharp critiques against the
attitudinal model. Some believe that the evidence supporting the model has focused on the Supreme Court's
decisions, which cast doubts about the model's effectiveness for predicting lower court's judicial decisions.
Likewise, others have accused the model of oversimplifying the judicial decision-making by concentrating
their analysis on case outcomes instead of analyzing the judicial process more broadly.1015
It is necessary to keep in mind that legal scholars' use of the attitudinal model as a point of reference
has not meant that they have ultimately rejected the use of the legal model of judicial decision-making.
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Hybrid models of judicial decision-making are widely used. Moreover, the legal model continues to be
dominant in the teaching of law and judges public accounts case decisions in the U.S. Ultimately, the debate
on how broad or narrow is judicial discretion remains as one of the most debated issues in jurisprudence,1016
with some asserting that:

Many judges attempt to use the legal method in resolving cases. The research of Ashenfelter,
Eisenberg, and Schwab supports this and suggests, contrary to findings of political scientists, that
in the average case judges use the traditional legal method-look at precedent, and follow it in the
case at hand. The result is that case outcomes are relatively consistent. This does not mean that the
judge's identity has no impact on the outcome of a particular case or on the law itself. Instead, it
suggests that, at least in certain types of cases, outcomes are reasonably predictable.1017

Just as some participants suggested, some scholars have claimed that increased women and
minority representation on courts could have specific impacts on certain areas of the law. Theresa Beiner
argues that increased diversity in the judiciary has the potential for improving the enforcement of civil
rights legislation by the courts.1018 Following some legal scholars and political scientists who affirm that
increased presence of women and minorities on courts could lead to the consideration of additional
viewpoints in judicial decision-making.1019 Beiner asserts that descriptive representation in the judiciary
could also lead to substantive representation, which, according to Hanna Pitkin, refers to "acting for others,”
or the defense and procurement of somebody’s interests.1020
In this same line of argument, Anna Blackburn-Rigsby proposed that a diverse judiciary could help
narrow down the health-gap between whites and blacks in the United States.1021 In her view, the
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diversification of the judiciary could have a positive impact on closing the health gap between racial groups,
as judicial leadership is necessary to increase legal aid for underserved communities, which could ultimately
reflect upon minorities' access to the health system.1022
Analogously, Joy Milligan argues that the diversification of the judiciary could open the path to
improved judicial decision-making in the field of political morality.1023 According to her theory, race and
ethnicity are factors that inform the public's perception of issues of political morality and that, in such cases,
judges should consider all available points of view before making decisions. Milligan argues that a higher
level of minority representation in the judiciary could potentially enable the judiciary to consider additional
perspectives on public morality because minority judges could be better positioned to seriously take into
consideration perceptions that are held within their communities.1024 The interaction and deliberation
between majority and minority judges could lead to new or better judicial decisions, as:

Openness to alternative legal resolutions prevents us from discarding meritorious resolutions out of
hand, provides us with new information about the contours of the legal problem, and potentially
produces new and better answers based on compromise. Most significantly, the collective
experience of living with alternative moral solutions may be the surest way for us to agree on which
solutions are the correct ones.1025

Likewise, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that a more diverse judiciary could be an avenue for courts
to achieve an enhanced understanding of racial tensions, which could finally translate into a rule of law that
is inclusive of the narratives of the majority and the minorities.1026 She asserts that increased minority
representation on courts could foster a conversation about the roles and purposes of using race as a category
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in U.S. law. Lazos Vargas is careful to warn that “it is a fallacy to equate descriptive minority representation
with the substance of a deeper racial dialogue on problematic constitutional issues,”1027 as “greater minority
representation on the bench only increases the chances that a racial dialogue can be developed.”1028 In this
respect, the complexities of judging turn the descriptive representation of excluded groups into a condition
that facilitates cross-identity debates on racial issues but does not guarantee such viewpoint exchange.
Other authors have focused on the importance of minority representation on courts for specific
ethno-racial groups. Some scholars have asserted that the presence of certain racial groups on courts could
lead to better judicial decision-making due to the particular life experiences attached to different racial
identities. In the case of Asian Americans, Pat Chew & Luke Kelley-Chew seem to suggest a potential
connection between the low levels of representation of this racial group in the judiciary with their
difficulties to be successful plaintiffs in workplace racial harassment cases.1029 According to their findings,
Asian American plaintiffs were successful litigants in only 19.4% of these type of cases, and, along with
African Americans, had the highest dismissal rate among all racial groups in this type of litigation.1030
Furthermore, Chew & Kelley-Chew argue that Asian Americans experience discrimination in a different
way than other racial groups and that the members of this group may have a particular racial perspective
on this issue. Ultimately, the authors argue that increasing the number of judges that share this ethno-racial
identity may enrich the judicial decision-making process in this particular type of case, beneficiating not
only Asian American plaintiffs but the general public.1031 Serafin Tagarao et al. also endorse this position
in the case of Filipino-Americans.1032
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Similarly, Josh Hsu wonders whether the identity and experiences of judges of this group could
influence their perspective on specific legal issues.1033 He studied Asian American judges’ decisions and
biographies and concluded that “some judges have explicitly stated that their Asian American identities
affect their analyses, while in other instances, language in their opinions suggests the same. Statistical
evidence alone, however, has not supported these claims.”1034
In the case of Native Americans, Paige Hoster affirms that an increased level of representation of
this group in the judiciary could enhance judicial decision-making, as a diverse judiciary is better situated
to approach with empathy to different legal disputes.1035 According to Hoster, sufficient Native American
representation on the federal bench is crucial for this group's interests, as the judicial system tends to
downplay claims regarding Native interests. Hence, increased representation could translate into a fairer
study of Native American cases before U.S. courts.1036 Similarly, Robert Saunooke states: "We
underestimate profoundly the impact of the lack of diversity within the judiciary—especially the impact of
the void caused by the dearth of Native Americans in the federal judiciary."1037
In the case of Latinos/as, Kevin Johnson argued–before the confirmation of Justice Sonia
Sotomayor–that having a Latino justice in the Supreme Court could potentially benefit the court as an
institution, the community of Latinos/as, and the country as a whole.1038 In his view, a Latino/a justice could
bring new approaches to the court; enriching its decision-making process on a range of issues, including
constitutional law and civil rights.1039 Also, he asserted that the appointment of a Latino/a to the Supreme
Court could also send a powerful message of inclusion for this segment of the country’s population.1040
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Likewise, concerning African Americans, Kevin Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer stressed the
impact that Thurgood Marshall had on the Supreme Court during his tenure as an associate justice. They
explain that “other justices on the Court credited him with adding much to the Court's deliberations due to
his experiences as an African American civil rights activist in the days of great upheaval and enduring
change to the social fabric of the United States.”1041 Even more conservative justices, such as Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor, have acknowledged Marshall’s influence on the court and its
members, especially on issues related to social justice and criminal law.1042
I should note that some black scholars have been among the most consistent supporters of altered
decision-making rationales as foundations for minority representation on the bench. As an example,
Sherrilyn Ifill argued that the main benefit of granting representation to minorities in the judiciary is to
include an array of voices that have historically been excluded from courts. She sustained that these voices
have the potential to improve the quality of judicial decisions due to the interaction of different
perspectives.1043 Carl Tobias has also supported this idea concerning the prospective impact of LGBT
judges on courts' decisions.1044
Ifill trusts that minorities' representation may also lead to the substantive representation of
minorities' values and points of view. She believes that racial identities influence how minorities in the U.S.
perceive in the world,1045 and that those racial identities could also inform judges’ legal analysis, their
interpretation of the law, and their decisions on legal disputes.1046 The author recognizes that some people
could find it problematic to overtly acknowledge the use of personal experiences in judicial decisionmaking—due to the need to guarantee judicial impartiality. Nevertheless, she argues that in the case of
judges, individual impartiality should not require judges to leave aside their life experiences and principles,
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but rather to have an openness of mind when deciding particular cases.1047 Nonetheless, Ifill’s focus on the
decision-making effects also means that she does not believe that descriptive representation will be
sufficient—or even necessary—to accomplish such purpose.1048 She asserts: “Minority judicial candidates
who are explicitly promoted to fulfill diversity objectives, however, must offer more than their racial ‘face’
to demonstrate that they can bring diversity to the bench”1049, discarding the idea that any minority candidate
for a judicial vacancy could serve the purpose of diversifying the bench. Furthermore, she goes as far as to
assert that, in some instances, white candidates could be functional as "diversity candidates" if they are
capable and willing to serve as representatives of minority points of view.1050
The idea that descriptive representation is a precondition for substantive representation has
certainly been controversial in the political science scholarship. Jane Mansbridge asserts that descriptive
representation is not always the best alternative for minorities, as in a representative democracy, the core
concern of representation involves the deliberation about substantive interests.1051 Nevertheless, she also
affirms that there are conditions under which descriptive representation could be beneficial for traditionally
excluded groups,1052 including when the interests at stake are unclear, there is distrust among the parties, or
the institutions' legitimacy is low, or there is longstanding political subordination in society.1053
Similar to Sherrilyn Ifill’s position, Angela Onwachi-Willig affirms that the transformation of the
judiciary in terms of race and gender—as well as class, religion, sexuality, and other categories—will lead
to the introduction of a variety of voices that will enhance the judicial decision-making process.1054
Furthermore, she introduces a proposal to increase the number of justices that compose the Supreme Court
of the United States from 9 to 15, in order to allow different demographic groups to achieve representation
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in the highest level of the federal judiciary.1055 In her proposal, she highlights the negative effect of tokenism
in the judiciary. She notes that "once one minority is on the bench, the politicians who hold the
responsibility of appointing people to the bench believe their job is done, and they have little political
incentive to create further diversity on that court.”1056
It is essential to highlight that Onwachi-Willig does not assert that the diversification of the
judiciary will necessarily mean that these judges will be of a liberal or progressive line of thought. As an
example, she interprets Justice Thomas’ votes on cases involving racial issues as being an expression of
black conservative thinking in the U.S.1057 According to the author, experiences of racial subordination in
the life of Clarence Thomas have possibly influenced his role as a judge, but in a way in which they have
made him a voice speaking a narrative of black conservatism. She believes that Justice Thomas's voice is
also a diverse voice with the potential to enrich the judicial decision-making processes.1058
A similar debate to the one concerning the impact of minorities on judicial decision-making has
taken place regarding women representation in the judiciary, especially given the influence that the work
of the psychologist Carol Gilligan has had on feminist legal theory.1059 As Jilda Aliotta describes:

Feminist legal theorists have also argued that women judges will speak with a ‘different voice.’
Several of these theorists find their inspiration in the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, who
argues that women’s styles of reasoning and approaches to problem solving differ from those of
men. According to Gilligan, while men tend to view the world atomistically and to search for
abstract principles to resolve moral problems, women are more likely to see the world as
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interconnected and to perceive most moral problems as requiring an accommodation between self
and community.1060

Aliotta explains that this current of thought believes that the American legal system is constructed
from a male perspective, as it rests heavily on individualistic values, and it seeks to resolve cases based on
abstract principles. Hence, increasing the number of women judges could have the potential for introducing
new perspectives to judicial decision-making, as women might behave differently from men on how they
approach the legal analysis of cases.1061 Other authors such as Shirley Abrahamson, who has acknowledged
that her gender has played a significant role in her work as a judge, also support this position.1062
Some authors, such as Sue Davis, have tried to empirically assess the theory of a distinctive
women’s voice in the context of the judiciary by trying to identify it in specific judicial opinions.1063 Davis
concludes that, sometimes, women speak in a different voice; at other times, they do not.1064 She asserts
that sometimes men can speak in a different voice, too. Hence, regarding the results of her research, she
affirms that these “do not provide empirical support for the theory that the presence of women judges will
transform the very nature of the law.”1065 In contrast, regarding the question about the potential feminine
voice of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Jilda Aliotta argues that it is not possible to find such a voice in the
opinions of this specific justice. Moreover, she disputes the existence of significant evidence supporting the
idea that men and women, as a general rule, would reach different decisions in their role as judges.1066
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Another form in which women's presence in the judiciary might impact judicial decision-making
could be thorough the use of feminist legal methods. Katharine Bartlett explains that feminist legal methods
include an array of non-traditional approaches to the creation of law, which seek to uncover aspects of the
legal system that tend to be left unnoticed in traditional legal doctrine and epistemology.1067 These methods
include tools such as asking the woman question, feminist practical reasoning, and consciousnessraising.1068 Although some of these methods are not of exclusive use of feminists or even women, she
believes that it is reasonable to think that an increase in women's representation in the judiciary could open
the doors for broader use of feminist legal methods in judicial decision-making.
In opposition to Bartlett’s view, Michael Solimine & Susan Wheatly argue against the idea of
increasing the number of women judges over the basis of their alleged impact on judicial decisionmaking.1069 The authors argue that the idea that women judges will be able to use feminist legal theory in
their work is problematic since the feminist theory is not a single coherent current of thought.1070
Furthermore, there are no reasons to believe either that women judges would use feminist methods while
acting as judicial decision-makers, or that men could not use them if situated in an analog position.1071
Therefore, the authors argue that more women judges could be desirable from the perspective of intuitive
fairness, as evidence about the impact of gender in judging is still inconclusive.1072
Perhaps one of the contexts in which altered judicial decision-making rationales acquired public
visibility was during Sonia Sotomayor's confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice. Sotomayor was criticized
for having stated in public: "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."1073
Regarding this episode, Pat Chew identifies that the core of the critiques against Sotomayor was based both
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on her acknowledgment that identity informs judicial decision-making, as well as on the idea that her
identity could lead to non-impartial judicial decisions.1074 Chew beliefs that it is true that judges' race and
gender affect their decision-making and uses political science evidence to support such association.
However, she disputes the idea that women and minority judges would be biased or prejudicial in their
judicial role. Chew affirms that this would mean that white-male judges' perceptions are not to be
understood as the standard for impartiality.1075 Moreover, when judges exchange opinions with other judges
with different racial and gender identities, this could lead to an in-depth analysis of legal disputes, which
could be beneficial for judicial decision-making as a whole.1076
Regarding the modified decision-making rationales, perhaps the question is so much not whether
descriptive representation will lead to substantive representation for women and minorities, but rather under
what conditions such effects may arise. In this regard, the theories of representative bureaucracy could have
some answers.1077 According to Lael Keiser et al., some factors influence the transformation of a type of
representation into another, including "discretion, the gendering of a given policy issue,
mission/socialization, hierarchy, stratification, critical mass, and professionalization.”1078
Authors such as Maya Sen have argued that, even in modern times, when the educational and career
backgrounds of women and minority judges tend to be becoming similar to those of white-male judges,
women and minorities still tend to be more liberal than traditional judges.1079 This a significant change
since, as Elliot Slotnick & Mary Clark explain, years ago, the career paths of non-white-male judges and
traditional judges were noticeably different.1080 Sen's research indicates that in recent years, women and
minority judges have acquired similar career paths and education to white-male judges, including access to
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legal education in top law schools and previous judicial experience. In her view, this situation could
potentially allow us to assert that “the interests of women and minorities are being represented, even as the
professional and educational profiles of female and minority judges appear to slowly be converging toward
the Ivy League, private-practice oriented experience of white male judges."1081
I should mention that the most common criticism of post-modern legal theorists against the idea of
using descriptive representation as an instrument to achieve substantive representation in the judiciary is
that it could be based on essentialism.1082 As Theresa Beiner explains: "Indeed, the very idea that, for
example, women will decide a certain way in 'women's cases' is essentialist. It assumes a commonality of
perspective among women that is likely unjustified."1083 Although Beiner recognizes that certain empirical
studies have concluded that gender and racial identities may influence judicial decision-making, she
acknowledges that in most circumstances, traditional and non-traditional judges will decide cases
similarly.1084
In conclusion, the academic literature concerning altered or improved decision-making as grounds
for minority and women representation on courts has a similar diversity of opinions and analog
contradictions than the participant responses invoking this type of rationale. In the next section, I will
present a specific finding in the participants’ responses concerning the impact of the race-ethnicity divide
on the interviewees’ narratives invoking altered decision-making rationales.
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1.2.1.

The race-ethnicity divide’s effect on the altered decision-making
rationales as a foundation for Afro-descendant representation on
Colombian courts

An aspect that became noticeable in the participant’s undertaking of the potential effects of Afrodescendant presence on courts concerning judging is their differential treatment of Afro-descendant identity
in its racial and ethnic dimensions. In general, interviewees were more open to endorse altered or improved
judicial decision-making rationales when they were discussing the contributions of Afro-descendant judges
that have a distinct ethnic identity (a cultural identity that is different from majoritarian society) to judicial
decision-making, than when they referred only to Afro-descendants as a racial group (a form of difference
that is asserted based on discrimination experiences that follow phenotype).1085 In this respect, an Afrodescendant judge stressed that while racial identities should not have a significant impact on judicial
decision-making, cultural identities, since the judges that have stronger ties to the Afro-descendant
community (which he named as judges that are “more Afro”) could contribute to debates with a view that
those who are not “as Afro” might not provide. Likewise, an Afro-descendant woman who works as a
judicial employee for a high court, while answering to the question of whether being an Afro-descendant
was a circumstance that impacted her role within this institution, mentioned that:

Yes, just as I was telling you. Just because of the way you have a vision on the collective, even if
you are not an ethnic person. Then, I do not know, a case of rape, a theft, a murder, a person who
was killed by their husband. What happened to that family? What injuries did it suffer? How was
the community affected by it? The neighborhood? Let's say that the answers will only come from
the idea of the collective, which is very ethnic.1086
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Furthermore, in response to a question about whether increased Afro-descendant representation on
courts might beneficiate the judicial system, this participant declared:

I think that it depends on the type of Afro-descendant. Then, I do not know if you are familiar with
the concept of ‘oreo.' These are black [people] in the outside, but white [people] in the inside. Then,
they have been raised as a mestizo person, and they are only identified based on their skin color.
Then, having a person like this, that has a way of thinking openly like a mestizo, then, what
difference does it make? Only the color of the skin. It is different from having an Afro-descendant
with cultural background, with ethnic background, that will have a perspective, a different type of
analysis. Then, here the matter is not only about skin color but about identity and cultural
recognition. Then, what would be the gain be?1087

I believe this interview is revealing because it shows that some participants believe in the existence
of specific "black" and "mestizo" ways of seeing the world. Likewise, I find intriguing the differential
relevance that the participant gives to ethnic difference, in contrast to racial difference.
Some less essentialist perspectives verbalized such asymmetry in terms that were closer to the idea
of cultural competency: Asserting that the lack of knowledge about the traditions and ways of living of
ethnic communities could lead to injustice in judicial decision-making.1088 More than the ethnic identity
itself, participants underscored the relevance of knowledge of their cultures, territories, conditions of
structural disadvantage.1089 I should note, however, that other participants defended a different position,
explicitly naming as a stereotype the idea that an Afro-descendent person might be proficient on issues of
Afro-descendant rights just because of their identity, ethnic or not.1090
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I consider that the heavier weight that participants give to the ethnic Afro-descendant identity for
judicial decision-making when compared to the racial aspect of it is deeply related to how ethnicity has
trumped race as the acceptable framework to acknowledge the ethno-racial difference in Colombia.
Regarding the ethnic and racial divide, Peter Wade mentions that the concept of race is commonly used to
describe conditions such as biology, phenotype, ancestry, descendance, or an “, internal natural essence of
some kind,”1091 whereas ethnicity is commonly used to refer to a distinctive cultural or historical origin that
is not anchored in biology or nature.1092 Wade emphasizes that the use of racial classifications emerged in
particular historical coordinates: Those of the European colonization enterprise. Race was used to classify
colonized non-European groups.1093 In this respect, “the concept of race is even more surely linked into a
European history of thinking about difference, rather than a concept describing an objective reality that is
independent of a social context."1094
Álvaro Bello & Marta Rangel mention that the term ethnicity is of more modern usage than the
term race,1095 and Oliver Barbary and Fernando Urrea explain that term ethnic group has been used in the
anthropological sense to refer to native Amerindian populations (indigenous peoples) that inhabited the
continent before the arrival of the Spanish colonizers, and whose descendants can be distinguished from
the majority of the population due to their cultural characteristics.1096 The authors also elucidate that in
Colombia, the substitution of the term race by the term ethnicity, and the shift of focus from phenotype to
cultural difference, are not ideal for resolving the issues involving minority populations. This limitation is
a consequence of how the cultural the phenotypical dimensions of these identities are intertwined and of
the risk of essentializing cultural differences.1097
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Similarly, Shane Greene highlights the necessity of considering both race and ethnicity as two
objects that are inextricably related. The author asserts that instead of unlinking race from ethnicity, “we
need to think in terms of the complex inter-dependency between race and ethnicity, phenotypical and
cultural designators of social identity.”1098 Moreover, he suggests that "the race versus ethnicity contrast,
when drawn too sharply, implicitly overlooks something extremely important in terms of the historical
relationship between affirmative action, civil rights, and multiculturalism,”1099 as it disregards the historical
processes that the policies based on these rationales seek to address. Greene also declares that it is necessary
to “rethink approaches that draw too simple a contrast between the apparently ethnocultural 'rootedness' of
indigeneity and the apparently racialized 'rootedness' of Afro-descendants in every context."1100
Similarly to Greene, Bettina Ng'weno argues that race and ethnicity are co-dependent notions.1101
While the idea of ethnicity as a form of cultural difference dependent upon a particular relationship with
the land has been widely established in international law instruments and national Constitutions, the idea
of race as a factor contingent on phenotype has been less relevant in recent years.1102 The perception of race
as a category that is closer to Afro-descendants and ethnicity as a concept closer to indigenous peoples is
not new. It is a condition that has been essential at defining which groups could have access to certain types
of rights in multicultural states, particularly in Latin America. Ng'weno mentions that in the case of
Colombia, for example, Afro-descendants who are recognized as ethnic groups have access to particular
legislation that guarantees them certain collective rights, including territorial rights over their ancestral
land.1103 In contrast, non-ethic Afro-descendants (those who are not part of culturally distinct cultural
groups) are not protected by similar legislative measures.1104
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Similarly to Ng'weno, Juliet Hooker affirms that theorists have provided two main justifications
for granting collective rights to minority groups. The first refers to the need to protect minorities’ distinctive
culture, language, and practices, which ultimately calls for permanent measures to secure these values. The
second goes back to the idea of past discriminatory treatment and the need for reparations, which calls for
the establishment of temporary measures targeted at evening the playfield for the harmed groups. Hooker
argues that, in Latin America, indigenous peoples have been more successful than Afro-descendants at
attaining new rights through recent reforms, since the first type of justification for collective rights has been
the most widely accepted in this region:

In almost every case of multicultural reform in the region, indigenous groups have been much more
successful in gaining collective rights from the state than have Afro-Latinos. Of the fifteen Latin
American countries that have implemented some type of multicultural citizenship reform, only
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua extend (some) collective rights to
Afro-Latinos. Even when Afro-Latinos were granted collective rights, however, in almost no
instances did they gain the same rights as Indians. In fact, there are only three countries in Latin
America where Indians and Afro-Latinos have exactly the same collective rights: Honduras,
Guatemala and Nicaragua. Moreover, only a small subset of Afro-Latinos - generally rural
communities descended from escaped slaves - has been able to win collective rights under Latin
America's multicultural citizenship reforms.1105

Instead of considering that this asymmetry in the success of indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants in Latin America is the mere result of differences in population sizes, in mobilization efforts
around collective rights, or levels of organization among the two social movements, Hooker attributes this
situation to the fact that "collective rights are adjudicated on the basis of possessing a distinct group identity
defined in cultural or ethnic terms. Indians are generally better positioned than most Afro-Latinos to claim
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ethnic group identities separate from the national culture and have, therefore, been more successful in
winning collective rights."1106 Hence, the author warns that granting collective rights to minority groups
based on the distinctiveness of their cultural identity could have the negative effect of creating incentives
for these groups to mobilize around the issues of cultural recognition rather than around situations of race
discrimination.1107
Shane Greene seems to agree with Hooker’s view, as he points out that Afro-descendant
populations are commonly encouraged to present themselves as more indigenous (ethnification), in order
to become more visible.1108 Although in practice this has not necessarily led to Afro-descendants to be
granted fully ethnocultural recognition, when such recognition has been given to Afro-descendants, it has
been usually targeted to groups that are rural communities, usually descendant from groups of cimarrones,
and communities that are claiming ancestral-like rights.1109 In this respect, Greene declares:

This may mean that those Afro-descendants who do gain ethnocultural recognition are not becoming
so much 'like' indigenous peoples as they are becoming the only Afro-descendants who are semirecognizable as semi-sovereign pueblos, as 'legitimately' Afro-American peoples (i.e., the most
'Africanized' peoples in the 'Americas'). Those who survived through slavery, those who navigated
within slavery, those who purchased their way out of slavery and, of course, those who helped build
what were originally sovereign 'criollo' nations (long before they became ‘mestizo’ nations) are—
not unlike the re-routed and re-rooted cholos—in a position much more difficult to recognize.1110

My reading of the participants' greater receptiveness to discuss altered decision-making rationales
when framed in terms of ethnicity than in terms of race is that this is closely linked to how multicultural
discourses have unfolded in Colombia. In this country, multiculturalism has recognized Afro-descendant
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difference under the condition that it is framed in terms of cultural difference by opposition to narratives
that stress the discrimination aspect of the Afro-descendant position in society. Moreover, some participants
incurred in a contradiction by alleging that it was essentialist to sustain that race might influence judging
but that asserting the same about ethnicity would not fall into the same quandary. I consider that this
contradiction could be the effect of the Colombian multicultural model (shared by several Latin American
countries), which has censored the use of race as a category of legal and social analysis, while at the same
time has promoted the acknowledgment of cultural difference
I conclude that participants gave significant weight to altered decision-making rationales as a basis
for Afro-descendant representation on courts. Ethnic identities were, in many respects, the primary source
for the idea that an increase of this group's presence in Colombian judicial institutions may lead to a different
type of judicial decision-making.

1.3. Fairness and legitimacy rationales

In general, fairness and legitimacy rationales sustain that the minority underrepresentation in the
judicial system could lead to substantive illegitimate results in the practice of adjudication, negatively
impacting the members of excluded groups who come before these courts. These rationales tend to intermix
with altered decision-making rationales, especially with those that assert that these types of enhanced
decision-making could better align with the interests of excluded groups. The specificity of fairness and
legitimacy rationales vis-à-vis altered decision-making rationales is that the former stress particular
substantive values (legitimacy, fairness) as foundations for women and minority representation on courts.
Some participants articulated fairness and legitimacy rationales as grounds for enhanced Afrodescendant representation in judicial institutions.1111 For example, a participant mentioned that with more
significant minority presence, “courts also gain more legitimacy. The population feels closer to the people
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that are making decisions for them. And the understanding of situations also changes the realities and
issues."1112 Another one stated that a more significant Afro-descendant presence in judicial institutions
would not only be beneficial for the judicial system but would be necessary, referring to the multicultural
character of the Colombian state as declared in the National Constitution.1113 A third participant suggested
that the lack of Afro-descendant judges, and judges with specific knowledge of the particularities of Afrodescendant territories, played against certain types of litigants, due to the current judges' lack of knowledge
of their context.1114 Besides, the participant mentioned that some residents perceived Afro-descendant
underrepresentation on the courts in geographic areas that Afro-descendants traditionally populate as
evidence of racism against the black population.1115
All of these aspects are deeply connected to fairness and legitimacy rationales for Afro-descendant
representation on the courts, as they emphasize the citizenry's perceptions of the trustworthiness and
substantive fairness of the judicial system. Despite its importance, fairness and legitimacy rationales
received less attention from participants than other types of rationales. Perhaps, some participants assumed
that altered decision-making rationales might, in and of themselves, entail fairness and legitimacy rationales
as foundations for a more significant minority presence on Colombia's courts.
In the academic literature, Sylvia Lazos Vargas affirms that viewpoint diversity may promote three
valuable principles for the judicial system: Improved decision-making, credibility in the rule of law, and
the inclusion of underrepresented points of view.1116 Similarly to Sherrilyn Ifill and Angela OnwuachiWillig, Lazos Vargas uses the concept of voices of color, female voices, and queer voices to account for
how experiences of discrimination may lead to the creation of a particular perspective of social reality
endemic to discriminated groups.1117 Lazos Vargas underlines the idea that there is not a single legitimate
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voice of color, but rather a multiplicity of them exist, all of which have equal legitimacy, as experiences of
discrimination may be particular to each individual. Likewise, she argues that what unites minorities' voices
under this concept is that “life is different for them than for white America.”1118 Lazos Vargas is an excellent
example of fairness rationales because she argues that the inclusion of diverse points of view may work as
a protection against bias in the judicial system.1119 Such bias could occur if only one particular viewpoint—
the majoritarian—takes over judicial decision-making. Viewpoint diversity, she argues, could also prevent
the loss of credibility in the judicial system arising from a perceived lack of impartiality.1120 Analogously,
Deseriee Kennedy questions whether a court in which minorities are underrepresented is well-positioned to
decide cases involving the interests of excluded groups fairly.1121
Sherrilyn Ifill goes a step further and argues that diversifying the judiciary is a constitutional
imperative.1122 While discussing state trial judges, and using the Supreme Court decision on League of
United Latin American Citizens Council (LULAC) v. Clementss as evidence, she asserts that judges fulfill
a representative function. In Ifill’s view, the impartial judge provision in the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution should be interpreted to require not only individual impartiality from judges but also structural
impartiality from the judiciary. A representative role of judges would be a consequence not only from their
leadership positions but also of their function as representatives of their communities' values, as they use
such values in adjudication.1123 Moreover, like Barbara Graham,1124 Ifill notes that describing judges as
representatives is a position that is usually ill-received in the legal scholarship, due to the common idea
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that, as they need to be impartial, judges cannot fulfill a representative role.1125 In this sense, recognizing a
representative role in the judiciary is perceived to have the potential to undermine judicial impartiality and
independence.1126
Ifill notes that, as a general rule, the limited representation of racial minorities in the judiciary is
rarely questioned from a legal or constitutional perspective, but rather deploying the language of desirability
and public policy.1127 In her view, the structural impartiality of the judiciary is constitutionally mandated.
According to her thesis, structural impartiality “exists when the judiciary as a whole is comprised of judges
from diverse backgrounds and viewpoints.”1128 This allows different perspectives to interact in the legal
debate, preventing a single one from governing judicial decision-making.
Ifill identifies two types of foreseeable objections to her argument. The first is that arguing for
structural impartiality would essentialize the viewpoints of white and minority judges. The second is that
such a claim could lead to a potential demand for minority judges to be the ones who decide cases involving
minority plaintiffs. Regarding the first objection, Ifill declares that promoting racial diversity in the
judiciary does not require to identify any particular judge's position as biased based on race, but simply to
acknowledge that "the possibility of bias is increased by an all-white bench uninformed by the 'varieties of
human experience,' as compared to that of a racially diverse bench."1129 Concerning the second objection,
she explains that structural impartiality would not require minority judges to hear minority litigants’ cases,
but only that the pool of judges that may potentially decide such cases mirrors the community in terms of
identity.1130
Furthermore, Ifill responds to an additional objection, according to which recognizing judges as
representatives could be problematic because judges would be required to decide cases according to the
wishes of their constituents. She explains that "to conceive judges as representatives does not mean that
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judges must adhere to the views of the public in judicial decisions. Instead, a representative-even a
legislative representative-need only offer her constituents the opportunity to have their views translated into
public policy.”1131
Equally, Stacy Hawkins affirms that the gap between the racial composition of the governmental
institutions and the governed is problematic from a political and a constitutional perspective. She
understands that the representation gap does not only clash with basic pluralist democracy principles, but
also with the right to equal protection of the laws.1132 In her view, pluralism is not only a mediating principle
of the right to equal protection of the laws but also an idea that informs the doctrines of the deliberative and
the political processes.1133 Thus, it is problematic that minorities do not have representation in government,
as this is a limitation to the possibility of participating in the deliberative process of public decisionmaking.1134
Legitimacy rationales emphasize the idea that an enhanced presence of women and minorities on
courts could make the judicial system to appear as more legitimate and, therefore, deserving of obedience,
particularly in the eyes of excluded groups. Theresa Beiner binds of descriptive representation of excluded
groups on the bench with the goal of enhanced legitimacy for the judicial system. In her view, as different
groups gain access to positions of power within the judicial system, people will perceive the judiciary as
more legitimate.1135 Likewise, Marla Greenstein stresses the importance of courts’ perceived legitimacy for
the judicial system and argues that the low levels of women and minorities’ representation in the judiciary
affect such legitimacy in the eyes of the public.1136 She states: “Several articles in this issue connect the
composition of the courts and juries with the confidence that participants in court proceedings have in the
impartiality of the ultimate judicial decision.”1137 Furthermore, Greenstein does not only argue in favor of
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diversifying the body of judges, which she deems as just the face of judicial institutions, but also the court’s
staffs and jury pools, in order to make them more similar to the communities they serve.1138
Fairness and legitimacy rationales are deeply intertwined. Constance Anastopoulo & Daniel Crooks
sustain that one of the potential benefits of judicial diversification is an improvement of courts’ perceived
legitimacy, as the citizens could see this as an indicator of impartiality and fairness in adjudication.1139 In
the same line, Ming Chin asserts that the perceived legitimacy of the legal system is as important as its
actual fairness.1140 If courts' legitimacy is lost in the eyes of the public, these institutions face the risk of
being deemed irrelevant or labeled as tools for oppression.1141 Finally, Josh Hsu claims that the absence of
perceived legitimacy may have substantial effects on the functioning of the judicial system.1142
Although the idea that greater women and minorities' representation in the judiciary could improve
the fairness of the judicial process and the legitimacy of courts has been, in general, well received in
scholarly debates, some sectors could see these rationales as problematic. Nancy King elucubrates that, if
the peremptory challenge was implemented in a particular jurisdiction—allowing a litigant to demand a
change of judge assigned to a case without meaningful justification—, the parties could use it to disqualify
judges from deciding cases based on race. For example, minority judges could be perceived as unfair solely
because of their identity.1143
In an analogous context, the use of the recusal motion—allowing litigants to ask judges to remove
themselves from a case due to lack of impartiality—to address cases of judicial bias has also been put into
question in academic debates since the race of the judge has been used as a reason to suspect lack of
impartiality of the judge to decide particular legal disputes.1144 Frank McClellan suggests that the recusal
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motion is not an adequate instrument to address racial bias in the judicial context. Such motion should only
be used in the most extreme cases, when the use of words makes it evident that the judge will act in a
prejudicial way based on race.1145 In such cases, McClellan proposes that the lawyer of the affected party
is professionally obligated to use the recusal motion and should initiate the procedures for the removal of
the judge from the bench. However, he also warns that in cases in which a lawyer initiates the recusal
motion against a judge for racial bias solely based on the judge's racial identity—or without having
sufficient evidence of the impropriety—sanctions should be imposed on the lawyer.1146

1.4. Equality in access to resources

A final type of rationale for women and minority representation in judicial institutions is the idea
of equality in access to resources. This rationale considers that judgeships and judicial employee positions
are not only functionally important, but also as a means to attain access to resources (salaries, employment
benefits, prestige). Thus, a new foundation for women and minority representation on the bench is allowing
these groups to access these resources and benefiting from them as dominants groups in society do it. In
general, this rationale has not been debated as much as others in the U.S. academic literature. However, I
should note that there have been interesting debates in the U.S. concerning the idea that the government
should be a model employer, which includes the government duty of not discriminating its workers.1147 The
significant level of attention that the participants gave to the equality in access to resources rationale might
be due to the fact, as I will explain next, it tends to gain relevance in areas where the legal market is small
and in which judicial positions are more profitable than other types of legal employment.
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Several participants appeared to embrace equality in access to resources rationales as foundations
for Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions. A participant suggested that one of the factors
influencing the limited access of Afro-descendants to high-ranking positions within the judiciary is the
competition over access to resources. He mentioned that the significantly high salaries of intermediate
tribunals and high court magistrates led to a stiff rivalry for these positions, and that “for a black man to
earn 25 million pesos a month, [in one of these posts] a lot has to happen.”1148
My impression is that the equality on access to resources rationales appear to be more present in
locations where the legal market is more reduced, such as peripherical areas of the country and rural areas.
In many of these places, public employment is one of the few types of employment that offers competitive
salaries, full-benefits, and stability to employees. Due to the lack of prospects, many people find it unfair
that the few desirable jobs in the legal market in these areas are given to people coming from other regions
and who tend to be mestizos, while, at the same time, the local Afro-descendant lawyers struggle to make
a living.1149 Despite the complexities that this rationale entails, participants mentioned in several occasions
that this, too, should be considered in the debate about equitable access to judicial positions, since it
acknowledges the economic and material aspect of this debate for legal professionals.1150 A paradigmatic
example of this situation is the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. Given its
isolated nature, this region has a very reduced legal market, in which judicial positions are sought after.1151
Mary Clark points out that among the different types of rationales that justify the need for increased
women and minorities' representation in the judiciary, the one that has received the least attention has been
"the significance of women’s judicial appointments stems from the importance of applying equal
opportunity/anti-discrimination principles.”1152 From her perspective, the appointment of women to the
bench should be deemed as necessary mainly because "equality of opportunity is achieved when women
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are considered for the same percentage of judgeships as they constitute in the pool of interested and
qualified candidates."1153
Another aspect that makes part of the equality in access to resources rationale is its collective
dimension. As I explained in chapter 2, there are certain are in regions in Colombia that are of majority
Afro-descendant population and in which judicial positions tend to be occupied by white-mestizo
professionals coming from other regions of the country. According to participants, on some occasions,
people coming from central areas of the country to occupy these positions do not resettle in the cities where
they work. Instead, they maintain their primary residence in their regions of origin, traveling back-and-forth
between the two places. The existence of traveling judges is problematic from the perspective of the equality
in access to resources rationale since, according to some participants, the lack of resettlement of these judges
means that local economies benefit little from their incomes since they do not invest their earnings or inject
money into the local markets. As one participant explained, traveling judges "do not leave anything to the
region’s economy. They do not leave anything! They do not rent an apartment—they rent out rooms in
family houses. They do not spend a weekend here, do not hire a housekeeper, do not generate
employment.”1154 Considering the already limited size of local economies, this “lost income” is another
reason to increase (local) Afro-descendant representation in the judicial system in the eyes of the locals.

1.5. Preliminary conclusions

Regarding the different types of rationales that serve as foundations for women and minorities’
representation in the judiciary, it is possible to reach the following conclusions: 1) I identified four
commonly used foundations for supporting women and minority representation on courts: The idea of nontraditional judges as role models for the legal profession, marginalized communities and society as a whole;
the altered or enriched judicial decision-making process that would be follow an increase of representation
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of women and minorities on courts; the idea that these groups’ representation on judicial institutions is a
condition for fairness in judicial-decision making and for the legitimacy of the judicial system; and the idea
that women and minority representation on courts a way to secure equal access to resources for persons
belonging to these groups; 2) the symbolic effect of minority representation is perhaps the less contentious
rationale for justifying the diversification of the judiciary, but there are questions about the relevance and
potential benefits of stressing the role of symbolic representation in the judiciary; 3) the fairness and
legitimacy rationales are deeply intertwined with altered judicial decision-making rationales, as enriched
decision-making resulting from a wide range of viewpoints and values is understood to be correlative with
judicial impartiality and, therefore, fairness in judging, which in turn increases the legitimacy of the justice
system; 4) altered decision-making rationales have received, overall, more attention by participants and
scholars than other types of justifications for increasing women and minorities representation in the
judiciary; 5) enriched decision-making effects of women and minority representation in the judiciary tend
to be controversial, as some understand that they essentialize points of view on the basis of racial or gender
identities; 6) in case of Colombia, the race-ethnicity divide presents an additional layer of complexity to
the debates about altered decision-making rationales as grounds for minority representation on courts; 7)
equality in the access to resources emerged as an additional rationale for women and minority representation
on courts in Colombia, given the precariousness of the legal markets in some areas of the country.
I believe that minority representation in courts can be better defended using fairness and legitimacy
rationales. These rationales emphasize the implications that the racial homogeneity of judicial institutions
can have in countries with models of representative democracy or that have embraced multiculturalism as
a formal state policy, such as Colombia. Furthermore, I consider that in a country with a genuine
commitment to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, it is objectionable that the apparatus of
the state is built in the absence of historically discriminated groups.
In the following section, I will concentrate on examining the available evidence concerning the
impact on case outcomes of women and minorities' representation on courts.
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2. Empirical evidence on the impact of women and minorities’ representation on judicial
decision-making

As I previously stated, there have been no previous studies regarding the impact of race in judging
conducted in Latin America, perhaps due to the incipient Afro-descendant and indigenous representation
in judicial institutions. Nevertheless, participants often invoked altered decision-making rationales as
reasons for increasing Afro-descendant presence in the judiciary.
Several interviewees asserted that there were specific cases in which they considered that the ethnoracial identity of judges and judicial employees had a significant impact on the outcome of cases. An Afrodescendant woman judicial employee affirmed that the introduction of Afro-descendant and indigenous
judges to the SJP had facilitated the consideration of aspects such as the right to prior consultation of ethnic
groups, inter-jurisdiction coordination with indigenous justice systems, and the depositions of indigenous
ex-combatants before the transitional justice jurisdiction.1155 Another participant, an Afro-descendant
women judge, asserted that having a distinctive Afro-descendant ethnic identity facilitated her work on
issues related to lands and territorial rights, as there is a significant difference between the role that property
legal institutions have in the majoritarian society and some ethnic communities.1156 A third interviewee
stressed how judges with ethnic identities might be better situated to decide on specific family law issues,
such as those revolving around marriage arrangements in Afro descendant ethnic communities.1157
Similarly, another participant, an Afro-descendant man judge, asserted that his ethnic identity and territorial
knowledge facilitated his comprehension of certain criminal cases in the place where he worked.1158 The
same occurs concerning language barriers in territories where the Afro-descendant population speaks a
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language different than Spanish since the domain of the native language (which is commonly spoken only
by members of the ethnic groups) is an asset for the undertaking of judicial functions.1159
Given the multiplicity of testimonies that affirmed the ethno-racial identity of judicial servers might
significantly influence judicial decision-making, it is essential to discuss the trajectory of the academic
debates regarding the effects of race and gender on judging. Although in Latin America there has been little
research on this topic, in the United States, for over 40 years, there has been a growing body of research
focusing on the effects that the increased presence of women and minority judges have on judicial decisionmaking. This branch of political science has received the name of judicial behavioralism.1160
As I will discuss later, evidence about the type of impact and degree of influence that minority and
women’s representation in the judiciary has on the process of adjudication is, to an extent, inconclusive.
The lack of certainty of these empirical studies' results may be attributed to the vast number of variables
that can influence a judge's perception of a case. In this respect, Theresa Beiner explains that:

The problem with political science data is that a single study cannot account for all the variables
that may impact an individual judge’s view of the law or reality. It is much more complex and
involves many categories of information, including such variables as sex, race, religion, upbringing,
political partisanship and ideology, judicial ideology, appointing president (where applicable),
socio-economic background, region of the country in which the judge was raised or lives, among
others.1161

Moreover, research on judicial behavioralism has been the object of diverse critiques from social
scientists and legal scholars alike, due to the limitations in the different types of experiments and models
that have been used to estimate the influence of judges' identities on adjudication. Beiner has criticized that
most empirical studies on the impact of judges' identities on judicial decision-making have not considered
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how legal procedures and substantive law influence adjudication. Therefore, ignoring relevant variables
that could have a determinant effect on how judges decide cases.1162 Likewise, Sherrilyn Ifill has pointed
out that, as many of these studies recognize, the size of the samples used for these studies were—in some
cases—very small and is doubtful that their conclusions could be generalized to other cases.1163
Furthermore, she argues that these studies are quite limited as “most studies only focus on case outcomes,
not the process of judicial decision-making itself,"1164 ignoring aspects such as judicial deliberation and
substantive law. Equally, Josh Hsu has critiqued that empirical studies in this area have tried to isolate
identity characteristics—such as sex and race—from other elements influencing judicial decision-making.
This approach disregards some relevant aspects of the conflict, including the facts of the case, the applicable
legal rules, and the sociological aspects of the decision-making process.1165 More broadly, the studies that
I will refer to are also the object of a more profound critique about methodological flaws in empirical
research for the study of issues regarding racial and gender identities’ issues.1166
Despite these critiques, I still consider that it is worth it to engage with this academic literature
since it provides significant evidence on how women and minority judges impact judicial decision-making
in the U.S. This literature could illuminate paths to explore this relationship in the Latin American context
in the future. Besides, this type of research has been treated as deeply relevant in the work of scholars
working on issues related to group-representation on courts.
In order to present the information in the most precise form possible, first, I will refer to the studies
regarding the influence of race on judicial decision-making. Second, I will present those studies referring
to the effects of gender on judging. Third, I will introduce the studies that encompassed both race and
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gender variables. Lastly, I will reference a few studies on the influence of ethnicity on judging that were
conducted outside of the U.S.

2.1. Studies concerning the influence of race on judicial decision-making

As soon as 1978, Thomas Uhlman published one of the first studies on the influence of race on
judging, in which he compared judicial decisions on felony cases made by a group of 16 trial court black
judges with those of 75 white judges.1167 His research found that there were small differences between the
behavior of black and white judges, as black judges declared defendants guilty in 55.5% of the cases
analyzed, while white judges did the same in 61.1% of cases.1168 The study also found that:

There are no essential differences between white and black judges' treatment of white and black
defendants. Black judges convicted 56.7 percent of black defendants and 50.5 percent of white
defendants, for a difference of 6.2 percent, White judges convicted 63.0 percent of black defendants
and 53.8 percent of white defendants, for a difference of 9.2 percent1169

The author explained that the differences found could be explained by the individual behavior of
the judges, rather than as a consequence of the judges’ race.
About a decade later, Susan Welch et al. published another study on the influence of race in judicial
decision-making in the context of criminal cases.1170 The research used a sample of 3,418 convicted felons
from 1,968 to 1,979 in a large city in the Northeast of the U.S. It found that white and black judges treated
black defendants similarly. However, black judges tended to send white defendants to prison more often

1167

Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 884–895
(1978).
1168
Id. at 888.
1169
Id. at 888.
1170
Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 126–
136 (1988).

284

than white judges. The authors explained that “black judges tend to treat black and white defendants alike,
while white judges are more severe with blacks, compared with white, defendants.”1171 They also found
that black judges, in general, give shorter prison sentences to defendants than white judges, and also give
lighter sentences to black defendants than white judges.1172
In 1990, Cassia Spohn published another study on the effect on the judges’ race on the decisions
regarding criminal cases.1173 The research analyzed judicial decisions on violent felony cases in the city of
Detroit from 1976 to 1978. It suggested that black judges were only slightly less likely to incarcerate
defendants than white judges. The study found differences between the two groups of judges regarding the
minimum sentence they ordered for defendants,1174 and concluded that, rather than deciding according to
their racial identity, “judges' sentencing decisions are determined, first and foremost, by the seriousness of
the crime committed by the offender and by the length of the offender's prior criminal record-factors of
explicit legal relevance to the sentence.”1175 The data also showed that, although white judges are more
likely than black judges to sentence black-male defendants to prison,1176 both groups of judges sentenced
black defendants harsher: “For both black and white judges, adjusted incarceration rates for black offenders
were seven percentage points higher than for white offenders.”1177
In the context of criminal justice, in 1996, Malcolm Holmes et al. published a study in which they
compared Anglo (non-Hispanic white) and Hispanic judges’ decisions on non-capital felony cases in the
county of El Paso, Texas.1178 Their results suggested that Hispanic judges sentenced Hispanic and Anglo
defendants similarly. In contrast, Anglo judges seemed to sentence Hispanic defendants similar to Hispanic
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judges, but they were more lenient toward Anglo defendants, which appears to suggest a preference of
Anglo judges for defendants of their same racial identity.1179
Five years later, Darrell Steffensmeier & Chester Britt published a study on the differences in
sentencing decisions of black and white judges.1180 Their research analyzed sentencing decisions imposed
by men judges from 1991 to 1994 in four Pennsylvania counties. By using logit models, the authors
concluded that although white and black judges similarly evaluated cases, black judges were more likely
than white judges to impose prison sentences to defendants regardless of their race.1181
In a study published in 2009, Chris Bonneau & Heather Rice tried to established weather white and
African American judges made different decisions at deciding criminal cases.1182 Their research was based
on a sample of state supreme court non-unanimous decisions on criminal cases' appellate decisions taken
between 1995 and 1998. It suggested that white and African American judges make different decisions
depending on the institutional design of the judiciary. The evidence showed that "African American judges
are more sympathetic to those convicted of crimes, but only in states with no intermediate appellate
court."1183
Outside of the context of criminal justice, in the year 2000, Pat Chew and Robert Kelley published
a study, made with a sample of randomly selected racial harassment cases decided in six federal circuits
that ranged from the years 1981 to 2003, that compared the decisions of African American and white federal
judges on cases of racial harassment in the workplace.1184 While plaintiffs in racial harassment cases have—
in general—slim chances of winning in court, Chew and Kelley’s research showed that they had a better
chance of success if an African American judge decided their cases. The authors stated that “plaintiffs are
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successful in 46% of their cases before African American judges but less than half as often before White
judges; logistic regression analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before African American judges are
3.3 times more likely to win than before White judges.”1185 Chew and Kelley recognized that when multiple
factors (e.g., the political affiliation of the judge and facts of the case) are jointly taken into consideration,
the role of race tends to lose preponderance. Nevertheless, their research still suggested that white and
African American judges differ on how they understand this type of case.1186
Almost a decade after that, the same authors published a new study on the influence of judges and
plaintiffs' race on racial harassment cases' outcomes.1187 Their research used a database "of all reported
racial harassment cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the federal district courts of six
representative circuits between 2002 and 2008."1188 According to their findings, racial harassment plaintiffs
were successful in only 22.2% of the 473 analyzed cases,1189 with Hispanics having a higher success rate
(37.3%) and Asian Americans (4.3%) and African Americans (20.7%) having the lowest. African
Americans accounted for over 70% of all racial harassment complaints.1190 Regarding the judge's race, the
study found that the plaintiffs who appeared before white judges, which accounted for nearly 80% of the
judges in the cases under scrutiny,1191 had a success rate of only 20.6%, which was lower than when they
appeared before African American judges (42.2%), but higher than when they did so before Hispanic judges
(15.6%).1192 The study also suggested that the race of the judge and the plaintiff interact with each other, as
judges tended to be, in general, more lenient to plaintiffs of their same race.1193 As an example: African
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American judges had a higher success rate when judges of their same race decided their cases (47%) than
when White (19%) or Hispanic (9.5%) judges were the decision-makers.1194
In 2014, Jason Morin published a study on the U.S. Courts of Appeals' minority judges' decisions
on Title VII employment discrimination cases between 2001 and 2009.1195 The research found that in this
type of case, African American judges were, on average, more supportive of the claimant: "As the
percentage of favorable votes among African American judges is about four percentage points greater than
White judges."1196 He also concluded that African American judges were nine percentage-points more likely
to rule in favor of African American claimants than White judges.1197 However, he also established that
Latino judges were, in general, more averse than white and black judges to the claimants. The author stated:
"The proportion of favorable rulings among Latino judges is about nine percentage-points less than White
judges and more than 13 percentage-points less than African American judges."1198
Adam Cox & Thomas Miles published a paper regarding the influence of judges’ characteristics
on judicial decisions regarding the Voting Rights Act, in which they studied “every published federal case
decided under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982.”1199 Their research suggested that democrat
judges and African American judges tend to be more likely to find liability under section II of the Voting
Rights Act, when compared to republican judges and white judges, respectively. In the case of race, which
authors found to be more preponderant than political affiliation, they concluded:

African-American judges are, on average, more than twice as likely as white judges to find that
minority citizens’ voting rights were violated under section 2. African-American judges vote in
favor of liability more than half the time, while judges who are not African-American do so only
about one-quarter of the time. Moreover, a judge’s race substantially affects the votes of his
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colleagues on a panel. Both Republican and Democratic appointees are substantially more likely to
vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African-American judge than when they do not.1200

In 2013, Jonathan Kastellec published a study in which he measured the impact of race on the U.S.
courts of appeals’ decisions in affirmative action cases.1201 The research sample was composed by courts
of appeals’ decisions on race-based affirmative action cases from 1971 to 2008 and used statistical models
to assess the effects of race on case outcomes. According to his results, non-black judges had a probability
of between 56% and 65% to vote in favor of affirmative action policies, depending on the model used. By
contrast, black judges had a probability of about 90% of voting in favor of affirmative action policies.1202
They also found that black judges seem to influence the votes of their colleagues. The probability of a nonblack judge voting in favor of affirmative action policies was about 50% when the panel was all non-black
but rose to 20% when a black judge was part of the decision panel.1203

2.2. Studies concerning the influence of gender on judicial decision-making

In the early 1980s, John Gruhl et al. published a study in which they assessed the impact of judges’
gender on the decisions of criminal cases.1204 The authors analyzed the convicting and sentencing decisions
of men and women trial judges in over 30,000 felony cases from 1971 to 1979 in a metropolitan area in the
Northeast of the U.S. The study evidenced that women judges were more likely to sentence women
defendants to prison than men judges, as women judges gave prison sentences to about 20% of the convicted
women. In contrast, men judges did so to only 12% of them.1205
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Also, in the criminal justice context, Darrel Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert published a study in
which they tried to establish whether or not men and women judges approached and decided criminal cases
similarly.1206 The research used a database of the sentencing decisions in Pennsylvania from 1991 to 1993.
The study found that gender seems to impact criminal case outcomes. Women judges were 10% more likely
to incarcerate defendants than men judges. They also tended to impose sentences that are, on average, five
months longer than those determined by their male counterparts.1207 Women judges appeared to be
especially tough when sentencing black defendants who were repeated offenders.1208 Nonetheless, the study
also found that men and women tend to value criteria for similarly establishing sentences.1209
In a different context, David Allen & Diane Wall published a study in which they evaluated the
behavior of women judges in state supreme courts to establish whether they conformed to the points of
view of men judges—behaving as tokens—or presented extreme voting conduct—behaving as outsiders.1210
The voting record of 14 women judges sitting on 14 different high courts on cases concerning women
issues, criminal cases, and economic liberties were analyzed.1211 The study found that in all three areas,
women judges presented extreme voting habits, as they were very liberal in the first policy area, and either
very liberal or conservative in the other two.1212 Later on, the authors expanded their research and published
another article in which they studied the behavior of 24 women justices in 21 states.1213 This study arrived
at similar conclusions: "Women justices tend to: (1) act as the most pro-women member of the court on
issues of immediate concern to women, (2) occupy positions at the extreme liberal and conservative ends,
and (3) tend to engage in both extreme and isolated dissenting behavior in criminal and economic cases.”1214
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In 1993, Sue Davis et al. presented a study in which they analyzed gender differences in judicial
decision-making in the U.S. courts of appeals.1215 The study tracked judges’ voting in three areas of interest:
Employment discrimination, criminal procedural rights, and obscenity from 1981 to 1990.1216 The research
found that in employment discrimination cases, women voted for plaintiffs 63% of the time. In comparison,
men did so in only 46% of cases. In search and seizure cases “women judges were more likely than their
male colleagues to support the claims of criminal defendants.”1217 Finally, in obscenity cases, no significant
gender differences were found.1218 A year later, the same authors published another study in the same
area.1219 They concluded that judges' gender did not seem to make a difference in how they approached
search and seizure or obscenity cases. However, gender had a significant in cases of employment
discrimination: “The probability that a male judge will cast a liberal vote is 38% while the estimated
probability of a liberal vote by a female judge is 75%. Thus, the impact of gender appears to be quite
substantial.”1220
In 2000, Phyllis Coontz published a study in which she analyzed the influence of the judge and the
litigant’s gender on case outcomes.1221 The research was conducted using a survey containing hypothetical
cases, which was completed by a sample of 195 state trial judges in Pennsylvania.1222 After evaluating the
results, the study found that the characteristics of the litigants in the hypothetical cases did not seem to
influence judges' decisions. However, it concluded that men and women judges showed differences in how
they decided the cases. In nearly half of the decisions, statistically significant differences arose between
men and women judges.1223
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That same year, Linda Maule published a paper in which she assessed the impact of the gender
composition of the Minnesota State Supreme Court, which was the first high court in the country where
women hold the majority of seats.1224 The study, which considered about 1250 opinions 1985 to 1994,
concluded that in that particular court: “the female justices were more willing to dissent once more females
were appointed. Furthermore, the female justices, despite holding different political orientations, evidenced
a higher level of agreement (even more so than the court generally) when deciding family law cases.”1225
In 2004, Sarah Westergren published a study on the effects of gender on case outcomes at the
federal appellate level.1226 The research aimed to find gender differences in how judges decided a sample
of sex discrimination cases between 1994 and 2000. The study found that there was no statistically
significant difference in how men and women judges voted on sex discrimination cases. However, the
political affiliation of the judged seems to have a more substantial statistical impact.1227
In 2005, Jennifer Peresie published an article about her research on the impact of gender in judicial
decision-making in the federal appellate courts.1228 Her research was based on the analysis of all federal
courts of appeals' decisions on Title VII disputes concerning sexual harassment and sex discrimination from
the years 1999 to 2001. 54 women and 273 men judges were included in the study. Her research found that
plaintiffs lost in about 75% of sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases. Nevertheless, the presence
of a woman judge in the decision panel seemed the increase the likelihood of a victory for the plaintiff.
Although women were part of the panels in 38% of cases in which the plaintiff lost, they were also present
in 62% of panels in cases in which the plaintiff won.1229 The study also found that both gender and political
ideology seemed to play a significant role in how judges voted on cases: “Female judges ruled for plaintiffs
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more often that did male judges, and judges appointed by Democratic presidents found for plaintiffs more
often than did Republican appointees.”1230 In addition to personal effects, the study also found that the
presence of women judges seemed to have panel effects. The addition of a woman judge to a panel increased
from 16% to 35% the chances that men judges would favor the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case and
increased from 11% to 30% the likelihood that men judges would do the same in sex discrimination cases.
This panel effect was similar among liberal and conservative men judges.1231
In 2010, Christina Boyd et al. published a paper in which they measured the effects of sex in judging
both at the individual and panel levels by using a matching methodology of judges and assessing the
differences in 13 different areas of the law.1232 The results of the study showed that, at the individual level,
in most areas of the law, men and women judges tend to arrive at similar decisions, with one exception:
"Female and male judges differ significantly in their treatment of Title VII sex discrimination suits. On
average, the probability of female judges voting in favor of the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case is
around 0.10 higher than it is for male judges.”1233 The same was valid in the case of panel effects, in which
judges' gender differences seem to play a significant role in sex-discrimination disputes, as: "The likelihood
of a male judge ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14% when a female sits on the panel.”1234
That same year, Paul Collins et al. published a study in which they tested the critical mass theory
on the U.S. district court judges.1235 Their research "analyzes final case rulings in 38,639 cases handed down
by 1,310 judges over a 24-year span, from 1977 to 2000.”1236 They found that, in some instances—such as
criminal law and civil rights cases, women do present a different behavior when the city in which the district
court is located has attained a critical mass of women judges.1237
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Finally, a year later, Pat Chew published a meta-study in which she synthesized the previous
empirical research on the effects of gender on case outcomes in employment discrimination cases.1238 After
reviewing the existing literature, the author concluded that:

First, considerable evidence supports the hypothesis that the gender of the judge does make a
difference in sex discrimination cases. Female judges are more likely than male judges to hold for
the plaintiffs, and a mixed-gender appellate panel is more likely to hold for the plaintiff, suggesting
that female judges do influence male judges in their decision making. Second, in studies of
employment discrimination cases in general (studies that include a range of discrimination claims,
including sex discrimination), the pattern of gender differences is also the consensus. It may be,
however, that the sex discrimination cases in those studies drive this result. A third pattern supports
this possibility: in the few studies with employment discrimination cases that were not genderrelated, including race discrimination and racial harassment cases, the gender of the judge did not
appear to make a difference. In other words, male judges were as likely as female judges to hold for
the plaintiffs. No evidence of a significant difference in their decision-making patterns surfaced.1239

2.3. Studies concerning the influence of both race and gender on judicial decision-making

In 1983, Jon Gottschall published a paper in which he examined judicial decisions from July 1st,
1979 to June 30, 1980, of the U.S. courts of appeals. The study looked at decisions on issues of criminal
procedure, sex discrimination against women, and race discrimination against minorities, after these courts
had just received a significant number of women and minority judges appointed by President Carter.1240
The study found that Carter's white-women judges tended to be more liberal than white-men judges. They
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favored plaintiffs on sex discrimination cases in 66% of the cases and preferred plaintiffs in race
discrimination cases in 64% of the cases, in comparison to white men who sided with plaintiffs in 57% and
59% of cases, respectively. No difference in terms of gender was found regarding criminal cases.1241 On
the impact of race, the study found that Carter’s black men judges tended to side with the plaintiff in 79%
of criminal cases, by comparison to 53% of Carter’s white men judges. Black men judges also supported
sex discrimination plaintiffs in a higher percentage (65%) that white men judges. However, they did not
support race discrimination plaintiffs in a higher percentage (57%) than white men judges (59%).1242
Two years later, Thomas Walker & Deborah Barrow published a study in which they examined the
impact of Carter’s non-traditional judges on the federal judicial decision-making.1243 The authors used a
pairing methodology to study women and minority district court judges’ decisions in different areas of the
law. According to their research, men judges supported personal rights claims 55% of the time, while
women judges did so 37% of the time.1244 Racial comparisons were inconclusive in this regard, as
differences were not statistically significant.1245 In the criminal law context, women judges favored
defendants 44% of the time, compared to men judges who favored them 51% of the time. Racial differences
were, again, insignificant. However, in both cases, the authors warned that these findings might be the result
of chance.1246 In the field of economic regulation, women judges supported federal economic regulation
73% of the time, while men judges did so only 53% of the time. Racial differences were also negligible.1247
In areas of particular interest for women, women judges and men judges did not show significant
differences.1248 In areas of particular interest for minorities, men judges sided with minorities 69% of the
time, while women judges did so only 48% of the time. Both in areas of particular interest to blacks as of
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particular interest to non-black minorities: “Black judges supported the minority position at only a
marginally higher rate than did the white judges.”1249
Almost a decade later, Jennifer Segal published a study on the decision making of President
Clinton's non-traditional judges.1250 The research was conducted by pairing up a group of 24 judges of
different race and gender and analyzing: “Decisions published in the Federal Supplement through July
1996,”1251 pertaining a variety of areas. The research found that black judges supported claims involving
the interests of black claimants or black communities in about 50% of the cases, by contrast to white judges
who only supported such claims in about 10% of the cases. A similar trend was found in cases involving
women's interests, which black judges supported in 9 out of 15 cases, by comparison to white judges, who
only did so in 5 of 14 cases. In other areas such as criminal rights, state economic regulation, and individual
liberties, no differences were found. In the case of women judges, 50% of the decisions they wrote were
supportive of the interests of minorities, by comparison to decision authored by men, which supported
minorities in less than one-third of the cases. No differences were found involving women judges deciding
cases involving women's issues.1252 The authors concluded: “Our analysis of policymaking by the race of
the judge consistently revealed no substantial differences between white and black jurists,"1253 unlike in the
case of women, which in specific policy areas, did present significant differences from their male
counterparts.
In 1998, Gregory Sisk et al. published a paper in which they used the Sentencing Guideline Crisis
of 1988 to explore how the facts of the case, in conjunction with other variables, influence judicial reasoning
and decision-making.1254 Their research analyzed district court judges' decisions regarding the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines of 1988 and tried to identify differences in judges' decisions
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based on a group of variables, which included race and sex. The researchers found that the gender of the
judge had minimal effect on how they decided cases involving the constitutionality of the guidelines:
"Although female judges rejected the constitutionality of the Guidelines at a slightly greater rate than male
judges (64% versus 61%), this difference was not statistically significant."1255 A similar finding took place
regarding the race variable: "Although minority judges invalidated the Guidelines by a larger percentage
than white judges (71% versus 60%), this difference was not statistically significant."1256 Notwithstanding,
the study found a significant difference when the particular rationale of violation of due process–the denial
of the defendant’s right to have an independent judge to dictate an individual sentence–was used to argue
against the unconstitutionality of the law. In these cases, minority judges invalidated the guidelines in 90%
of the cases, as compared to all the judges, who only ruled them invalid in only 58% of the cases.1257
A year later, Nancy Crowe presented her doctoral dissertation in which she tried to assess the effects
that gender has on judicial politics.1258 Her research used a database containing all non-unanimous decisions
taken by U.S. courts of appeals on employment discrimination cases, both based on race and gender from
the years 1981 to 1996. Although her analysis was focus on issues of gender, she also included race as a
variable. The study describes that, overall, judges favored employment sex discrimination plaintiffs in 48%
of their votes. Women judges voted for plaintiffs on 69% of the time, and men judges 46% of the time.
African American judges favored plaintiffs with 85% of their votes, by contrast to white judges, who gave
them 45% of their votes.1259 Regarding employment race discrimination cases, Crowe's study describes that
judges voted for plaintiffs 45% of the time, with African American judges voting for plaintiffs in 90% of
the times, compared to White judges' 41%. By contrast, gender did not seem to make a difference, as men
judges voted for plaintiffs 45% of the time vs. 48% of women judges.1260 These results seemed to suggest
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that although African American judges were, in general, more supportive of sex discrimination plaintiffs
than white judges, women judges were not significantly more supportive of race discrimination plaintiffs
than men judges.1261 Finally, Crowe also analyzed whether the composition of the decision panel influenced
how the judges that compose that panel vote. The study suggested that white men are more likely to vote
for race discrimination plaintiffs when they sit on a panel composed exclusively of white males, as
compared to panels including African American judges.1262
In 2000, Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle published a study in which they assessed the effects of race,
gender, and political affiliation on Michigan Supreme Court's non-unanimous decisions on discrimination,
divorce, and feminist issues from 1985 to 1998.1263 The authors found marked influences of gender on how
divorce cases were decided. Likewise, they concluded: “African American Democratic justices were the
most liberal in two out of three issue areas examined.”1264 Nevertheless, they determined that political
affiliation was the characteristic that had the most relevance on judges’ voting in that specific court.
That same year Jennifer Segal published a study assessing the representative effect of Clinton’s
first term appointees to the U.S. district courts.1265 The research paired up a group of 39 judges that differed
from each other in terms of race or gender and comparing the judges' rulings on a variety of issues from
1994 to 1999. The study found that "for all intents and purposes, black judges are not significantly different
from their white counterparts in their support of a variety of issues before their benches. Most notable is
the absence of any race differences for black issues; black judges are clearly no more supportive of black
claims than white judges.”1266 Regarding gender, Segal's study found that even though men and women
judges presented differences in their treatment of cases involving women's issues, it was men who were
more supportive of women's interests. Hence, the study concluded that "President Clinton's black and
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female district court appointees are no more likely to serve the policy interests of their own communities
than are his white and male appointees."1267
In 2003, Carol Kulik et al. published a study on the influence of judges' characteristics on sex
discrimination cases' outcomes.1268 The authors used a database of 143 sex discrimination cases heard by
U.S. courts between 1981 and 1996. Although the authors found that characteristics such as age and political
affiliation played a significant role in how judges decided cases, they did not find evidence that either
gender or race had a sensitive impact on case outcomes. However, they warned that their “inability to find
differences based on gender and/or race may be a function of low statistical power with respect to these
variables.”1269
One year later, Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro published a study regarding the influence of
women and minority judges on federal three-judge panels’ decisions on especially sensitive issues from the
perspective of race and gender.1270 Their research, which used “a random sample of 400 published federal
Court of Appeals employment discrimination cases decided in 1998 and 2000,”1271 concluded that men
judges are more likely to vote for the plaintiff when there is a woman in the panel of judges deciding over
the case by about 19 percentage points. Regarding race, the differences in judges' decisions were not
statistically significant.1272
In 2005, Max Schanzenbach published a paper on the effects on race, gender, and political
affiliation in prison sentences at the district level.1273 His research, which was based on the data collected
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, concluded that “there is little impact on average sentences from having
a greater proportion of female, Democratic, or black judges.”1274 Nevertheless, the article also concluded
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that the proportion of women judges in the district seems to be in direct correlation with the length of
women’s prison sentences, as “the greater the proportion of female judges on the district's bench, the longer
the sentences received by female offenders,”1275 and also found that “having more black judges on the bench
results in lighter sentences for women and Hispanics.”1276
In 2008, Todd Collins & Laura Moyer published a study in which they evaluated the effects of
intersectional identities in judging, by using minority women judges as an example, instead of focusing
solely on the judge’s gender or race.1277 The study analyzed criminal cases decided by the U.S. courts of
appeals between the years 1977 and 2001 and found that judges who were minority women tended to
support the defendant's claims more often than those who were Caucasian men, Caucasian women, or
minority men,1278 as “female-minority judges were approximately between 6 to 10 percent more likely to
support a liberal outcome than males or Caucasian females.”1279

2.4. Non-US studies concerning the effects of ethnicity on judicial decision-making

Up to this point, the empirical studies we have referenced inquired for race or gender differences
in judging in the United States of America. However, in Israel, there have also been efforts to assess the
impact of identity on judicial decision-making. In this respect, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan SulitzeanuKenan published a study about the effects of ethnic identities on judicial decision making in Israel.1280 In
their study, they compared Jewish and Arab judges' decisions in first bail hearings of Arab and Jewish
suspects.1281 Their results showed that the judges in the study had in-group preferences for suspects of their
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same ethnic background: "Arab suspects are 6.3 percent more likely than Jewish suspects to be released by
an Arab judge, while Jewish suspects are 10.4 percent more likely than Arab suspects to be released by a
Jewish judge."1282 However, they found no differences in judges' authorized length of detention based on
ethnic identity.1283
Likewise, Guy Grossman et al. published a study regarding the panel effects of ethnicity in criminal
cases in Israel.1284 The study, which looked at criminal cases decided by appellate courts between 2007 and
2011, found that panel composition (all Jewish or mixed Jewish-Arab) did not seem to have an impact on
the type and severity of the punishment for Jewish defendants. However, panel composition did affect the
case of Arab defendants, which were 14% to 20% less likely to be incarcerated and had sentences 15% to
26% shorter when mixed ethnic panels decided they cases than when they faced all-Jewish panels.1285

2.5. Preliminary conclusions

Regarding the existing empirical evidence concerning the impact of judges’ race and gender on
judicial decision-making, it is possible to reach the following conclusions: 1) Political science research on
judicial behavioralism has been the object of critiques from both political scientists and legal scholars, due
to methodological limitations and the focus that some studies adopted for assessing understand the effects
of identity on adjudication; 2) there is no consensus on how influential the judges’ race and gender may be
in the context of judicial decision-making, as empirical evidence is still–in many ways–inconclusive; 3) it
seems that in certain areas that are particular sensitive from a gender or race perspective (e.g. sexual and
racial harassment in the workplace, sex discrimination, and affirmative action policies), the gender and race
of the judge could play a significant role in the outcome of the cases; 4) certain studies concerning the
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impact of judges’ race and gender appear to contradict the idea that minorities and women are–in general–
more liberal in their decision-making than white men, as some studies found that minority judges and
women judges voted in a more conservative fashion than white or men judges; 5) the potential effects of
gender and race in judging may not be restricted to the individual votes or decisions of women and minority
judges, as some studies found that the presence of women or minority judges could have the potential to
influence the votes of other (traditional) judges sitting in the decision-panel, in situations of collegiate
judicial decision-making; 6) some studies also found that the effects of judges’ identity in judicial decisionmaking tended to be stronger in situations in which there was a critical mass of non-traditional judges in a
particular court or jurisdiction; 7) a portion of the studies found that different types of minorities (e.g.
African Americans v. Hispanics) may have different patterns of judicial decision-making; 8) some studies
also found that the impact of race or gender on judging may differ vis-à-vis the gender or the race of the
litigants; 9) there are studies that have found evidence of different judicial decision-making on the basis of
the judges’ ethnicity outside of the U.S. context.
As I stated at the beginning of this section, although there is no hard evidence concerning the
impacts of Afro-descendant representation on Colombian courts on case outcomes, there is anecdotal
evidence suggesting that the ethno-racial identity of the judge might play a meaningful role in the judicial
decision-making process. Since engaging in a more detailed discussion about this topic would exceed the
purposes of this dissertation, I consider that future studies, ideally in the field of political science, should
conduct an empirical analysis to test this hypothesis.
In the next section, I will discuss the issue of racial discrimination in the Colombian justice system
and whether a higher representation in this country's courts might help to tackle this problem.

3. Racial discrimination in the Colombian justice system

In this section, I will examine the potential of Afro-descendant representation in judicial institutions
to counter situations of bias and discrimination in the Latin American judicial systems. In previous sections
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of the manuscript, I discussed situations of racial discrimination affecting judicial servers. I will now focus
on discrimination against attorneys and the general public when they interact with judicial institutions and
their representatives.
A particular aspect of the law’s role in the construction of racial stratification in Latin America is
how the justice system has been used for preserving racial inequality. Significant evidence to support this
claim can be found in Brazil. In this country, there have been several studies about the judicial system
institutions' treatment of race that have found that public institutions, including the judiciary, have
historically treated Afro-descendants, the poor, and other unprivileged groups unfairly.1286
Likewise, participants in the qualitative study were outspoken about experiences of discrimination
that they lived or witnessed in the Colombian justice system. One of the participants remarked: “I have
witnessed the judicial treatment towards Afro Colombians, and it is not the same that a white or mestizo
person receives in our society.”1287 Other participants complained about the treatment that Afrodescendants and poor people receive by the justice system. These groups often face unjustified delays in
their procedures, are treated disadvantageously by judicial servers, or have to endure different forms of
subtle discrimination.1288 As a participant declared, these forms of discrimination come from all the sides
present in the courtrooms: Judges, judicial employees, attorneys, the parties, and state institutions alike.1289
However, the perception of discrimination in judicial institutions tends to be more acute in geographical
areas in which Afro-descendants are a minority.1290
In the case of the criminal justice system, some participants shared their perception of the high (and
perhaps excessive) number of incarcerated Afro-descendants. They also sustained that, on occasion, law
enforcement personnel and judicial authorities use stereotypes in the fulfillment of their duties.1291 An Afro-
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descendant woman judicial employee even affirmed that a prosecutor actively acknowledged to her that
when he was assigned cases in which the defendant was black, he was particularly severe, given his dislike
of Afro-descendants. According to the participant, this revelation occurred because the prosecutor did not
see the participant as an Afro-descendant, given her light-skin color.1292 This participant also recalled that,
when working as an attorney with family members of forcibly disappeared Afro-descendant persons, it was
not uncommon that the district attorney's office would refuse to investigate these cases. Prosecutors
believed that the victims were not missing, but rather "partying out" somewhere.1293 Likewise, the
participant suggested that Afro-descendant defendants appear to be treated more ruthlessly by the criminal
justice system, for example, by being subjected to pre-trial detention for even minor offenses.1294
During my direct observation exercises, I had the opportunity to witness a situation that, in many
ways, corresponds to similar forms of discrimination in the criminal justice system that participants
reported. While I was visiting the courthouses in the city of Medellín, I ran into a black young man that was
surrounded by a group of mestizo penitentiary officers in one of the judicial complex's corridors. The
prisoner was handcuffed and was holding a transparent plastic bag with some food items inside. Since
criminal hearings in Colombia are, as a general rule, public, I decided to stay and observe the hearing.
While I was waiting for the custodial officer to allow the public in, I saw that there was a group of people,
a majority of whom were black women, waiting outside of the courtroom. From their interactions, I could
tell they were the romantic partners of the men that were facing trial. A few minutes after, two groups of
prisoners—one of 5 and another of 6 detainees—arrived in the courtroom handcuffed to each other. None
of the 12 defendants appeared to have reached the age of 25. 11 of them were black men, one was a black
woman, and the remaining one was a mestizo man (I made this assessment based on their skin color). A
moment later, the custodial officer (a mestizo man) showed up. With a loud and unfriendly voice, he warned
the four black women waiting to enter the courtroom that they had to turn off our cellphones and seat still,
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and that if they were loud during the hearing, he would remove them from the courtroom: "You have to
behave well"—the custodial officed said.
Although the courtroom was large and all the benches were empty, the custodial officer ordered
the black women (and me) to sit in the back of the room, as far away as possible from detainees, leaving a
significant distance between the detainees and us empty. Minutes after, the judge presiding over the case
arrived. she was a light-skinned mestizo woman with dyed blond hair. I took a look around, and all the
people present in the courtroom at that moment (the judge, the police officers, the judicial employees) were
either white or mestizo. The exceptions were the prisoners, their families, and me.
Later on, I learned that the prisoners were on trial for the crime of aggravated robbery (hurto
calificado y agravado) and conspiracy to commit a crime (concierto para delinquir). All of the detainees
had a public defender arguing for them, except for one that had a private attorney. When the counselors for
the defense had to identify themselves and introduced their clients, they read out their client names out of
the case file. They did not know any of them out of memory, perhaps because of the high number of cases
that public defendants have assigned. When it was the turn of the detainees to identify themselves, many of
them did not seem to be able to remember their addresses, which prompted their family members to pass
small pieces of paper on to them with the addresses written on them. From the addresses and neighborhoods
that they provided, I could tell (as I had anticipated) that all of them came from some of the poorest
neighborhoods in the city of Medellin, such "El Popular,” “Moravia,” and “Parte Alta de Robledo.”
Sometime later, the victims of the alleged crime arrived at the courthouse, all of which were white and
mestizo.
A few minutes after the hearing began, the prosecutor and defense attorneys announced to the judge
the defendants’ intention to accept charges so they could receive a reduction of their sentence. This practice
is allowed under Colombian law. This situation reminded me that a few moments before the hearing began,
I saw the prosecutor and the defense attorneys meeting in the courtroom located across the hall, apparently
discussing the case. Since the judge accepted the motion, the hearing lasted for no more than 15 minutes in
total.
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I consider that this hearing exemplifies many forms of discrimination and inequality that
participants in the study mentioned during the interview process: The lack an adequate defense of poor
Afro-descendant detainees, the incentives for criminal defendants to plead guilty in exchange of sentence
reduction, and the many forms of subtle discrimination that detainees' loved-ones face in the criminal justice
system (like having to sit in the back of the room).
Moreover, the narratives of the study participants and my own experiences in the courthouse in
Medellin seem to parallel the existing literature concerning the treatment of Afro-descendants by the
criminal justice systems in Latin America. This evidence is, sometimes, historical. Sueann Caulfield studied
the role that race played in the judicial decisions on sex-crime cases brought before the courts of Rio de
Janeiro during the first part of the 20th Century.1295 In her study, Caulfield found evidence suggesting that
color played a significant role in the decisions that judges made on sex-crime cases. The author mentions
that: “When both the victim and defendant were in the same category, there was no discernible difference
in rates of indictment or conviction for black, pardo, or white men. However, indictment and conviction
were less likely if the woman was darker than the man and more likely if she was lighter.”1296
More recently, Sérgio Adorno conducted a study on race discrimination in the criminal justice
system of the state of Sao Paulo.1297 His research concluded that there is no significant difference in the
potential for violent crime among blacks and whites in Brazil. However, the criminal justice system tended
to give black defendants a severer treatment, which manifested in aspects such as a higher persecution rate,
more considerable obstacles to access the criminal justice system, and more difficulties in exercising their
right to an adequate defense.1298 The author concludes that in this country, "color is a powerful instrument
of discrimination in the distribution of justice."1299 Similarly, Peter Fry points out that, in certain Brazilian
states, such as Sao Paulo, Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately present in prisons, are significantly more
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likely to be killed by police than whites, and are, in general, more affected by the criminal justice system.1300
Likewise, after examining data from 1988, Michael Mitchell & Charles Wood concluded that in Brazil,
black men were more likely than other men to be the objects of physical assault and suffering police
aggression.1301
However, the evidence on this topic does not stop in Brazil. In the case of Ecuador, Carlos De La
Torre argues that black people are commonly racialized as criminals. A stereotype often used to justify
police violence. De La Torre mentions different cases of police brutality against black individuals in
Ecuador. He sustains that, despite being reported and made public, nobody has been held accountable for
these actions.1302 Likewise, Rita Segato asserts that, in general, it is difficult to discuss the racial dimension
of the criminal justice system in Latin American academic forums because:

Trying to enunciate what one sees when entering prison, make reference to the face of the
incarcerated people, is not easy because it hurts the sensibility of various hegemonic actors: of the
traditional and academic left, as it requires to give bone and flesh to the mathematics of class,
introducing color, culture, ethnicity and, in sum, difference; it hurts the sociologic sensibility
because the numbers on that topic are scarce and very difficult to precise with objectivity due to the
complexities of racial classification; and it hurts the sensibility of the law operators and the forces
of legality because it suggests institutional racism.1303

Notwithstanding the difficulties of obtaining reliable data on the racial breakdown of inmates,
Segato indicates that the available information suggests that indigenous and Afro-descendant persons are
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more often the object of criminalization policies and face worse detention conditions than other population
groups in the region’s prisons.1304
Additionally, language discrimination is particularly concerning in criminal cases. There were
some accounts of defendants who did not speak Spanish and, due to the judge's lack of native language
proficiency and the absence of translators, could not fully understand what has happened in the courtroom
while they were on trial.1305 As I explained in chapter 3, language discrimination was an issue in areas in
which Afro-descendant populations speak a language other than Spanish, as some judicial servers who are
proficient in the native languages often reject non-Spanish communication.1306 While most language
discrimination cases that I have mentioned so far involved Raizal persons, this is not the only Afrodescendant group that does not have Spanish as their first language. Other groups, such as the Palenqueros,
are also language minorities and, therefore, also have language barriers when they interact with the
majoritarian justice system, including the criminal justice system.1307
As it has been registered in the existing academic literature, some participants pointed out that
racial discrimination cases were challenging to litigate. Judicial servers often believed that the injuries
caused to the victims were unimportant, and that the discrimination event was the mere result of the victim's
perception or could be attributed to oversensitivity of the claimant. These assumptions disregard the moral
and psychological harms that discrimination can produce on people.1308 A participant also referred to the
lack of racial fluency among judicial servers, and their overall rejection to investigate situations of
discrimination related to their work.1309
Although some situations of discrimination had their origin in the judicial servers' explicit biases,
others appeared to be the result of a lack of cultural competency on Afro-descendant issues and, particularly,
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cultural traditions of certain Afro-descendant ethnic groups.1310 Also, some situations of discrimination
seem to have been the result of the overlapping of race and class forms of oppression.1311 An Afrodescendant attorney mentioned that in certain cities the lack of competent legal counsel prevents poor
people from presenting criminal complaints when they were the victims of certain types of crimes since
they are often undermined by bureaucratic employees who use filters to decide on the merits of the case
without legally having such authority.1312
The limited or restrictive interpretation of anti-racist legislation and the lack of knowledge about
racial discrimination in Latin America has frustrated litigation efforts to address this issue in many
countries. Seth Racusen mentions that, in the case of Brazil, it is common for courts to dismiss
discrimination cases when the person accused of engaging in racial discrimination claims to be mixed-race,
as judges tend to see this as evidence of lack of racial prejudice.1313 Comparable situations happen in other
Latin American countries, such as Perú, where the law allows employers accused of engaging in acts of
racial discrimination to argue as a defense that the discrimination act was “objective and reasonable”.1314
Similarly, Antonio Guimarães writes about how laws enacted to punish acts of race discrimination are
difficult to enforce in Brazil. The text of these statutes is not sufficiently clear and tries to specifically target
overt acts of race discrimination, which are not the most common way in which racial prejudice manifests
in this country. Besides, when judges interpret the law and apply it to cases, they tend to quickly assume
that those accused of racism did not act with the intent to discriminate based on race and often narrow down
the scope of anti-discrimination laws.1315
My perception is that Afro-descendant representation might have some potential to improve the
levels of racial discrimination and prejudice in the justice system. This might not be the effect of the "more
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empathic nature" of Afro-descendant judges and judicial employees, their alleged greater awareness of how
racism and race discrimination operates in the court system, or any other quasi-essentialist argument that
portraits Afro-descendants as less biased. Instead, this effect might come from their presence inside judicial
institutions and its potential influence in helping to dismantle the multiple negative stereotypes held against
black people (their dangerousness, intellectual inferiority, and proclivity to crime). I do not necessarily
believe that a more significant Afro-descendant presence on Latin American courts will change case
outcomes (this effect might be contingent on other aspects besides the ethno-racial identity of judicial
servers). However, ethno-racial integration could change the perceptions and imaginaries present inside
judicial institutions and, through them, lessen the role of judicial institutions in the preservation of racial
subordination.
In the next section, I will briefly present the dissertation's general conclusion, discuss the study
limitations and introduce some recommendations for researchers, judicial institutions, judges and
magistrates, and the black social movement.
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VI.

Conclusions, limitations, and recommendations

In this last section, I will introduce the study’s conclusions, limitations, and recommendations.

1. Conclusions

The main conclusion arising from this dissertation is that Afro-descendants are, in general,
underrepresented on high and intermediate courts in Colombia. Afro-descendants are absent from the
Constitutional Court’s group of magistrates and, seemingly, from its group of judicial employees. Afrodescendants appear to be only a few among the magistrates and judicial employees of the Supreme Court
of Justice, the State Council, and the Superior Council of the Judicature. This ethno-racial group might
account for between approximately 2% and 4% of intermediate tribunals magistrates and judicial
employees; and might be underrepresented even among the group of lower court judges, except in certain
areas. Similarly, indigenous persons appear to be virtually absent from the Colombian judiciary. In the case
of women, even though they are a majority of judicial servers, they also experience a crystal sealing.
Women enjoy significant representation among the lower levels of the judicial pyramid, but limited
representation in its upper layers.
The SJP seems to be an exception to the general rule of Afro-descendant and indigenous
underrepresentation in judicial institutions since in this tribunal the level of Afro-descendant representation
among magistrates resembles their share of the national population—as reported in the 2005 Colombian
national census. The level of indigenous representation in the group of magistrates surpasses their
percentage in the national population. Likewise, women in the SJP account for half of the magistrates on
this court. A significant level of Afro-descendant and women representation also appears to exist among
this court’s judicial employees.
Geographic location plays a significant role in explaining Afro-descendant underrepresentation in
judicial institutions in Colombia. Certain regions appear to follow the general rule of minimal representation
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(i.e., Medellin, Cartagena, Tumaco, Buenaventura, and Cali). In contrast, some places seem to be exceptions
to such rule (i.e., Quibdó and San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina). Several conditions seem to
explain the uneven distribution of the Afro-descendant representation among the country's courts. Regional
demographic differences, the institutional dependency of peripherical regions on central regions of the
country, stiff regional disparities in access to services and the effects of structural discrimination, the
conflation of regional and racial identities and stereotypes, the lack of ethno-racial self-identification among
the Afro-descendant population in some regions (Cartagena), the presence of social mobilization calling for
increased black presence in judicial institutions in some areas, and the pervasiveness of racial stereotypes
are some of these conditions.
Likewise, there appear to be several factors contributing to the underrepresentation of Afrodescendants on Colombia's courts and the stratification of judicial institutions, including the statistical
invisibility of the Afro-descendant population in the country’s databases; the overlapping of race and class
subordination; the lack of Afro-descendants’ access to good quality education and, particularly, higher
education; the interaction of race and gender forms of oppression; the influence of race, color, and identity
on the representation assessment; the negative disparate impacts that some judicial selection mechanisms
cause on Afro-descendants; the ubiquity of different forms of racial discrimination and bias in judicial
institutions and the legal profession. Moreover, courts and judicial servers seem to have competing
narratives regarding the importance of race in the composition of judicial institutions, ranging from the lack
of acknowledgment of racial differences to the recognition of issues of racial discrimination in judicial
institutions.
Finally, from a policy perspective, several types of rationales for asserting the need for women and
minorities' representation in judicial institutions have been identified in the U.S. academic literature on this
topic (role model rationales, altered or improved decision-making rationales, and fairness and legitimacy
rationales). The study participants appeared to elicit similar foundations in favor of increased Afrodescendant representation on Colombia’s courts. They also introduced other rationales that have not had a
prominent role in U.S. scholarly works (equality in access to resources).
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Concerning the impact of race and gender on judicial decision-making, there has been a significant
number of empirical studies on this issue. Although most of the evidence on this matter continues to be
inconclusive, in some instances of a particular gender or racial salience, some studies suggest that the race
and gender of the judge might play a significant role in the decision of cases. In the case of Colombia, some
participants argued that, in some areas of the law, the ethno-racial identity of the judge might play an
important role in judicial decision-making.
Likewise, participants described several instances in which attorneys and citizens experienced
situations of discrimination in their interactions with judicial personnel, which leads to the question of
whether improved Afro-descendant representation on courts also might help to prevent or to address racism
in the justice system.

2. Study limitations

Perhaps the most visible limitation of this study were challenges arising from of having to begin
the research within a vacuum in social sciences’ literature regarding the ethno-racial composition of Latin
American judicial systems, the absence of systematic race statistics in Colombia, and the cultural taboo of
discussing racial discrimination in this region. Despite the different restrictions arising from these
conditions, I consider that my dissertation helps to narrow down a knowledge gap—at least at an
exploratory level—concerning the role of race in the composition of judicial institutions in Colombia, since
this topic has received minimal attention from the disciplines mentioned above.
Also, my study does not depart from a unified criterion to define who counts as an Afro-descendant
to assess representation in the judiciary. This aspect is, in part, the result of the fluidity of ethno-racial
identities in Latin America. The consequence of this limitation is that different identification criteria (selfidentification—hetero-identification) to establish Afro-descendants' presence on courts at different stages
of the research process. Although this is, of course, an important limitation, I addressed some of the
principal issues related to the multiple definitions of Afro-descendant identities and the methodologies used
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to inquire about them. I also analyzed the participants' narratives around race and identity in the different
stages of the project, therefore providing nuance and critique to the data gathered throughout the project’s
development. I consider that the lack of precise definitions of racial categories is not a significant barrier to
the research project because, given the statistical extremity of low Afro descendant presence, the added
nuance of precise definitions would not alter the conclusions. Finally, as I explained in chapter 1 of this
project, despite the fluidity of Afro-descendant identities in this region, I consider that it is possible to rely
on the social and cultural meanings attached to these identities for understanding issues of discrimination,
exclusion, and inequality. In the end, ethno-racial identities are cultural constructs that enjoy a shared social
meaning.
Another limitation is the scarcity of the data on the ethno-racial composition of the lower courts. I
could not obtain data from the courts themselves in this level of the judiciary nor integrate into the study
the perspectives of the judiciary’s administrators (The Superior Council of the Judicature) and Afrodescendant organizations. In both cases, this was a consequence of time and access limitations. I contacted
persons inside these spaces and ask them to participate. Nevertheless, they did not provide final responses
to my petitions.
Likewise, the focus on Afro-descendant narratives and perspectives, although it was an outcome of
the study design, does entail certain limitations. Such a focus does not fully encompass the perspectives of
other ethno-racial groups that might have unique views on this debate and whose appraisals on this issue
might be different.
Similarly, I would have liked to delve into the particularities of the role that color plays in the
stratification of the Colombian judicial system. I consider that studying whether color differences determine
which Afro-descendants attain access to judicial positions would have been relevant for this research. It
could be, for example, that skin color plays an essential role in the hierarchization of minority judges and
judicial employees within the judicial pyramid. Further research efforts such inquire about this aspect.
Finally, two additional study limitations are the amount of time dedicated to the fieldwork
component of this research, which was completed in approximately three months, and the lack of a historical
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perspective of this project. Concerning the fieldwork duration, this was, to a great extent, a consequence of
financial restrictions, and, even though time was certainly limited, it did allow me to gather a significant
amount of data to achieve the project's objectives. With respect to the lack of a historical perspective, it
would have been essential to explore how levels of representation of women, Afro-descendants and
indigenous persons have varied through time since this would have added a desirable layer of complexity
to this research project. Nevertheless, the lack of available data and the scope of this project did not allow
me to engage in that adjacent conversation. This is especially true if one considers that, before this research
project, there was no data concerning the ethno-racial composition of the judicial system in Colombia.

3. Recommendations

The creation of empirical data on the ethno-racial composition of Colombia’s judicial institutions
and the racial dynamic within them is, perhaps, the most salient contribution of this dissertation. Based on
the study findings, I would like to recommend the following actions to researchers, judicial administrators,
judges, and magistrates, the Afro-descendant social movement, and universities and higher education
institutions.

3.1. To researchers

-To create databases concerning the composition of the judicial system and the legal profession that
are independent from judicial administrators’ databases.
-To further study the composition of the legal profession in terms of gender, race, ethnicity,
sexuality, class, and other factors in the region.
-To grant considerable attention to judicial politics in their research agendas and to conduct
additional qualitative and quantitative research on the composition of the judiciary and the effects of race
in judicial decision-making.
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-To evaluate and empirically assess the conditions identified in chapter 3 as potentially responsible
for the underrepresentation of Afro-descendants on Colombian courts.
-To research on the specific influence of color and color-based discrimination in the composition
of judicial institutions and the legal profession.
-To engage in historical analysis of the ethno-racial composition of Latin American judiciaries and
other state institutions.

3.2. To judicial administrators

-To address the statistical invisibility of Afro-descendants in the judicial system and judicial
institutions by collecting data on the ethno-racial composition of courts, the legal profession and the
communities they serve. An alternative for this would be to regularly conduct a judiciary census, like the
one undertaken in Brazil.
-To further assess and correct the disparate impacts that judicial selection mechanisms have on
Afro-descendants.
-To consider the use of affirmative action and other types of special measures for the judiciary.
-To create new judicial selection methods that are sensitive to race and ethnicity and that facilitate
the recruitment of minority candidates to different judicial positions.
-To incentivize universities to guarantee Afro-descendant access to high-quality legal education
and their recruitment by all sectors of the legal profession.
-To address situations of racial discrimination affecting judges, judicial employees, attorneys, and
private persons in judicial institutions and the legal profession, by studying these issues, enforcing existing
anti-discrimination and employment harassment laws, using their disciplinary powers, training judicial
personnel on implicit bias, creating racial justice campaigns, and any other appropriate means.
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3.3. To judges and magistrates

-To consider the gender and ethno-racial composition of the courts in hiring practices.
-To use free appointment and removal positions and provisional positions to increase the level of
representation that Afro-descendants and other marginalized groups have in judicial institutions, especially
in the upper layers of the judiciary.
-To address situations of racial discrimination that occur among their staff and during judicial
procedures over which they preside.
-To secure training for themselves and the judicial servers that they supervise on implicit bias,
Afro-descendant rights, and anti-discrimination practices.
-To incentivize fair access to high-quality legal education for Afro-descendants and indigenous
persons.

3.4. To the Afro-descendant social movement

-To include the issue of Afro-descendant underrepresentation on courts in their mobilization
agendas as a means to secure greater access of minority applicants to judicial positions.
-To require judicial institutions to address situations of racial discrimination and bias inside the
courts and affecting the judicial system's users, including discrimination based on language, color, and
micro-aggressions.
-To demand Afro-descendant statistical visibility in the justice sector.

3.5. To universities and legal education institutions

-To study and address situations of racial discrimination and bias inside higher education
institutions.
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-To incorporate Afro-descendant and ethnic perspectives into their research agendas and curricula.
-To provide adequate training for future lawyers on ethnic rights and anti-discrimination law and
policy.
-To create student recruitment policies that are sensitive to ethno-racial difference.
-To engage in actions to close down the gap in the access to higher education that affects Afrodescendants.1316

1316

TELLES, supra note 42 at 232. (Regarding public support for affirmative action programs, Edward Telles reported
that across different Latin American countries, there was widespread support for affirmative action policies to benefit
indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants. This support is especially true in the context of education, as "In all
countries studied in the PERLA project […] more than 80 percent of respondents supported affirmative action policies
for indigenous people and Afro-descendants in education.”).
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